"That this (Sychar) cannot be the large, ancient Sikhem, which, at the time when the Gospel was written, was probably already generally called Neapolis in Greek writings, has been already stated; it is the place still called with an altered Arabic name Al 'Askar, east of Naplûs. It is indeed difficult to prove that Sychar could stand for Sikhem, either through change of pronunciation, or for any other reason, and the addition [Greek: legomenê] does not indicate, here any more than in xi. 54, so large and generally known a town as Sikhem. or Flavia Neapolis." [33:3]
Mr. Sanday, [33:4] of whose able work Dr. Lightfoot directly speaks, says:—
"The name Sychar is not the common one, Sichem, but is a mock title (='liar' or 'drunkard') that was given to the town by the Jews. [33:5] This is a clear reminiscence of the vernacular that the Apostle spoke in his youth, and is a strong touch of nature. It is not quite certain that the name Sychar has this force, but the hypothesis is in itself more likely than, &c…. It is not, however, by any means improbable that Sychar may represent, not Sichem, but the modern village Askar, which is somewhat nearer to Jacob's Well."
To quote one of the latest "travellers and apologists," Dr. Farrar says: "From what the name Sychar is derived is uncertain. The word [Greek: legomenos] in St. John seems to imply a sobriquet. It may be 'a lie,' 'drunken,' or 'a sepulchre.' Sychar may possibly have been a village nearer the well than Sichem, on the site of the village now called El Askar." [34:1] As Dr. Lightfoot specially mentions Neubauer, his opinion may be substantially given in a single sentence: "La Mischna mentionne un endroit appelé 'la plaine d'En-Sokher,' qui est peut-être le Sychar de l'Evangile." He had a few lines before said: "Il est donc plus logique de ne pas identifier Sychar avec Sichem." [34:2] Now, with regard to all these theories, and especially in so far as they connect Sychar with El Askar, let me quote a few more words in conclusion, from a "common source of information:"—
"On the other hand there is an etymological difficulty in the way of this identification. 'Askar begins with the letter 'Ain, which Sychar does not appear to have contained; a letter too stubborn and enduring to be easily either dropped or assumed in a name … These considerations have been stated not so much with the hope of leading to any conclusion on the identity of Sychar, which seems hopeless, as with the desire to show that the ordinary explanation is not nearly so obvious as it is usually assumed to be." [34:3]
Mr. Grove is very right.
I have been careful only to quote from writers who are either "apologetic," or far from belonging to heterodox schools. Is it not perfectly clear that no place of the name of Sychar can be reasonably identified? The case, in fact, simply stands thus:—As the Gospel mentions a town called Sychar, apologists maintain that there must have been such a place, and attempt by various theories to find a site for it. It is certain, however, that even in the days of St. Jerome there was no real trace of such a town, and apologists and travellers have not since been able to discover it, except in their own imaginations.
With regard to the insinuation that the references given in my notes constitute a "subtle mode of intimidation" and "literary browbeating," Canon Lightfoot omits to say that I as fully and candidly refer to those who maintain views wholly different from my own, as to those who support me. It is very possible, considering the number of these references, that I may have committed some errors, and I can only say that I shall very thankfully receive from Dr. Lightfoot any corrections which he may be good enough to point out. Instead of intimidation and browbeating, my sole desire has been to indicate to all who may be anxious further to examine questions in debate, works in which they may find them discussed. It is time that the system of advancing apologetic opinions with perfect assurance, and without a hint that they are disputed by anyone, should come to an end, and that earnest men should be made acquainted with the true state of the case. As Dr. Mozley rightly and honestly says: "The majority of mankind, perhaps, owe their belief rather to the outward influence of custom and education than to any strong principle of faith within; and it is to be feared that many, if they came to perceive how wonderful what they believed was, would not find their belief so easy and so matter-of-course a thing as they appear to find it." [36:1]
I shall not here follow Dr. Lightfoot into his general remarks regarding my 'conclusions,' nor shall I proceed, in this article, to discuss the dilemma in which he attempts to involve me through his misunderstanding and consequent misstatement, of my views regarding the Supreme Being. I am almost inclined to think that I can have the pleasure of agreeing with him in one important point, at least, before coming to a close. When I read the curiously modified statement that I have "studiously avoided committing myself to a belief in a universal Father, or a moral Governor, or even in a Personal God," it seems clear to me that the Supernatural Religion about which Dr. Lightfoot has been writing cannot be my work, but is simply a work of his own imagination. That work cannot possibly have contained, for instance, the chapter on "Anthropomorphic Divinity," [36:2] in which, on the contrary, I studiously commit myself to very decided disbelief in such a "Personal God" as he means. In no way inconsistent with that chapter are my concluding remarks, contrasting with the spasmodic Jewish Divinity a Supreme Being manifested in the operation of invariable laws—whose very invariability is the guarantee of beneficence and security. If Dr. Lightfoot, however, succeeded in convicting me of inconsistency in those final expressions, there could be no doubt which view must logically be abandoned, and it would be a new sensation to secure the approval of a divine by the unhesitating destruction of the last page of my work.
Dr. Lightfoot, again, refers to Mr. Mill's "Three Essays on Religion," but he does not appear to have very deeply studied that work. I confess that I do not entirely agree with some views therein expressed, and I hope that, hereafter, I may have an opportunity of explaining what they are; but I am surprised that Dr. Lightfoot has failed to observe how singularly that great Thinker supports the general results of Supernatural Religion, to the point even of a frequent agreement almost in words. If Dr. Lightfoot had studied Mill a little more closely, he would not have committed the serious error of arguing: "Obviously, if the author has established his conclusions in the first part, the second and third are altogether superfluous. It is somewhat strange, therefore, that more than three-fourths of the whole work should be devoted to this needless task." [37:1] Now my argument in the first part is not that miracles are impossible—a thesis which it is quite unnecessary to maintain—but the much more simple one that miracles are antecedently incredible. Having shown that they are so, and appreciated the true nature of the allegation of miracles, and the amount of evidence requisite to establish it, I proceed to examine the evidence which is actually produced in support of the assertion that, although miracles are antecedently incredible, they nevertheless took place. Mr. Mill clearly supports me in this course. He states the main principle of my argument thus: "A revelation, therefore, cannot be proved divine unless by external evidence; that is, by the exhibition of supernatural facts. And we have to consider, whether it is possible to prove supernatural facts, and if it is, what evidence is required to prove them." [37:2] Mr. Mill decides that it is possible to prove the occurrence of a supernatural fact, if it actually occurred, and after showing the great preponderance of evidence against miracles, he says: "Against this weight of negative evidence we have to set such positive evidence as is produced in attestation of exceptions; in other words, the positive evidences of miracles. And I have already admitted that this evidence might conceivably have been such as to make the exception equally certain with the rule." [38:1] Mr. Mill's opinion of the evidence actually produced is not flattering, and may be compared with my results: