Following general Semelé’s journal,[4] the French loss did not exceed three hundred men, a number so utterly disproportionate to that of the vanquished as to be scarcely credible, and, if correct, discovering a savage rigour in the pursuit by no means commendable; for it does not appear that any previous cruelties were perpetrated by the Spaniards to irritate the French soldiers. The right to slaughter an enemy in battle can neither be disputed nor limited; but a brave soldier should always have regard to the character of his country, and be sparing of the sword towards beaten men.
The main body of the French army passed the night of the 28th near the field of battle; but Latour Maubourg marched with the dragoons by the left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a detachment at Torre Mexia to watch the roads of Almendralego and Villa Franca, and to give notice if the remains of Cuesta’s army should attempt to gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders to intercept them at Loboa.
The 29th, Villatte’s division advanced as far as Villa Nueva de Serena, and the light cavalry were pushed on to Campanarios. But, as all the reports agreed that Cuesta, with a few horsemen, had taken refuge in the Sierra Morena, and that the remnants of his army were dispersed and wandering through the fields and along the bye-roads, without any power of re-uniting, the duke of Belluno relinquished the pursuit. Having fixed his head-quarters at Merida, and occupied that place and Medellin with his infantry, he formed with his cavalry a belt extending from Loboa on the right to Mingrabil on the left; but the people had all fled from the country, and even the great towns were deserted.
Merida, situated in a richly-cultivated basin, possesses a fine bridge and many magnificent remains of antiquity, Roman and Moorish; amongst others, a castle built on the right bank of the river, close to the bridge, and so perfect that, in eight days, it was rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault; and six guns being mounted on the walls, and an hospital for a thousand men established there, a garrison of three hundred men, with stores and provisions for eight hundred, during two months, was put into it.
The king now repeated his orders that the duke of Belluno should enter Portugal, and that general Lapisse should march upon Abrantes; but the former again remonstrated, on the ground that he could not make such a movement and defend his communications with Almaraz, unless the division of Lapisse was permitted to join him by the route of Alcantara. But as Badajos, although more capable of defence than it had been in December, when the fourth corps was at Merida, was still far from being secure; and that many of the richer inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the violence of the mob government, were more inclined to betray the gates to the French than to risk a siege; Victor, whose battering train (composed of only twelve pieces, badly horsed and provided) was still at Truxillo, opened a secret communication with the malcontents.
The parties met at the village of Albuera, and everything was arranged for the surrender, when the peasants giving notice to the junta that some treason was in progress, the latter arrested all the Journal of Operations MS. persons supposed to be implicated, and the project was baffled. The duke of Belluno then resigned all further thoughts of Badajos, and contented himself with sending detachments to Alcantara, to get intelligence of general Lapisse, of whose proceedings it is now time to give some account.
Plate 3. to face Pa. 226.
Sketch Explanatory of
ML. VICTOR’S OPERATIONS
AGAINST CUESTA
in March 1809.
London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.