The Story of the Zulu Campaign

by Waller Ashe; Edmund Verney Wyatt-Edgell

In spite of the rapidity of the raid, the necessary observations were made by the officers deputed for this duty, and a rough sketch of the ground passed over gave all the information requisite for the construction of the projected road. This work, which was forthwith taken in hand, had a most satisfactory effect upon the spirits of the garrison generally. The working parties were occasionally driven in, but not without inflicting loss upon the enemy, whose attention was much taken up in guarding and patrolling the main road by which Pearson came.

Wood, it has been mentioned, fell back upon receiving the news of Isandhlwana; but this retrograde movement was of short duration, and from that time till all was ready for the relief of Ekowe, his was the only column acting on the offensive.

From the 25th January to the 1st February his marches and countermarches afford little matter of interest. On the 28th he moved on to a new camping-ground, called Potter's Store, and there obtained full particulars of the Maglisini or Baglusini Kraal. This place Colonel Wood had for some time known as one of the principal rallying-points and depôts of supplies for the Zulu armies. Large quantities of "mealies" (Indian corn) and grain of other sorts were known to have been accumulated at this magazine, while cattle in large droves had been seen on their way to the depôt. Under these circumstances it was necessary to proceed with caution, as, had any ostentatious preparations been made for an advance in the direction of the magazine, it is more than probable Wood's object would only have been gained at a severe cost. In this view it was determined that a cavalry raid should be made by the mounted troops under Piet Uys, with his Burghers, and Colonel Buller, with his dashing corps of Frontier Light Horse. From the camp near Potter's Store to the Baglusini stronghold was at least thirty miles. A plain suitable to the passage of cavalry intervened before the Manzana river was reached, and Colonel Buller saw no reason why the distance should not be covered in one day. The kraals of Umbelini and of Inyatini were also in the same neighbourhood, therefore the utmost caution and secrecy were necessary in making preparations for the attack. The weather had been most unfavourable for some days, but fortunately cleared up, and became settled on the 1st of February. On that morning Colonel Buller, having selected on the previous day 106 of his best mounted men and thirty-three of the Dutch Contingent under Piet Uys, their commandant, paraded his men under the supervision of Colonel Wood, and explained to them clearly the feat they were about to attempt, not concealing the danger which they would have to incur in the performance of a most difficult and dangerous duty. The scene was a most dramatic one, as the camp lanterns lit up the faces of the bronzed and stalwart volunteers who formed the devoted band. Each man was exceedingly well horsed, and no precaution had been neglected in the careful overhauling of arms, accoutrements, and saddlery. Biscuit and, for those who cared, a little ration of rum were served out, and with a hearty "God-speed" from their comrades, who half envied their chances of adventure, the little troop of 141 gallant fellows started long before the earliest streak of dawn. The utmost silence was ordered and maintained, while the ground for some miles was so favourable that the horses' hoofs were scarcely heard as they cantered over the light and springy veldt. Distances on horseback are so differently estimated out in South Africa and at home in England, that when the ground is favourable, very long, and to European experience almost impossible, marches are constantly made without distress to horse or rider. In the present instance two short off-saddles only were indulged in; the first not far from the centre of the flat, and the next after the Manzana river had been safely crossed. The country now became more broken and the pace was reduced to a walk, but before the sun was well up the goal was in sight, and the herds of cattle were seen calmly feeding on the slopes. No suspicion would seem to have been excited, and it is more than probable that the very smallness of the attacking force, and its being all composed of the mounted branch, contributed to the success of the affair. The kraal was exceedingly well built, and seen from a distance of 1200 or 1000 yards it was doubtful whether it held a large guard or not. Cautiously yet swiftly advancing, Colonel Buller felt his way, with a few of his best shots thrown out as vedettes. These men soon encountered some scattered Zulus, who did not seem at all prepared for any hostile demonstration, but on retiring towards the hills they were reinforced by several other larger bodies, who had evidently been sent out to reconnoitre. After a few shots had been fired, a sudden and simultaneous advance was made on two sides of the kraal, and almost without resistance on the part of its defenders the kraal was captured. Two hundred and fifty well-built huts were counted by Buller's men, who, losing not a moment, collected no less than four hundred head of cattle, and a large quantity of grain, and then set fire to the magazine. Six Zulus were killed in the capture of the place, and although more than one body of them were seen hovering about in the vicinity, numbering severally 100 to 200 and 300 men, no opposition was offered to the rear-guard or patrols.

