He ordered general Stewart’s brigade, strengthened by two German battalions, to halt at Santarem. He explained his own motives to the Portuguese, and urged the regency to a more frank and vigorous system than they had hitherto followed; for, like the Spanish juntas, they promised every thing, and performed nothing; neither would they, although [Appendix, No. 3], section 5. consenting, verbally, to all the measures proposed, ever commit themselves by writing, having the despicable intention of afterwards disclaiming that which might prove disagreeable to the populace, or even to the French. Sir John Cradock, however, had no power beyond his own personal influence to enforce attention to his wishes. No successor to sir Charles Cotton had yet arrived, and Mr. Villiers seems to have wanted the decision and judgement required to meet such a momentous crisis.
In the north general Cameron, having sent the sick men and part of the stores from Almeida towards Oporto, gave up that fortress to sir Robert Wilson; and, on the 5th of January, marched, with two British battalions and a detachment of convalescents, by the Tras os Montes to join the army in Spain. On the 9th, hearing of sir John Moore’s retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida, but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened to intercept the line of march; wherefore, Cameron turned towards Lamego, giving notice of his movement to sir Robert Wilson, and advising him also to retire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, with seven companies of the 3d regiment, escorting a convoy for sir John Moore’s army, was likewise forced to abandon his route, and take the road to Oporto, on which town every thing British in the north of Portugal was now directed.
Notwithstanding the general dismay, sir Robert Wilson rejected Cameron’s advice, and, being reinforced by some Spanish troops, Portuguese volunteers, and straggling convalescents, belonging to Moore’s army, proceeded to put in practice all the arts of an able partizan. Issuing proclamations, enticing the French to desert, spreading false reports of his numbers, and, by petty enterprizes and great activity, arousing a spirit of resistance throughout the Ciudad Rodrigo country.
The continued influx of sick and stores at Oporto, together with the prospect of general Cameron’s arrival there, became a source of uneasiness to sir John Cradock. Oporto, with a shifting-bar and shoal water is the worst possible harbour for vessels to clear out, and one of the most dangerous for vessels to lie off, at that season of the year; hence, if the enemy advanced in force, a great loss, both of men and stores, was to be anticipated.
The departure of sir Charles Cotton had diminished the naval means at captain Halket’s disposal, and, for seventeen successive days, such was the state of Sir John Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. the wind that no vessel could leave the Tagus; he, however, contrived at last to send tonnage for two thousand persons, and undertook to keep a sloop of war off Oporto. Sir Samuel Hood also despatched some vessels from Vigo, but the weather continued for a long time so unfavourable that these transports could not enter the harbour of Oporto, and the encumbrances hourly increasing, at last produced the most serious embarrassments.
Sir John Moore having now relinquished his communications with Portugal, sir John Cradock had to consider how, relying on his own resources, he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain his hold of that country, without risking the utter destruction of the troops intrusted to his care.
For an inferior army Portugal has no defensible frontier. The rivers, generally running east and west, are fordable in most places, subject to sudden rises and falls, offering but weak lines of resistance; and with the exception of the Zezere, presenting no obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating by the eastern frontier. The mountains, indeed, afford many fine and some impregnable positions, but such is the length of the frontier line and the difficulty of lateral communications, that a general who should attempt to defend it against superior forces would risk to be cut off from the capital, if he concentrated his troops; and if he extended them his line would be immediately broken.
The possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the possession of Portugal, south of the Duero, and an inferior army can only protect Lisbon by keeping close to that capital. Sensible of this truth, sir John Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente’s views for the defence of Lisbon; and proceeded, on the 4th of January, with seventeen hundred men to occupy the heights behind the creek of Saccavem—leaving, however, three thousand men in the forts and batteries at Lisbon.
At the earnest request of the regency, who in return promised to assemble the native troops at Thomar, Abrantes, and Vilha Velha, general Stewart’s brigade, two thousand seven hundred strong, Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. was ordered to halt at Santarem. But it had been marching incessantly for a month, and in the rain, the men’s clothes were worn out, their accoutrements nearly destroyed, and in common with the rest of the army, they were suffering severely from the want of shoes.