Japan

by Walter G. Dickson

In 1854, during the Crimean war, Sir James Stirling, then admiral on the China station, with H.M.S. “Winchester” and a squadron, anchored in Nagasaki with the object of concluding a treaty with Japan. The last article of the treaty was to the effect that “no high officer coming after to Japan should ever have power to alter this treaty.” For this treaty the admiral received the thanks of the nation through the House of Commons. It may by some be thought a mistake not to have stood upon the old treaty given to England by Iyeyas in the seventeenth century, which would have been considered more binding upon the government and upon the empire than a treaty made when the position of the Shiogoon was once more being questioned.

These treaties were a step forward, but had this step not been followed up they would soon have become inoperative.

Mr. Townsend Harris was appointed consul for America at Simoda, and arrived there in 1856; and being in constant intercourse with the Japanese authorities, he concluded a convention by which further advantages were gained by the Americans. The Japanese government thought that if the further concessions brought no more trouble than what had resulted from the little opening already made, they might, without much danger, open the sluices a little more; and in 1858, Mr. Harris, after much negotiation, arranged the articles of a commercial treaty (based upon the treaties with China), which was signed by him and the Japanese commissioners upon July 29, 1858. After this was settled, Holland, Britain, Russia, and France concluded similar treaties.

The sound of the trumpets which had been blown to herald the approach of the American squadron to the shores of Japan had reached those shores long before the vessels themselves. The government was informed through the Dutch of the coming mission. The American government does not seem to have intended anything further than ostentatious display in the number and size of the vessels sent. They did not propose to follow up a refusal to open their doors, on the part of the Japanese, by any warlike operations. But the Japanese government does not appear to have been aware of this, and at the time they may have felt some doubts as to whether their late treatment of foreigners did not call for some display of power on the part of European nations. Commodore Biddle had been grossly insulted on board a vessel of war. The crew of one vessel had been very unkindly treated, and, according to native report, more than one vessel had recently been wrecked on the coasts of Japan, and the crews treated with severity until they died out. Until the squadron should arrive, the Japanese could take little or no action. But they waited with much anxiety the arrival of the expedition. It was considered as a most important event, fraught with much either of good or evil to the country—which was it to be?

There is a pamphlet, published in Yedo, which professes to give some account of the doings in Japan at this time, and which is interesting as showing the internal state of Japan at this most critical time in her history, and the feelings with which the proposed opening of the country was viewed by different political parties. The views of the Emperor are set forth; the daring acts of the Regent in support of his own position; the intrigues set on foot against him, ending in his assassination, and the subsequent train of events which followed thereon, and which have led to the overthrow of the Shiogoon’s position and the restoration of the Emperor to the power originally held in the imperial hands. The letters may appear to be tedious, but they show the working of the government more clearly perhaps than a simple description would do. The country was threatened with internal disturbance, and there were two parties divided upon the point of a successor to the Shiogoon, who was weakly in mind and body—worn out and epileptic. As leader of the one party was Ee Kamong no kami, the head of the Fudai Daimios, and having a certain right to be appointed Regent in case of necessity. He seems to have been a clever, bold man, to Western ideas unscrupulous in the means by which he attained his ends. At the head of the other party was Mito, one of the “three families,” hereditary vice-Shiogoon in Yedo, and connected by marriage with the families of the Emperor and the highest Koongays in Miako, and with the wealthiest Daimios—a shrewd, clever, scheming old man. What follows must be considered a mere imperfect sketch of what the pamphlet contains.

The name of the pamphlet is a play upon the name Mito, meaning Water-door—Midzu Kara Kori. “Water machines make,” or “A machine made at Mito.” The Regent (whose name, Ee, means “a well”) wished to take out, as with a bucket, the water in the well and divide it—i.e., to break down the power of Mito.

The pamphlet commences by stating by way of “contents” that the Regent sent Manabay Simosa no kami to Miako to seize Takatskasa, the highest officer of the empire, the Kwanbakku and his son Daifu dono, and Awata, a young relative of the Emperor, and at the time the head of the Buddhists—and that these high officers were all put into confinement, and that all this trouble had its origin at Mito. The source of the Tokungawa—i.e., the line of Iyeyas, or the government by the family of Iyeyas—is very clear, but this work will show how Mito tried to make it impure. The book was published in the spring of 1860. The name of the author is “Every one drunk.”

The anticipated arrival of the United States squadron was agitating the rulers of Japan, and parties were divided as to the reception which should be given it. There was probably some political source of discord besides this, connected more or less with the office of Shiogoon, which had fallen into the hands of an epileptic imbecile. It would appear that in 1854 letters were sent to all the Daimios and Ometskis, requiring them to give their opinions as to the reception which should be given to the squadron, and whether the Americans should be repelled by force, or whether a trial should be made of a limited intercourse with foreigners, under the impression that if it was not found to work satisfactorily the ports might again be closed, and the country might return to its old state of seclusion. The answers sent showed that they were divided into a large majority for repelling them, by force of arms if necessary, and a small minority who were for admitting foreigners to trade. All agreed that it was a question of peace or war, but many thought that whether it was to be the one or the other, no answer should be sent until time was obtained to put the shores and batteries into a state of defense. At present, they alleged, the coasts were weak and defenseless, and “if Japan does not conquer it will be a great disgrace, and the country will be defiled. But, high and low, all must be unanimous.” In the first place, it must be ascertained how many men each Daimio can muster, and the strength of each in guns, ammunition, etc. In 1854, in the tenth month, the Ometskis sent letters to all the Daimios to obtain information on this head.

In 1855, in the 9th month, the Shiogoon sent a commission to Mito, ordering him to put all the coasts of the country into a defensible condition. The care of the forts along the shore was to be committed to Mito. The forts and guns were to be examined. The Shiogoon wrote—“You have hitherto come to me three times every month, now I wish you to report to me every second day what is doing.”

From published documents, it appears by the Emperor’s own letter, 22d day of the 2d month, 1858, in corroboration of what is stated in the pamphlet quoted, “that this matter was discussed before him by the Kwanbakku (Koozio dono), the Taiko, or previous Kwanbakku (Takatskasa),[9] and the Tenso. It appears that the old Taiko pleaded as an excuse that he was unwell, but as the Mikado sent several times to command his attendance, he was obliged to come. At the conference the Taiko expressed an opinion contrary to that of the others, which had been given in favor of the course advocated by the Shiogoon. The Mikado was very angry” (with these others), “and it was with difficulty the Kwanbakku succeeded in pacifying him. On the 23d a document bearing the refusal of the Mikado to the treaty was written out. Then three officers went to the residence of Hotta, the Shiogoon’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs and Envoy to Miako, to obtain the Mikado’s consent to the American treaty, and informed him of the document hereunder. The messengers sent by (to?) the Mikado were afflicted, and shed tears because they did not succeed.”