Japan

by Walter G. Dickson

In the practical working of the system of Iyeyas, there was the difference between Japan and European countries, that, until the use of steam, she had no neighbors to dread as foes or to covet as vassals. There was always an attempt to compensate for the want of this external pressure in the duality or separation of interests between the Mikado, the fountain of honors, and the executive, by whatever name the head officer might be called, whether Kwanrei or Shiogoon.

Security was sought for by the laws of Iyeyas, not against external foes, but against the decadence of the dynasty from internal weakness, or from the power of those who ought to be supporters becoming overwhelming. There was in Japan no call for great expenses, either in keeping up fortifications, armaments, or a standing army or navy. No embassadors were dispatched to foreign courts, to consume the revenues of the empire. Against the tendency to the aggrandizement of the barons, and their increase in wealth and power by marriage and other means, Iyeyas fixed the amount of territory which each lord was to possess. Land which produced of rice annually a certain quantity was allotted to each baron, according to his rank or rights. But one great difference between this system and that of entails in Europe lay in this, that the estate granted to each baron could not be added to or diminished, either by marriage or by purchase or by might, except by express permission and grant from the Shiogoon, the superior of all. This law tended to prevent the enormous accumulation of land in a few hands. This land they might lease or grant to their retainers, some of whom were very wealthy; but so long as such a one was a retainer of a Daimio, whatever his wealth might be, there was little chance of his rising to honors in the state.

The barons in Japan are bound to bring a certain number of men to assist the lord superior in war. Each of these followers is paid by the baron by so much land producing a certain quantity of rice.

Succession to these lands is hereditary, but not strictly to the eldest son, while the custom so common over the East of adoption is allowed, and all the rights of a son are conferred upon the adopted one. Many of the present Daimios are adopted children—frequently no relative whatever of the person who so adopts. But while Iyeyas declared that these fiefs should be hereditary, he at the same time laid it down as a principle that it was good that these lesser lords should not remain too long in one place, but that, when occasion seemed to require it, it was well to change them from one barony to another. He would no doubt have gladly laid down a similar principle as to the Kokushu, or lords of provinces, but their power and influence were too great to be lightly interfered with. This power has been frequently put forth down to the present time. A Daimio with an income of 10,000 koku is ordered to remove to the territory of another with the same revenue; or perhaps, if there be some cause for reproof, a Daimio will be transferred to a territory in the far north, such as Tanagura, and the baron then living there, who may be the son of one who had been similarly deported, is removed to the better locality.

Iyeyas provided for the payment of stated presents on arrival at Yedo. At other times gifts are made to the Shiogoon; and, as under the feudal system, presents are to be offered on other occasions, such as marriage or becoming of age.

The civil authority of the Shiogoon was liable to much limitation, and this Iyeyas seems to have expected. At first an officer was deputed by the Shiogoon to reside in the territories of the greater barons, and to report to Yedo when he saw anything taking place worthy of animadversion. But this has been done away with, and the Kokushu are virtually in full possession of power, each in his own provincial territory.

Under the laws above recited the men of the country are divided into four classes—the gentry, agriculturists, artisans, and merchants. The gentry are separated from the other classes by the distinctive badge of wearing a long sword, which they are warned never to forget. By this sword the class is distinguished over the whole empire. But the class is again subdivided by the respective badges, shields or coats-of-arms of the chiefs worn prominently on some part of the dress—generally on the back and on each breast.

The right of wearing two swords brings with it privileges which may be looked upon as means of paying the class—somewhat as purveyance under the feudal laws of England conveyed privileges, which were gained generally at the expense of the agricultural class along the highroads. Under these laws all two-sworded men are allowed to demand carriage for themselves and goods along the highway at a much lower rate than others, and this naturally ends in paying nothing. Their goods are permitted to enter towns free of customs, or at much-reduced rates. Such privileges become in time very irksome to the class which has to pay for them.

While a Daimio is not permitted to add to his territories by purchase or marriage, these may be increased at the will and by the favor of the Shiogoon, or they may be diminished by his fiat. While, if any officer has been thought deserving of a little punishment, he may be desired to build a fort or a bridge, or make a road, or do something which shall benefit the country, and at the same time act as a pecuniary fine upon the person upon whom the honor is conferred.—The fort at Kanagawa was built in this way.

One of the strongest measures of control used by the Shiogoon toward the barons is put forward when they have been known to be intriguing against their superiors. This is sometimes carried out without trial or previous step of any kind, and consists in the intimation to the lord that he is to divest himself of the insignia of rank, hand over the power which he holds as a Daimio to some other individual (generally a near relative and a minor), and confine himself to one room until further orders. Such an intimation would probably not be given unless the government were sure of its ground. But the power consists in the position in which his own retainers stand toward their lord. If he, upon receiving such a notice, obeys it at once, no other changes take place; the individual is simply removed out of the way, and the offices are transferred to his successor. The wealthy and powerful vassals remain, with their property, unaffected by the step. But should he presume to offer resistance, and rise in rebellion, all the retainers suffer with him. They will all be, in case of the failure of the rebellion, deprived of their territories, which will be taken from them and given to others. It is therefore the interest of all those about a Daimio that he should obey a sentence which they all have an idea he more or less deserved. All those about him, therefore, insist upon his abdication; and he, feeling himself alone and forsaken, is obliged quietly to yield, and thus trouble to the whole province is averted. But in the case where the retainers believe that the cause of their master is a right one, and that he has the power as well as the ability to defend himself, they will rally round him, and defy even the highest government. This took place in the case of Choshiu against the Shiogoon; while the cases of Satsuma, Owarri, and others, who were deposed by the regent in 1858, show how the power is at times exercised.