Vicksburg National Military Park, Mississippi

by William C. Everhart

Photograph of Vicksburg taken from across the Mississippi River by a Union surgeon during a bombardment. From Photographic History of the Civil War.

In a pouring rain, Sherman and McPherson approached Jackson on the morning of May 14. Johnston posted the brigades of General Gregg and Brig. Gen. W. H. T. Walker on the approaches to the city with instructions to hold just long enough for valuable stores to be removed from Jackson northward to Canton where he hoped to combine forces with Pemberton. Delaying their attack until the rain (which would spoil their powder) slackened, the Union infantry charged the Confederate entrenchments, driving the defenders before them and capturing the city along with 35 guns and much equipment. Having intercepted a dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton ordering a junction of all Confederate troops, Grant put his men on the road toward Edwards Station at daylight the following morning. His plan was to drive a wedge between the Confederate forces before Johnston, circling to the north, could effect a junction with Pemberton. Sherman remained in Jackson to destroy the railroad yards and stores.

A Union assault during the battle of Champion’s Hill. From a wartime sketch.

THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION’S HILL.

Events preceding the battle of Champion’s Hill emphasized the opposing tactical views held by the two Confederate commanders. Pemberton believed the retention of Vicksburg so imperative that no move which might endanger the city should be considered. It was Johnston’s view that Admiral Porter’s successful passage of the batteries and Grant’s approach from the rear had already doomed the city, and that it was consequently valuable only for the military supplies and troops which it contained. Johnston believed that the South’s only chance to prevent loss of the Mississippi was for Pemberton and himself to join forces and fight the great battle which might smash and destroy Grant’s Army.

On the morning of May 14, Pemberton, at Edwards Station, received the dispatch from Johnston (a copy of which Grant had already intercepted) informing him of the position of Union troops at Clinton, between the two Confederate forces, and ordering him “if practicable, come up on his [Grant’s] rear at once.” Pemberton considered the order “suicidal.” Convinced that Johnston’s recent arrival on the field and separation from the main body did not give him sufficient information to survey the situation accurately, Pemberton called a council of war and placed the order before his commanders. Although a majority of his council favored obedience to Johnston’s order, Pemberton was unwilling to endorse a movement which might endanger Vicksburg. It was decided to move instead against Grant’s supposed communications which were believed essential to the Union Army’s existence away from the river.

On May 15, Pemberton marched to the southeast with 17,000 men, his route further separating him from Johnston to the north. Grant, meanwhile, prepared to head westward, his line of march threatening to pierce the gap between Johnston and Pemberton and beat both of them in the race for Vicksburg. On the morning of the 16th, a second order was received from Johnston ordering Pemberton to move to the north and join Johnston. This order was obeyed, but as Pemberton’s troops were countermarching they were struck by Union troops.

The battle of Champion’s Hill centered around a crescent-shaped ridge of about 75 feet elevation near the Champion plantation home and involved three parallel roads leading from Edwards Station to Raymond. Each of Pemberton’s three divisions—led by General Bowen, General Loring, and Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson—covered one of these roads. The battle opened shortly before noon on the 16th when Brig. Gen. A. P. Hovey’s Union Division, supported by Logan’s Division, attacked along the north road which passed over the slope of Champion’s Hill. From the crest of the hill, Stevenson’s Confederate Division opened a heavy fire on the advancing Union lines which steadily mounted the ridge, driving the Confederates back and capturing 11 guns. To meet this threat to the Confederate left flank, Bowen’s Division was shifted to the north to prevent a breakthrough. Re-forming his lines, Bowen counterattacked the ridge position. He dislodged the Federal infantry, driving them from the slope, and recaptured all but two of the lost guns.