Oham was a black ikehla (head-ringed man), resembling both his father, the late Mpanda, or Panda, and his brother Cetywayo, and although a large man, his body and muscles were firm, not flabby like those of so many other big Zulus. After the usual salutations he thus opened his interview with Wood:—
"Sir, chief, and great warrior, whom I respect, because you fight against men, and do not kill women or children, I came here to your camp from a desire to see you, and to ask you to intercede for me and my people, who have never wished to make war upon you, but to live in peace and goodwill, and hunt the wild deer together. I have left more than two thousand of my people ready and most anxious to come in and submit to you, surrendering their arms and cattle, and giving their sons as hostages, if you will guarantee their safety."
The chief, who had a dignified manner and an honest expression of countenance, was then informed that he and his people should receive every consideration, and as much protection as was consistent with the safe advance of the English troops into Zululand. He then assured Wood that the Zulu army was considerably demoralized, and that, the people having gone back to their kraals, Cetywayo found it no easy task to collect a really effective fighting force. With some difficulty, indeed, the king had managed to get together a strong impi, composed of the Udhlambedhlu, or "Ill-tempered" Regiment, whose kraal was at Udhlambedhlweni, about six miles east of the Usixepe, to exercise a surveillance over Oham and his people. This corps, however, was formed originally from a clan, or tribe, which were Dingaan's chief and favourite regiment, and although in a measure loyal to their then ruler, they were somewhat indignant at the duty imposed upon them, when they would infinitely prefer the chances of raiding and plunder, which the present unsettled state of the border presented. Now, when Wood was at Utrecht the previous autumn, a letter was sent by the Landdrost Rudolph to the Secretary for Native Affairs, in which he mentioned the arrival of Gwegwana, the favourite messenger of Uhamo or Oham, with letters from that chief to the following effect, which Oham now repeated to Colonel Wood:—"I am sent back by Uhamo to hear what answer his father, Somtseu (Sir Theophilus Shepstone), has sent to his message brought by me on the 10th October last. Uhamo is very anxious to know what is going to take place in the land now that Cetywayo has called the whole of Zululand together, and Uhamo has refused liberty to his people to assemble at 'Ondi,' and will openly tell Cetywayo that if he (Cetywayo) makes war upon the English, he (Uhamo) will not join him, because Cetywayo's people, Sirayo and Umbelini, have, by their overt acts, brought the country into its present state of trouble and disgrace. Moreover, the building by Cetywayo's orders of a military kraal on the Pongolo, and the claims made by him of a portion of the Transvaal beyond the Blood River, which had been, as Uhamo repeatedly told Cetywayo, ceded many years ago to the Transvaal people, and other acts, had never received any countenance from Uhamo, who now asks, Why does Cetywayo want to quarrel with the English, who have ever been his friends, and who, indeed, placed him on his present throne?"
In his second interview with Colonel Wood, Oham was still more explicit and demonstrative. He expressed himself with much indignation at his brother's countenancing such a despicable character as Umbelini, who, neither a pure Zulu nor a Swazi, had all the vices and none of the good qualities of either; and he added that the degradation which his brother had brought upon the race of Chaka by such an unworthy alliance has caused him to lose much of his former popularity. Oham also added that, in case of the continuance of the war, rather than be compelled to fight against his old friends the English he would at all hazards bring his people bodily over to that Government, and under these circumstances claim their protection. "Uhamo loves peace as his father Panda did," said the chief in conclusion, and his open and honest-looking eyes seemed to corroborate this expression.
We now come to another sad event, which though less in magnitude, is in many points similar to the Isandhlwana disaster. Major Tucker, the chief officer at Luneberg, gives this account of the affair:—Captain Moriarty, with a company of the 80th, was ordered to march from Luneberg on the 7th March, for the purpose of bringing in twenty waggons from Derby, variously loaded, which had arrived at the Intombi Drift. Earlier in the month Major Tucker sent down to the Drift, which was not more than four miles off, a small escort to await the arrival of these waggons. Believing, however, the position a perilous one, owing to the proximity to Umbelini's kraal, on the 5th he ordered it to return. On the 7th, however, the waggons, which had all but been captured on the way down, did arrive at the Drift, and Moriarty was again sent with seventy men of his company to act as escort and assist in getting the convoy across the stream, which was considerably swollen by the continued rains. The Drift was only four miles from the stronghold of the renegade Swazi freebooter, Umbelini, who had of late given so much trouble, and Moriarty had orders to neglect no precaution, and above all to laager his waggons and keep an incessant and vigilant look-out. It was ascertained from survivors that the waggons were actually parked, but in a somewhat loose and careless fashion, and that no earthworks were thrown up around the camp. For several days the river continued in strong flood, and consequently no crossing could be effected. On the 11th it was reported by the native waggon-drivers that Umbelini's people were gathering in the neighbourhood. The camp was pitched in a most dangerous position, with its face towards some high ground, covered here and there with dense bush, while its rear was resting upon the swollen river, across which Lieutenant Harward and thirty-four men were posted. No particular precautions appear to have been taken, with the exception of a sentry being posted about fifteen paces from the front of the camp, on the Derby side. When first warned by the drivers, Moriarty ordered the men to stand to their arms, but only for a short time. On the morning of the 12th, at four o'clock, a shot was heard from the unfortunate sentry, who had barely time to call "Guard, turn out!" when dense masses of the savages were seen not more than two hundred yards from the camp. Their front extended for several miles, and they could not, by the lowest estimate, have been less than 4000 or 5000 strong. Lieutenant Harward, who had been on the qui-vive, and who had carefully placed his thirty-five men under cover of his solitary waggon, at once called his detachment to arms, and made what dispositions he could to open fire upon the enemy's flank. In less than ten minutes, however, the whole valley was swarming with the savages, who at once proceeded in their usual manner to surround and overlap the camp and waggons. In less time than it takes to tell, the camp was in their hands, and the majority of the soldiers were assegaied, many of them before they could leave their tents. The fight, or rather butchery, which ensued was soon over, and, in spite of a well-directed and well-sustained fire from the Luneberg bank of the river, the enemy followed up the men, and assegaied them as they endeavoured to swim the river. Harward, seeing the enemy crossing the river in large numbers, gave the order to his men to retire slowly. Then, jumping on the back of his horse, he galloped away at full speed to Luneberg, where he reported what had happened. The savages continued to cross the stream, and coming on in dense masses, for a short time a hand-to-hand fight took place, ending however in the little band being broken up.
