Thus, Cameron being on the Douro, the main body between Santarem and Lisbon, and colonel Kemmis at Elvas, with the fortieth regiment, an army of ten thousand men—with the encumbrances of an army of forty thousand—was placed on the three points of a triangle, the shortest side of which was above a hundred and fifty miles. The general commanding could not bring into the field above five thousand men; nor could that number be assembled in a condition for service at any one point of the frontier, under three weeks or a month; moreover, the uncertainty of remaining in the country at all, rendered it difficult to feed the troops, for the commissaries being unable to make large contracts for a fixed time, were forced to carry on, as it were, a retail system of supply.
Mr. Frere, however, with indefatigable folly, was urging sir John Cradock to make a diversion in Spain; and while Mr. Frere was calling for troops in the south, Mr. Villiers was as earnest that a force might be sent by sea to Vigo. The minister’s instructions prescribed the preservation of Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida; the assembling, in concert with the Portuguese government, a combined force on the frontier, and the sending succours of men to Moore; but although sir John Cradock’s means were so scanty that the fulfilment of any one of these objects was scarcely possible, Mr. Canning writing officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, as if a mighty and well supplied army was in Portugal, enforced the “necessity of continuing to maintain possession of Portugal, as long as could be done with the force intrusted to sir John Cradock’s command, remembering always that not the defence of Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy’s military force, and the diversion which would be thus created in favour of the south of Spain, were objects not to be abandoned, except in case of the most extreme necessity.” The enemy’s military force! It was three hundred thousand men, and this despatch was a pompous absurdity; but the ministers and their agents, eternally haunted by the phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese armies, were incapable of perceiving the palpable bulk and substance of the French hosts. The whole system of the cabinet was one of shifts and expedients; every week produced a fresh project,—minister and agent, alike, followed his own views, without reference to any fixed principle: and the generals were the only persons not empowered to arrange military operations.
The number of officers despatched to seek information of the French movements enabled sir John Cradock, notwithstanding the direct communications were cut off, to obtain intelligence of Moore’s advance towards Sahagun, and being still anxious to assist that general, he again endeavoured to send a reinforcement into Spain, by the route of Almeida; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies finally induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers’ wishes, and he shipped six hundred cavalry, and Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. thirteen hundred infantry, on the 12th of January, meaning to send them to Vigo; the vessels were, however, still in the river, when authentic intelligence of sir John Moore’s retreat upon Coruña with the intention of embarking there, was received, and rendered this project useless.
The 14th of January the Conqueror line-of-battle-ship, having admiral Berkeley on board, reached the Tagus, and for the first time since sir John Cradock’s Paper, MSS. Cradock took the command of the troops in Portugal, he received a communication from the ministers in England.
It now appeared that their thoughts were less intently fixed upon the defence of Portugal, than upon getting possession of Cadiz. Their anxiety upon this subject had somewhat subsided after the battle of Vimeira, but it revived with greater vigour when sir John Moore, contemplating a movement in the south, suggested the propriety of securing Cadiz as a place of arms; and in January an expedition was prepared to sail for that town, with the design of establishing a new base of operations for the English army. The project failed, but the transaction deserves notice, as affording proof of the perplexed and unstable policy of the day.
NEGOTIATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CADIZ.
Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.