Journal of a Cavalry Officer; Including the Memorable Sikh Campaign of 1845-1846

by W. W. W. Humbley

February the 8th. Sunday. Dined at half-past six, with my brother officers, at the mess of the 3rd Light Dragoons. They are encamped on our right, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile. As in the field, so at the mess-table, the Lieutenant-Colonel of this fine corps, Colonel White, C.B. (now aide-de-camp to the Queen), appeared to be beloved by his officers; indeed they have no small reason to be proud of one, so universally esteemed and respected by the cavalry division of the army of the Sutlej.

The battle was at hand: already were preparations making to meet those gallant men, the Sikhs, in mortal combat. On the evening of the 9th, Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, of the engineers, came into the camp, having been sent to the frontier at the recommendation of Sir Herbert Maddock, Deputy-Governor of Bengal. Troops had been detached from the army to meet the large convoy coming from Delhi, with ammunition and stores; for the operations against the enemy at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Aliwal, had exhausted the greater part of our gun ammunition. Indeed, as I have already observed, that on the 22nd of December, 1845, when Tej Singh came before Ferozeshah, the British had no shot left. The force under Brigadier Campbell, however, brought up 4,300,000 rounds of musket ball cartridges, and twelve 12-pounders, with shot and other missiles, otherwise my gallant friend, Sir Harry Smith, would not have had the means of fighting the splendid battle of Aliwal.

And now we come to the 10th of February, the day on which the memorable battle of Sobraon, the crowning battle of the Sikh campaign of 1845-46 was fought, and which most persons expected would be the last.

The fate of the Punjaub seemed to hang by a thread; from the 22nd of December, 1845, to the 28th of January, 1846, no military operations had occurred till Sir Harry Smith gained the battle of Aliwal. The Sikhs' strongly entrenched position at Sobraon still remained to be taken; defended as it was by 30,000 regular troops, besides being equally strong by nature and art. By nature, as situated on the banks of the river, in the form of a half moon, having many and great impediments in its front; by art, the triple form of the entrenchments, bristled with a triple row of guns, which must be silenced before an entrance could be effected; a bridge of boats in its rear, by which the besieged might retire if they chose; and, moreover, batteries commanding the rear of the flanks of the entrenchment, which enabled them to fire upon any troops attempting to storm the works: added to which, the men could come over the pontoon bridge to assist in serving the guns in the works; and this they actually did.

Major-General, Sir Harry Smith, after the battle of the 28th of January, in which he had lost 589 killed and wounded, joined His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, on the 8th of February. It was judged expedient to wait for his arrival before the attack on Sobraon could be safely made. Part of the siege train, too, had arrived, to ensure the safety of which, it may be recollected, was the principal object in detaching Sir Harry Smith.

A plan had been proposed by the late Brigadier E. Smith, C.B., Chief Engineer, but when the nature of the proposed attack was explained to Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, a senior officer, who had been sent by Sir T. Herbert Maddock, to join the army, which he had only reached on the 9th, the day before the battle, he is said to have taken a different view.

It is recorded, that in the year 1776, Sir W. Howe, in a despatch on the American entrenchments, wrote: "If I could have made approaches I could easily have taken the enemy's entrenchments."[27]

Whether Colonel Irvine proposed to make approaches I cannot say; certain it is, that it was agreed to follow the plan laid down by Brigadier Smith, Colonel Irvine being of opinion that it would be better to leave the conduct of the affair in the hands of the officer who had formed a digested plan. Had Brigadier Smith been superseded, a delay of two or three days at least must have ensued. Now, without knowing the exact cause for the delay, it is stated in the "Blue Book" that certain proposals had been made by the Lahore Durbar, or by some of the principal chiefs. Some say, that the celebrated Goolab Singh of Cashmere had made certain offers, to which an answer was required in three days. An officer of artillery remarked to the Commander-in-Chief, that the remainder of the supplies, stores, etc., from Delhi, would reach camp in two days. Lord Gough, in his Despatch of the 13th of February, says:—"Part of my siege train having come up with me, I resolved, on the morning of the 10th, to dispose our mortars and battering guns," etc.[28] This waiting of two days or more would have consumed more time than it was thought politically right to expend. We must remember that an answer was required in three days. Now, if Goolab Singh was the real proposer of these terms, it would seem that it could not answer to grant them. Perhaps he undertook to pay us the expenses of the war, to reduce the Sikh army, and to accept a British Resident at Lahore; these conditions, or something like them, must have been proposed.

Such offers could not have satisfied the government of India, because, when after the treaty of 1846, we took a slice of the Punjaub (Jullundur), and allowed the Sikh Durbar to keep up an army of 32,000 men, they raised more, either openly or covertly; hence, if they acted thus under our own eye, while holding the reins of government at Lahore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that they would follow up the plan in extenso in our absence, for a Resident would have been no adequate check.