At three o'clock, A.M., on the 15th June, the French army crossed the frontier in three columns, directed on Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Chatelet. The Prussian out-posts were quickly driven in; they, however, maintained their ground obstinately at three points, until eleven o'clock, when General Ziethen took up a position at Gilly and Gosselies, in order to check the advance of the enemy, and then retired slowly on Fleurus, agreeably to the orders of Maréchal Blucher, to allow time for the concentration of his army.[309] The bridge at Charleroi not having been completely destroyed, was quickly repaired by the enemy. Upon Ziethen's abandoning the chaussée, which leads to Brussels through Quatre-Bras, Marshal Ney, who commanded the left of the French army, was ordered to advance by this road upon Gosselies, and found at Frasnes part of the Duke of Wellington's army, composed of Nassau troops, under the command of Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar, who, after some skirmishing, maintained his position.[310] The French army was formed, on the night of the 15th, in three columns, the left at Gosselies, the centre near Gilly, and the right at Chatelet. Two corps of the Prussian army occupied the position at Sombref on the same night, where they were joined by the first corps, and occupied St. Amand, Bry, and Ligny; so that, notwithstanding all the exertions of the French, at a moment where time was of such importance, they had only been able to advance about fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen hours of daylight.[311] The corps of Ziethen had suffered considerably, but he had effected his orders: so that Maréchal Blucher was enabled to assemble three corps of his army, 80,000 men, in position early on the 15th, and his fourth corps was on its march to join him that evening.
The Duke of Wellington seems to have expected an attack by the Mons chaussée,[312] and on his first receiving information of the enemy's movements, merely ordered his troops to hold themselves in readiness; this was on the evening of the 15th of June, at six o'clock. Having obtained farther intelligence about eleven o'clock, which confirmed the real attack of the enemy to be along the Sambre, orders were immediately given for the troops to march upon Quatre-Bras; a false movement of the English general to his right, at that period, could not have been easily remedied in time to have fought in front of Brussels, and to have effected his junction with the Prussians; and in such a case, as Maréchal Blucher only fought at Ligny on the expectation of being supported by the Duke of Wellington, it is probable that that action would not have taken place. He had, however, a safe retreat on Bulow's corps and Maestricht, as had the Duke of Wellington on Ghent and Antwerp, or else the plan afterwards adopted of concentrating at Waterloo and Wavres, could not have been easily executed. It is, indeed, a matter of surprise, that Buonaparte did not make a more important demonstration on the side of Lisle and Mons. The Duke, in deciding on these movements, was under the necessity of acting on the intelligence given by spies or deserters, which can only be so far depended on, as it is confirmed by reports from the outposts, who may be themselves deceived.[313] What was true at their departure, may be entirely changed at their arrival with the information; and whatever may have been the case formerly, few or no instances occur at present of a person in the confidence of the cabinet, particularly of a military officer, betraying the confidence placed in him.
The Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre-Bras on the 16th, at an early hour, and immediately proceeded to Bry, to concert measures with Marshal Blucher, for arranging the most efficient plan of support. It appeared at that time, that the whole French attack would be directed against the Prussians, as considerable masses of the enemy were in movement in their front. Blucher was at this time at the wind-mill of Bry, about five English miles from Quatre-Bras. [Muffling, p. 10.] The Duke proposed to advance upon Frasnes and Gosselies, which would have been a decided movement, as acting on the French communications, and immediately in rear of their left flank; but as the troops could not be ready to advance from Quatre-Bras before four o'clock, the attack must have been too late, and in the meantime the Prussians would have to sustain the attack of nearly the whole French army. Maréchal Blucher, therefore, judged it more desirable, that the Duke should form a junction with the Prussian right, by marching direct by the chaussée from Quatre-Bras to Bry.[314]
The object of the enemy on the 16th, as may be seen by the general orders of Napoleon, communicated by Soult to Ney and Grouchy, was to turn the Prussian right, by driving the British from Quatre-Bras, and then to march down the chaussée upon the Bry, and thus separate the armies. [Batty, p. 150.] For this purpose, Ney was detached with 43,000 men. [Liv. ix., p. 103.] On reference to the above orders, it appears that not much resistance was expected in getting possession both of Sombref and Quatre-Bras.[315] Ney has been accused of delaying to attack, but reference to those orders will show that Ney had not been commanded to attack[316] until two o'clock P.M., in consequence of the allies having assembled in force at Quatre-Bras. The plan was excellent, and if Ney had been successful, would have led to important results. After obtaining possession of Quatre-Bras, he was to have detached part of his forces to attack the Prussian right flank in rear of St. Amand, whilst Buonaparte was making the chief attack on that village, the strongest in the position, and at the same time keeping the whole Prussian line engaged. Half of Ney's force was left in reserve near Frasnes, to be in readiness either to support the attacks on Quatre-Bras or St. Amand, and in the event of both succeeding, to turn the Prussian right, by marching direct on Wagnele or Bry.[317]
The village of St. Amand was well defended; it formed the strength of the Prussian right, and from the intersection of several gardens and hedges, was very capable of defence; although so much in advance of the rest of the Prussian position. The face of the country in front of this position possesses no remarkable features; the slopes towards the stream are gentle, and of easy access. After a continued attack for two hours, the enemy had only obtained possession of half the village of St. Amand, and a severe attack was made upon Ligny, which was taken and retaken several times.[318] At this time Buonaparte sent for the corps of reserve left by Ney at Frasnes; before, however, it reached St. Amand, in consequence of the check they had sustained at Quatre-Bras, it was countermarched, and from this circumstance became of little use either to Buonaparte or Ney. Buonaparte having observed the masses of troops which Blucher had brought up behind St. Amand (and probably in consequence of the corps above mentioned being necessary at Quatre-Bras,)[319] appears to have changed the disposition of his reserves, who were marching upon St. Amand, and moved them towards the right, to attack the Prussian centre at Ligny, which they succeeded in forcing, and so obtained possession of that village.[320] A large body of French cavalry, and another of infantry, then pushed forward to the height between Bry and Sombref, immediately in the rear of Ligny, and quite in the heart of the Prussian position, where they were attacked by Blucher at the head of his cavalry; this attempt to re-establish the action failed, and the Prussian cavalry were driven back upon the infantry.[321] It was now nine o'clock, about dark, which prevented the French from advancing farther, and they contented themselves with the occupation of Ligny. The Prussians did not evacuate Bry before three o'clock A.M. on the 17th.[322] In the course of the night, the Prussians fell back on Tilly and Gembloux. The loss of the Prussians, according to their own account, amounted to 14,000 men, and fifteen pieces of artillery. The French official account in the Moniteur to 15,000.[323] The French acknowledge to have lost 7000. It is evident that Buonaparte, in changing the point of attack from the Prussian right at St. Amand, to the centre at Ligny, in a manner forced the Prussians, if defeated, to retreat upon the British army, and give up their own line of operations; but still, at that hour in the evening, when the situation of the armies is considered, the change of attack appears to be the only hope he had of obtaining even a partial success; under such circumstances, it was perhaps the best course he could pursue.[324]
It is not easy to conceive that a defeat, in any case, would have been such as to prevent their junction, since each army had such considerable reinforcements moving up, and close upon them; but even in an extreme case, they could each have retired on their fortresses, and formed intrenched camps of perfect security, with every means of repairing the losses they sustained.[325]
The force of the enemy, at the time the Duke of Wellington left Quatre-Bras to communicate with Blucher, appeared to be so weak, that no serious attack was at that time to be apprehended; but on his return to that position, about three o'clock, he found they had assembled a large force at Frasnes, and were preparing for an attack, which was made about half-past three o'clock by two columns of infantry, and nearly all their cavalry, supported by a heavy fire of artillery. The force at that time under his orders, was 17,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, of which about 4500 were British infantry, the rest Hanoverians, and Belgians, and Nassau troops.[326] They at first obtained some success, driving back the Belgian and Brunswick cavalry; their cavalry penetrated amongst our infantry before they had quite time to form squares, and forced a part to retire into the adjoining wood; they were, however, repulsed. At this period of the action, the third British division, under General Alten, arrived about four o'clock, soon after the action had commenced. They consisted of about 6300 men, and were composed of British, King's German legion, and Hanoverians. They had some difficulty in maintaining their ground, and one regiment lost a colour.[327] They succeeded, however, in repelling the enemy from the advanced points he had gained at the farm of Gemincourt and village of Pierremont.