Wood then again moved his camp to the White Umvolosi. His position here was a remarkably strong one, and from it he commanded the passage of the White Umvolosi, the Pewana, while his day and night patrols held the disputed territory south of the Pongolo. A raid was next made in the direction of the Insulwa Kraal. The men got upon the road about seven a.m., and steady marching for about three miles brought them opposite the spot where, a few days before, a large force of Zulus had been seen engaged at drill. A scout who had been sent out on the right front came galloping back with the news that the Zulu cattle were in considerable numbers at the lower end of the valley, while he also added that the guard over these animals was not much larger than the English party. Piet Uys at once concerted with a couple of his smart non-commissioned officers, and decided, as they were exceedingly well mounted, to ride for the kloof which formed the exit to the valley. To execute this manœuvre was the work of ten minutes, during which they were hidden from sight of the Zulus by a tall ledge of scarped rocks which almost divided the valley. In the meanwhile the remainder moved steadily on at a walk, so as not to alarm their prey. In rather more than half an hour they had so far gained upon the cattle that they could make a tolerable guess as to their probable number, which was estimated at a couple of hundreds. The main body had now arrived at a place which Piet Uys and his Dutchmen seemed intimately acquainted with, and the Zulu cattle and guard could be seen on a ridge running parallel to the one they themselves were upon. Below was a deep kloof leading to the river. Some of Buller's Horse were now sent round to the opposite side, to drive the enemy down the kloof to the main party, while they continued to march down the ridge to meet these men as they came on. But they had not advanced very far when, as was expected, a much larger force appeared on the neighbouring heights, but the cliff was so precipitous they could not join their comrades. The seven-pounder was now brought into action, and sent a couple of shells right in amongst them, one of the rounds being a capital shot. Advancing still, the English leader saw that the enemy lately on the heights had managed, by making a détour, to get to the cover of a dense mimosa bush on his left. This move was answered by several rounds of canister, which it was afterwards found were not without effect. The foes were thus driven out into the open, and at one moment it seemed as though they were going to fight; the Boers, however, who had been detached to the neck of the valley now served their comrades by an excellent ruse. They had taken with them one of the bugle boys of the 13th, mounted on a wiry Kaffir pony, and the main party now heard coming across the valley the echoes of his bugle sounding the advance. The Zulus could not make out the meaning of this sound, and evidently imagined that the English commander had posted at least the wing of a regiment to intercept them. The consequence was, that the moment the main body cantered forward with a bold front, the cattle were abandoned; and they were left masters of the field, taking 170 head and some few wounded prisoners. Two villages were left in flames behind the retiring troops, who, as the crackling and flashing approached the bush where the hills met the plain, could see individual forms of black warriors shouting and gesticulating from out of the dust and smoke, wild with impotent rage at the loss of their kraal and cattle. The ridges beyond the gullies still afforded considerable shelter, and the English party were continually fired upon as they returned with their spoil; but it was evident that the Zulus had not any long-range weapons, as it could be seen from the splashes of dust how far short their bullets were falling. Ten of Buller's men were now sent on to cover the passage of the guns through the drift, and in about twenty minutes, and under the protection of the rear-guard, it was passed over in safety.

On the 15th, Wood was fortunate enough to destroy the great military kraal of Manyanyoba. Several reconnaissances had been made by Colonel Wood's directions, and from the local knowledge of one of Piet Uys's men, Colonel Buller was enabled to carry out the instructions of his chief with a success fully equal to the most sanguine expectations. The stronghold in question was situated on the Intomba river, and had always been considered by Cetywayo and his Indunas as a place of more than ordinary strength. At ten p.m. on the 14th the men were got under arms, and the column was composed of a strong detachment of Buller's Horse and fifty of the Burgher Volunteers under Piet Uys, whose services had on more than one occasion been most handsomely mentioned by Colonel Wood. The men paraded without lights, bugles, or the slightest sound, and moved off silently into the bush, without even the jingle of a sabre or the clank of a chain. Their march was accompanied by one gun, the wheels of which were, however, carefully wrapped with cloth and bound with raw hide. This was not only a protection against sound, but a preventive to injury to spokes and axles from the sharp boulders and rocks in the bed of the drift. The column left the camp by moonlight, crossing the usual ford, and were fortunate enough to gain the shelter of the bush without being seen or heard in the neighbouring villages. After a couple of hours' marching they reached a wide plain, where there was a broad watercourse, but sufficiently shallow to be easily forded. Here the gun, as the early grey of the morning came on in the sky, was brought into position, and here the final instructions were given to the men. As the daylight grew more marked there could be seen in front a long unbroken range of mountains, varying in height from 900 to 1000 feet. This range ran along the valley leading to the smaller kraals in the distance. Half the cavalry were now sent away by Colonel Buller to the left, with instructions to gain the bush, and wait dismounted until the shells were heard. They were then to dash forward at a swinging canter and cut off the cattle to be seen feeding on the slopes, which manœuvre would, if carried out, drive them into the hands of Piet Uys and his men posted on the right. Just as the sun began to appear above the horizon the gunners managed to hit off the range to a nicety, and the second shell crashed and burst right into the centre of the interior circle where the cattle were placed at night, and which is usually surrounded by the beehive-shaped huts where the Zulus live. It was at once perceived that this shot had caused the wildest commotion, as it was immediately followed by smoke and flame, figures rushing about through the village, the bellowing of oxen, and the shouts of men. As the horsemen advanced at a gallop towards the kraal, the enemy, firing a random and hasty volley, fled up the sides of the mountain, where cavalry could not follow. All the huts and stores along the base of the mountain were now destroyed without much resistance, although as soon as the Zulus got a little vantage-ground on the cliffs, they turned, and replied to the English fire. Four hundred head of cattle and a quantity of sheep and goats were brought off by Buller's men, who behaved with the most admirable coolness and steadiness. The fight had lasted about half an hour, when indications of reinforcements to the Zulus were observed. Seeing that nothing more was to be gained, and that he might lose the cattle, Colonel Buller gave the order to make good the retreat, covered by skirmishers and a rear-guard. This movement was skilfully effected without loss, and the column reached the camp early in the afternoon, having been about eight or nine hours in the saddle.

