I venture to think that Lord Avebury himself would have admitted the force of this contention. It would, at least, answer the question he puts more than once, “Where, indeed, is it (municipal and national trading) to stop? Is it to stop at all?… It is sometimes said that the line should be drawn at necessaries. But if so, to light, gas, water and tramways, we should have to add bread, meat, fire insurance, … etc., while many would also add tobacco, tea and beer.”[13]
In effect, the whole of the objections to State ownership, as will appear from a perusal of the various books referred to above, and the arguments of other opponents, are all comprised under three heads, namely, according to the relationship of the State:—
1. With traders.
2. With railway servants.
3. With the general public, especially on such matters as officialism and inefficiency, owing to want of competition, bad administration, and interference with private enterprise.
The first of the two objections referred to is that the Government would be in the great difficulty of having to meet the conflicting interests of traders and merchants on the one hand, and the general public on the other, with continual disputes as to the claims of various parties, and possible attempts to bring influence to bear on the Government and Members of Parliament. This objection was raised by the Prime Minister recently in reply to a deputation supporting railway nationalisation. The difficulty has been found in countries where railways are State owned, and would, I admit, be a most serious objection, if, after nationalisation, the railways should be worked on the same principle as now, namely, with the object of making the most profit possible, and charging according to “what the traffic will bear.”
The objection, however, disappears if the proposed rules are adhered to, especially when, as in the proposed scheme, fares and rates are fixed irrespective of distance, locality, class of traders or goods, and in which, therefore, no question of preference or, indeed, of any conflicting interests can arise.
As to the second heading, affecting the relationship of the State with the railway servants. It is suggested that the railway servants (who would, on nationalisation, become Civil servants) could use their voting powers to exact undue privileges for themselves which they cannot now obtain, and that serious abuses might arise owing to the great political power exercised by a large increase in the number of voters who are also Civil servants.
This does not appear to me so formidable an objection as the first, but it is quite possible that a large united body of Civil servants might have power to so influence the Government as to extract higher wages or less hours, if they discovered that by their exertions a very large profit was derived by the railway system.