Japan

by Walter G. Dickson

Mencius said people have this common saying—“The empire, the state, the family. The root of the empire is the state—the root of the state is in the family—the root of the family is in the person of its head.” And Iyeyas seems to have recognized these principles as the foundation of his rule, believing that when too much weight is given to the state, despotism ensues; when the family preponderates, oligarchy of an aristocracy prevails; and where the interests of the individual man become paramount, democracy rears its head.

Those who framed the code were in all probability acquainted with the writings of the Chinese sages and their commentators, and perhaps they refer, in the allusions to Kamakura dono or Yoritomo, to some laws laid down by him or his officers, who had more opportunity of studying the Chinese writings than could fall to the lot of men who had been brought up in the troublous times when Iyeyas was a youth.

The consideration of such laws laid down by Iyeyas, and which are more or less still in force, leads to a comparison with the condition of Europe during the time when feudal institutions were in force, the genius of these laws being in many respects the counterpart of that which was in force in Europe in feudal times. The constitution of all warlike nations in early times has tended to this condition. The discoveries of gunpowder and printing have been the great means of breaking down this system; and in our day steam is rapidly breaking up what these had left.

The man to whom had been given the most capacity for dealing with men and for conducting war, was selected to take the command of those who saw these qualities in him, and confided in his ability to prosecute any undertaking to a successful termination. Of necessity such a man must be a soldier. He must have the capacity to govern as well as to fight; to make laws as well as to lead in battle; to conciliate men as well as to control them. He divides the spoils among his followers, allowing to each a proportion according to his merit.

A larger portion was retained by the chief, because, independently of being able to appropriate it, he was to rule over all, and to incur expenses on behalf of all in the general control of the acquired territory.

This chief generally retained in his own hand certain privileges, such as a more or less controlling voice in the legislature, power of life and death, and of making peace or war and treaties of commerce, coinage of money, right of property in mines of gold and silver, and other rights. He had the power of conferring some of these on the barons holding land from him and under him as superior. By subdivision a feudal kingdom was cut up into many small but semi-independent baronies. The execution of legal decisions became difficult, offenders escaping to other jurisdictions.

Through the greater expenses falling upon the king, his power often waned, while that of the barons waxed greater; and to render their independence perpetual, and at the same time to assure a support to the chief, the system of entail was fallen upon.

The barons were ever and again adding to their property and power by marriages, by successions, by purchase, or by force and might. Honors and even offices became hereditary.

So long as weapons of war were in each man’s possession, and every one was in proportion to his personal strength and activity a soldier, no great expense fell upon the chief. His followers could be summoned at an hour’s notice.

But when the introduction of gunpowder rendered personal strength and activity of comparatively small value, it increased the expense falling upon the leader. Trained skill required time, and education was necessary. Large guns, requiring expensive ammunition, called for a more expensive system of fortification. The lesser barons could not undertake these. The expenses of war fell entirely upon the king. Trained soldiers required a standing army. When there is any coast to defend, a navy is required.