Meanwhile, to strengthen Wood's hands, the Commander-in-chief had ordered Colonel Rowlands to join that general. Rowlands at this time had with him, at his entrenched camp at New Derby, only a wing of the 80th, a couple of guns, and 200 Swazis. Raaf's Horse and Weatherly's Borderers were, however, expected daily to reinforce him. In the meantime, Rowlands was not allowing the grass to grow under the feet of his men, for, on the same day that Wood destroyed the Manyanyoba Kraal he left his camp at Derby and marched on to the Talako range, where he knew the enemy were in the numerous caves hidden by dense bush. The operations were entirely successful. Five large kraals, some of them of great natural strength, were burnt to the ground, 197 cattle, seventy goats, and forty-five sheep were captured. Magalini, the chief, was killed, with ten of his men, while defending one of the caves. One Zulu prisoner was taken, and forty women and a number of children came in and claimed protection. Six of the Swazi allies, under Fairlie, were wounded, and one horse killed.

On a still more recent occasion Colonel Rowlands had shown even greater activity. On the 20th February intelligence was brought to his camp that a small force of Zulus had been left in charge of supplies at Makatees Kop, a natural fortress close to Elozo, and intended as a depôt for future operations. The place was by no means easy of access, and apparently innumerable difficulties were mentioned to dissuade the colonel from any hostile attempt. On the date just named (20th) the detachment sent forward as a sort of advanced guard by Colonel Rowlands reached one of the mission-stations still left on the border. There was a laager consisting of a simple stone enclosure, bastioned, however, and loopholed, and situated on the bank of a running stream of bright and clearly sparkling water. In the dead of night the sentries were heard to challenge, and the sergeant on guard at once called his men to arms. This alarm, however, proved to be merely the return of some mounted Boers who had been sent on to reconnoitre on the previous day, and the information they brought in was important. The kraal which they had been seeking was about twenty miles off and supposed to be only held by about fifty Zulus, belonging to the regiment of Nkobamakosi, and part of the Undi or Royal corps. A large number of cattle were not supposed to be yet there, but some were coming in daily, and it was considered advisable to break this link in the enemy's communications. In the early morning, preceded by a few horsemen (many were coming in as volunteers to both Rowlands' and Wood's column), and marching with only their haversacks full of rations for two days, the little expedition started for a duty uncertain and believed to be full of risk. Eight European officers, 275 natives, partly Swazi allies, and some volunteer horse, the whole under command of Captain Harvey, staff officer, formed the reconnaissance; but, as it turns out, a smaller force would have sufficed. From the post or laager at the mission-station the road lay up a narrow valley, from which, after an ascent of about 200 feet, it stretched out on to a wide grassy plain ten miles in length. On the left of this could be plainly seen a number of Zulus tending sheep and cattle on the hills. Crossing part of the Iwangovini district, and fording a drift on the Inpongo river, the Iembe mountain could be seen always to the right; while the Eloso, a rocky height, loomed in front. At the bottom of a steep, rocky, and heavily bush-grown gorge, fourteen miles from the laager, a halt and short off-saddle were made, and every precaution taken against surprise. From this point to the stronghold the pathway was most difficult, and the men had to proceed with the greatest caution, in case of an ambush, which was half suspected. Two columns of smoke, one from a steep krantz on the left and another lower down on the right, were noticed, but these were afterwards found to be abandoned camping-grounds of the enemy, who fancied the British force was much stronger than it really was. On nearing the kraal, and on turning an angle of the gully, the column came in sight of the first village, which was as usual fortified in the Zulu fashion. As the foremost files dashed on, a couple of shots rang out and some assegais were thrown, causing a couple of casualties amongst the Swazis, who, however, showed a bold front, and, gallantly led by the European officers, carried the kraal by a rush. The results of this skirmish may not appear of great importance, but, taken in conjunction with Wood's recent successes, they had a most useful effect upon both the minds of the regular soldiers and those of the colonial volunteers.

The junction of Rowlands' column with Wood's was the next eventful incident in the history of the latter force. It was found, of course, impossible for Wood with so small a column and with so few cavalry to keep an efficient and reliable watch over the lengthy border he had to defend, and the result was that a Zulu force managed to effect a raid in the German settlements over the Pongolo. Commandant Schermbrucker had hitherto done remarkably well in keeping his line of defence intact, but his want of mounted men seriously hampered him, and enabled the Zulus to elude his vigilance. A serious raid happened on the 11th February; but Schermbrucker came up with the marauders as they were retiring with their booty, recaptured some of the cattle taken, and killed about a dozen of the enemy. On the 13th a large Zulu force managed to cross the Pongolo, and steal past the fort and laager of Luneberg. This was in the dead of night, and by daybreak they had burnt a number of huts belonging to natives friendly to or in the employment of the Dutch. The savages rushed in thousands upon the kraals and single huts, setting the roofs on fire and massacring old people, women, and children who could not escape. They deliberately tortured to death about a score of old men, killed in the most brutal manner at least fifty women and an equal number of children, while they left several young women fearfully stabbed with assegais. All this took place within five miles of the fort; and as fire-arms were not employed, the attention of the sentries was not aroused. Early in the morning one of the wounded managed to effect his escape, and brought this terrible news to the laager, and measures were immediately taken to follow and punish the band. Patrols were ordered out, and the utmost diligence exerted to overtake the enemy, who, it was known, was overladen with spoil. Before the Tombe river was reached, the leading patrol came up with a portion of the enemy's rear-guard, and a very pretty fight took place. The Zulus numbered about 450, but they were embarrassed by the cattle they had charge of, and this did not allow them to make a good stand. The consequence was that the Boer patrol killed twenty of their foes, put the remainder to flight, and won back a number of the stolen cattle. The rest, however, managed to escape over the Tombe, and the patrol were wisely ordered not to pursue. These raids were principally due to the activity of both Umbelini and Manyanyoba, and were the immediate cause of the expedition to attack and burn the kraals of the chiefs on the Intombe river. It should be mentioned that Umbelini was a Swazi refugee, and not even a legitimate chieftain of that tribe, but was regarded by the real headmen as a mere adventurer and pretender. Manyanyoba's people, again, were not Zulus, but the débris or remnants of various tribes conquered by Chaka and Dingaan. They wandered about in a starving condition, landless, and without flocks or wealth of any kind, until Cetywayo, from compassion, allowed them to settle north of the Pongolo, and on the banks of the Tombe river. This very land was mentioned in the ultimatum sent by Sir Bartle Frere to the king, who had no right whatever to cede any portion of it.

Wood next moved his camp to the Kambula Kop, and there entrenched himself in a position of great natural strength. There now occurred an event of considerable importance. Oham, brother of Cetywayo, had always declared himself opposed to war, had openly stated his opinion in Zulu's councils, and had ever since the outbreak of hostilities been making overtures of friendship to the British. These, however, had been but lightly treated, as suspicions of their honesty were entertained by the powers that were. How groundless were these suspicions the event proved. On the 2nd inst. Oham came into the camp of Captain M'Leod, the political agent on the border of Swaziland, arrived at Derby on the 4th, and came on thence to Wood at Kambula a couple of days back, and declared his complete submission to her Majesty's Government. Immediately before leaving his kraal in Zululand the chief took the precaution to try and save some of his best cattle, and he subsequently sent a thousand head of his finest herds into the Swazi county; but they fell into Dutch hands, and some of the Boers, obtaining possession of them, had the audacity to brand them as their property before M'Leod could arrive to claim them. Oham had with him between 300 and 400 of his people, and was accompanied by his eldest son, an intelligent lad of fifteen, who soon made himself an object of great interest in Wood's camp, and a favourite with the soldiers. Immediately on his arrival he had an interview with, and was received with great respect by Colonel Wood, who was informed by him that he would have surrendered some time back but for two reasons. In the first place, he was under a system of espionage by the orders of the king, with whom he had never been on good terms since he openly, before the Indunas, spoke against the warlike attitude and aggressive tone of his brother; and, secondly, when he did make his first overtures for submission, he was told that he was not believed by the English, and would be cast into prison, and sent to Robbin Island as a convict.