Eight men, and the sergeant of Harward's detachment, by taking advantage of shelter afforded by an old and dismantled kraal wall at some little distance from the stream, and by their cool and determined shooting, succeeded in saving their lives and getting to Luneberg. Ten men only were saved from Moriarty's party, while he, with a civilian, Surgeon Cobbin, was slain.
The camp was evidently wrongly placed, and was clearly taken by surprise. Major Tucker went out from Luneberg in person, with a small party of horsemen, followed by 150 of the 80th, to see what could be recovered, and the bodies of the dead were brought over the river and buried, while twenty-five of the enemy's dead were discovered, and a couple of wounded taken prisoners. From these men it was ascertained that Umbelini himself was in command, having with him some men belonging to our old antagonist Manyanyoba. Mcame, a powerful induna, had been asked to join in the foray, but refused. When Tucker and his handful of horsemen arrived on the banks of the river, the enemy were seen to be retreating, but they could not be followed until the infantry came up. Curious to remark, the waggons were not taken, and many of them were only half plundered by the savages, who seemed most anxious to decamp with what spoil they had secured.
For his conduct in this affair Lieutenant Harward was subsequently tried by court-martial. The ground of complaint was his having galloped off on his horse—the only one present on the scene—leaving his men engaged in a desperate engagement. The loss of the camp, or anything of a similar nature, was in no way charged against him. His defence was that he had ridden off to obtain assistance from the nearest point—that this was his duty—and that he could not send a soldier in his place, as none of them could ride. In the event the Court acquitted him. But in May of the ensuing year (1880), the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief issued the following special general order relative to a court-martial recently held on an officer in South Africa:—
"At a general court-martial recently held, an officer was arraigned upon the following charges,—First. Having misbehaved before the enemy, in shamefully abandoning a party of the regiment under his command when attacked by the enemy, and in riding off at speed from his men. Second. Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in having at the time and place mentioned in the first charge, neglected to take proper precautions for the safety of a party of the regiment under his command when attacked. The Court recorded a verdict of 'Not Guilty' on both charges. The main facts of the case were not in dispute. The officer rode away from his men to a station distant four and a half miles, at a moment of extreme danger, when to all appearance the small party under his command were being surrounded and overwhelmed by the enemy. The charge alleged misbehaviour—that is, cowardice in so doing; the defence averred that it was to procure reinforcements, and either by their actual arrival, or by the imminence of their arrival, to ward off destruction. In acquitting the prisoner, they have found that he was not guilty of cowardice. The proceedings of the Court were submitted to the General commanding, who recorded the following minute:—'Disapproved and not confirmed. Lieutenant ... to be released from arrest, and to return to his duty.' The confirming officer has further recorded his reasons for withholding his approval and confirmation in the following terms:—'Had I released this officer without making any remarks upon the verdict in question, it would have been a tacit acknowledgment that I concurred in what appears to me a monstrous theory, viz., that a regimental officer who is the only officer present with a party of soldiers actually and seriously engaged with the enemy can, under any pretext whatever, be justified in deserting them, and by so doing abandoning them to their fate. The more helpless the position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to stay and share their fortune, whether for good or ill. It is because the British officer has always done so that he occupies the position in which he is held in the estimation of the world, that he possesses the influence he does in the ranks of our army. The soldier has learnt to feel that, come what may, he can, in the direst moment of danger, look with implicit faith to his officer, knowing that he will never desert him under any possible circumstances. It is to this faith of the British soldier in his officers that we owe most of the gallant deeds recorded in our military annals; and it is because the verdict of this court-martial strikes at the root of this faith that I feel it necessary to mark officially my emphatic dissent from the theory upon which the verdict has been founded.' In communicating to the army the result of this court-martial, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires to signify his entire approval of the views expressed by the confirming officer in respect of the principles of duty which have always actuated British officers in the field, and by which his Royal Highness feels assured they will continue to be guided. This general order will, by his Highness's command, be read at the head of every regiment in her Majesty's service.—By Command, H. Ellice, A.-G."