Ney still, however, occupied part of the wood of Bossu, which extends from Quatre-Bras, on the right of the road towards Frasnes, to the distance of about a mile. This favoured an attack on the right of our position, which he accordingly made, after having been repulsed on the left. At this moment the division of General Cooke [Guards,] 4000 strong, arrived from Enghien, and materially assisted to repel this attack, which, after considerable exertions, was done, and the enemy driven back upon Frasnes, in much confusion. This affair was severely contested, and though the enemy were repulsed, the loss on each side was nearly equal, owing to the superiority of the French in artillery. The loss, however, inflicted on the French by the fire of musketry, which their attacking columns were exposed to, was very considerable, and counterbalanced the advantage they derived from their artillery. It required great exertions to maintain the important post of Quatre-Bras, in the present relative situations of the two armies. It is certain that, if Ney had advanced as rapidly as Buonaparte says he might have done, he would have obtained his object. Ney, however, in his letter, contradicts the possibility of his having done so, which seems to be confirmed by Soult's letter to him, dated at 2 o'clock P.M., where he tells him, that Grouchy is to attack Bry with the 3d and 4th corps, at half-past 2 P.M. [Batty, App.]; that he is to attack the corps in his front, and afterwards to assist Grouchy; but that if he (Ney) defeats the troops in his front first, Grouchy would be ordered to assist his operations. It is most probable that the corps left at Frasnes, which Ney complains was taken away without his knowledge, was destined to assist either attack as might be found necessary.
Even had Ney got possession of Quatre-Bras at an early hour, he would scarcely have been able to detach any sufficient force against the Prussians, seeing, as he must have done, or at least ought to have calculated, that the British forces were arriving rapidly on the point which we suppose him to have occupied. The British could have still retreated on Waterloo, and been concentrated on the 17th at that position; and there was nothing to prevent the Prussians retreating on Wavre, as they afterwards did. Though Buonaparte says [Liv. ix., p. 209,] that on the 15th every thing had succeeded as he wished, and that the Duke of Wellington had manœuvred as he would have wished him to do; yet one corps of the Prussian army had so far kept him in check, that he was not able to reach Fleurus; and on the 16th, could not commence the attack until three hours after mid-day. He did not gain possession of Quatre-Bras until the forenoon of the 17th. He had sustained a severe check with one part of his army, and gained an indecisive action with the other; the loss of the allies not exceeding his own, whilst they had the advantage of retiring leisurely on their resources and reinforcements, and by the retreat, gave up no place or position now of consequence to the pursuing enemy. The result of the operations of the 16th produced no important consequences to the French. The celebrated engineer, General Rogniat, does not hesitate to term it an indecisive action. The success of the British in repelling the attack of Quatre-Bras, tended to make them meet the renewed attack at Waterloo with more confidence, and probably had a contrary effect on the enemy; whilst the manner in which the Prussian corps of Thielman received the attack of Grouchy on the 18th, who had superior forces, showed how little the confidence of the Prussians had been shaken by the action at Ligny. It may be observed, that the forces engaged at Ligny were nearly equal, even deducting D'Erlon's corps, which was left at Frasnes, as not engaged. The French passed the frontiers with about 125,000 men—Blucher had 80,000—and at the close of the day, Lord Wellington had 30,000.[328] The commanders of the allied armies appear not to have overrated what was to be expected from their troops, which was not exactly the case with their opponents.