Some writers have gone so far as to suggest that all persons employed by Government should be disfranchised. Others suggest that special representatives of Government officials should be returned to Parliament. Others that all such officials should take the same oath of allegiance as soldiers, and, in short, become subject to military discipline. In two articles appearing recently in the “Westminster Gazette,” under the title of “Unrest in the Railway World, by an Expert,”[14] it is suggested that “unless some discipline of the military kind were introduced” (in the event of nationalisation), “there would be no available methods of dealing with a national strike of railwaymen, other than to concede to their demands.” The question of “Strikes” has already been dealt with above ([page 36]). As to the political difficulty, although it is true that the number of Civil servants would be greatly increased (and it has been estimated that the total number of postal and railway servants who would have the vote might be as many as 600,000), it must be remembered, as pointed out by Mr. Emil Davies, that this number is spread over the whole Country, and the percentages in each district, compared to the whole number of voters, would not be a large one, except in railway centres like Crewe, where they already have a preponderance of votes. In any case, the same considerations which, as above mentioned, would be likely to prevent strikes, would operate equally in the region of politics if the four rules mentioned are adhered to, especially under the proposed scheme, carried on with the primary object of the public benefit. Exactly the same conditions would obtain as with the Post Office now.
Other grounds of objection to State ownership are:—
1. The fear of inefficiency owing to lack of competition.
2. The fear of difficulty in obtaining redress for loss or injury from a Government Department.
3. The fear of officialism.
As to competition, it is now generally admitted that there is no effective competition on railways.[15] In most parts of the country there never has been any competition, as one company only is available. In others, where more than one company operates, working arrangements have been made not only as to the fares and rates but also as to time of trains, thus precluding any effective competition. In the very nature of things no competition can be effective in a system of railway transit.
As to the questions of officialism and difficulties of obtaining redress, can anyone suggest that these are less in the case of private companies, responsible to no one but themselves, than in the case of a Government Department with a Cabinet Minister at the head who is responsible to Parliament? A vote of censure is one of the most powerful weapons in Constitutional countries against any serious abuse in a Government Department.
Mr. Edwin A. Pratt, in his book before referred to, cannot but admit the cogency of the argument in favour of the amalgamation and unification of the railways, but urges that this should be accomplished by the amalgamation of the whole of the existing railways into a Trust or Traffic Board. The answer to this is that when once constituted, even though appointed by Parliament, such a Board is responsible to no one but itself, and, however eminent may be the directors or managers, the want of ultimate responsibility inevitably and unconsciously leads to abuses. Can any instance be adduced of the successful working of any such large Trust or Board? On the other hand, instances are well known to the contrary. One of these was the notorious Metropolitan Board of Works. And is it certain that the Metropolitan Water Board and the Port of London Authority, both of which are constituted on similar lines, will answer all the expectations which were formed of them?
There are, of course, difficulties inherent in the administration of a great Government Department, but, as already hinted, various remedies may be suggested for many of these difficulties. For instance, there might be elected a Railway Council or Standing Committee in Parliament, consisting of representatives of several large districts of the United Kingdom, and of which the “Minister of Transport” would be, ex-officio, the President. In the first instance possibly some of the present directors of railway companies, many of whom are already in Parliament, could be members of this Council. Any proposals for improvements, extensions or alterations in the services of the railway or Post Office would be submitted to and decided upon by this Council or Committee, subject to an appeal to Parliament on questions of principle or finance. This would be one means of obviating an objection found in some countries where the railways are owned by the State, namely, the continual trivial complaints made in Parliament about the railways.
A further suggestion is that a special Railway Court should be established in London with branches in every important centre, and presided over by competent arbitrators to determine and adjudicate upon claims against the Department for personal injuries to passengers and servants, or for loss of or damage to goods, or by reason of delay, any one accident, involving a large number of claims, being dealt with by the same Court instead of being, as now, the subject of innumerable actions at law in the ordinary Courts. This Railway Court might also be useful in settling disputes between the Government and the men.