Magna Carta, and Other Addresses

by William D. Guthrie

I have examined the published record as to contested seats in the national convention of the Republican party at Chicago, and I have endeavored to ascertain all of the facts. I believe that I have done so. In my judgment no fair-minded person who will take the trouble to read the evidence, who will look impartially at the facts and candidly seek to discover the truth, can doubt the fairness of the procedure or the correctness of the decisions. Most of the contests were wholly unjustifiable, if not fraudulent, and had to be abandoned. Indeed, it was shamelessly boasted by a well-known newspaper that the great majority of the contests had been gotten up in order to create a psychological effect, which, I take it, among plain people would mean the deliberate creation of a false impression. I will read you the language of one of the exemplars of the class of reformers who are too virtuous to remain in the Republican party and who profess to teach the people of this country political morality. The "Washington Times" contains the following in its issue of June 9, 1912: "For psychological effect as a move in practical politics it was necessary for the Roosevelt people to start contests on these early Taft selections in order that a tabulation of delegate strength could be put out that would show Roosevelt holding a good hand. In the game a table showing Taft 150, Roosevelt 19, contested 1, would not be very much calculated to inspire confidence, whereas, one showing Taft 23, Roosevelt 19, contested 127, looked very different. That is the whole story of the large number of southern contests that were started early in the game. It was never expected that they would be taken very seriously. They served a useful purpose, and now the national committee is deciding them in favor of Taft in most cases without real division."

Of the 238 contests finally filed on behalf of ex-President Roosevelt, 164 were abandoned. The contests which were not abandoned were decided on their merits. After studying the facts, I am convinced that the Taft delegates were legally and morally entitled to their seats. Unfortunately, the record is voluminous, and few will take the time or trouble to read the evidence. The cry of fraud is misleading many. But surely when such men as Senator Root and the presidents of Columbia and Cornell universities declare their conviction of the integrity of the procedure and of the decisions, we may well rest satisfied. In his speech notifying President Taft of his renomination, Senator Root said that neither in the facts nor in the arguments produced before the national committee, the committee on credentials, the convention itself, or otherwise, did there appear to be any just ground for impeaching the honesty and good faith of the decisions of the national committee. He further declared to President Taft that his title to the nomination was "as clear and unimpeachable as the title of any candidate of any party since political conventions began." Senator Root's high character, his great services to the nation and to the party, and his lofty sense of personal honor and responsibility, entitle him to have his word and his opinion under such circumstances unqualifiedly accepted by the people of the state of New York.

The preference of the majority of the national convention being clearly for President Taft, should this majority nevertheless have cast him aside and nominated Mr. Roosevelt because of threats of disruption of the party similar to those of 1896, or because in a few states ex-President Roosevelt had secured a larger primary vote than President Taft in hasty contests in which misrepresentation undoubtedly had led many astray? What course did patriotism dictate to the majority of the delegates? Ought they to have surrendered, and, because of clamor and threats of disruption of the party, put aside their own preferences and instructions for President Taft and nominated Mr. Roosevelt? There were reasons why this course would have been an act of folly as well as of injustice.

In the first place, the nomination of an ex-President of the United States for a third term would have been in violation of an unwritten rule established by Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, and followed ever since. The Republican party which, as a matter of sound principle and political ethics, had refused in 1880 to nominate ex-President Grant for a third term, notwithstanding his transcendent claims to the gratitude of the nation, could not stultify itself in 1912 by nominating ex-President Roosevelt for a third term.

The wisdom of maintaining this unwritten rule should be evident. The common sense of thoughtful, candid and patriotic men must convince them that nothing could be more dangerous than to permit any individual, however popular or eloquent, to wield the power of the presidential office for more than two terms. The New York convention of 1788, which ratified the Constitution of the United States, proposed an amendment to the effect "that no person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States a third time," and this undoubtedly has ever since been the sentiment of the people of this state, although it was defied in 1880 when an attempt was made to force the nomination of ex-President Grant for a third term, notwithstanding the fact that only five years before the Republican state convention had declared in its platform "our unalterable opposition to the election of any president for a third term."

There is not time to discuss the genesis or wisdom of this unwritten rule of political policy, which had never been violated by any political party until the nomination of ex-President Roosevelt by the Progressives. It is now pretended that there never was any such rule or principle of political policy and that Washington and Jefferson were governed solely by considerations of their own personal convenience. Three quotations from Jefferson's writings ought to be sufficient to explode this pretense. I take Jefferson because he is now one of the patron saints of the Progressive as well as of the Democratic party.

In January, 1805, shortly after his re-election, Jefferson declared as follows: "General Washington set the example of voluntary retirement after eight years. I shall follow it. And a few more precedents will oppose the obstacle of habit to any one after awhile who shall endeavor to extend his term. Perhaps it may beget a disposition to establish it by an amendment of the Constitution. I believe I am doing right, therefore, in pursuing my principle." Again in 1807 he wrote to the legislature of Vermont: "I should unwillingly be the person who, disregarding the sound precedent set by an illustrious predecessor, should furnish the first example of prolongation beyond the second term of office." And fourteen years afterwards, in 1821, he published his "Autobiography," in which he said: "The example of four Presidents voluntarily retiring at the end of their eighth year, and the progress of public opinion that the principle is salutary, have given it in practice the force of precedent and usage; insomuch, that, should a President consent to be a candidate for a third election, I trust he would be rejected on this demonstration of ambitious views."

But aside from all principle and precedent, the promises deliberately made by ex-President Roosevelt to the people of the United States rendered his candidacy impossible without what seems to many a breach of faith. The facts speak for themselves.

On the 8th of November, 1904, President Roosevelt expressed to the people of the United States gratitude for his election, and appealed to them for their support and confidence during his second term, undoubtedly having in mind President McKinley's example in 1901, when he had declared that he would not accept a nomination for a third term if it were tendered him, and had pointed out that there were "questions of the greatest importance before the administration and the country, and their just consideration should not be prejudiced in the public mind by even the suspicion of the thought of a third term." President Roosevelt's language in 1904 was as follows: "On the 4th of March next I shall have served three and one-half years, and this three and one-half years constitutes my first term. The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form. Under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination." In December, 1907, he reiterated this declaration, and added the following words: "I have not changed and shall not change the decision thus announced." Yet on February 24, 1912, he gave to the press a letter in which he said: " I will accept the nomination for President if it is tendered to me, and I will adhere to this decision until the convention has expressed its preference."

The statesman who had thus pledged his word could not break his promise to the people without sacrificing the good opinion of many citizens. And if the Republican national convention had joined ex-President Roosevelt in a repudiation of these solemn promises, it would have alienated a large body of voters who still hold in reverence the names and examples of Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, and who still believe in political consistency and morality, and it would have put the party on the defensive throughout the campaign upon an issue of plain and simple morals. The Republican party, moreover, could not afford—in fact it would have been hopeless—to ask for the continued support of the country on any such terms.