OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSE.

This general, after taking Zamora in January, occupied Ledesma and Salamanca, where he was joined by general Maupetit’s brigade of cavalry, and as sir Robert Wilson’s legion and the feeble garrisons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only bodies in his front, universal terror prevailed. Yet he, although at the head of at least ten thousand men, with a powerful artillery, remained inactive from January to the end of March, and suffered sir Robert, with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his outposts, to intercept his provisions, to restrain his patroles, and even to disturb his infantry in their quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt, and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people which they were far from feeling when the enemy first appeared.

Don Carlos d’España, with a small Spanish force, being after a time placed under sir Robert’s command, the latter detached two battalions to occupy the pass of Baños, and Lapisse was thus deprived of any direct communication with Victor. In this situation the French general remained without making any vigorous effort either to clear his front or to get intelligence of the duke of Dalmatia’s march upon Oporto until the beginning of April, when he advanced towards Bejar, but, finding the passes occupied, turned suddenly to his right, dissipated Wilson’s posts on the Ecla, and forced the legion, then commanded by colonel Grant, to take refuge under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. He summoned that town to surrender on the 6th, and, after a slight skirmish close to the walls, took a position between the Agueda and Ledesma.

This event was followed by a general insurrection from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara and from Tamames to Bejar. For Lapisse, who had been again ordered by the king to fulfil the emperor’s instructions, and advance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, suddenly quitted his positions on the Agueda, and, without regarding his connexion with the second corps, abandoned Leon, and made a rapid march, through the pass of Perales, upon Alcantara, followed closely by sir Robert Wilson, don Carlos d’España, the two battalions from Bejar, and a multitude of peasants, both Portuguese and Spanish.

At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents endeavoured to defend the passage of the river, but the French broke through the entrenchments on the bridge, and, with a full encounter carried the town, and pillaged it, after which they abandoned the place, and joined the first corps, at Merida, on the 19th of April.

This false movement greatly injured the French cause. From that moment the conquering impulse given by Napoleon was at an end, and his armies, ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary or retrograded, and the British, Spanish, and Portuguese once more assumed the lead. The duke of Dalmatia, abandoned to his own resources, and in total ignorance of the situation of the corps by which his movements should have been supported, was forced to remain in Oporto; and at the moment, when the French combinations were thus paralyzed, the arrival of English reinforcements at Lisbon and the advance of sir John Cradock towards Leiria gave a sudden and violent impetus both to the Spaniards and Portuguese along the Beira frontier. Thus the insurrection, no longer kept down by the presence of an intermediate French corps, connecting Victor’s and Soult’s forces, was established in full activity from Alcantara, on the Tagus, to Amarante, on the Tamega.

Meanwhile Cuesta was gathering another host in the Morena; for, although the simultaneous defeat of the armies in Estremadura and La Mancha had at first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia, the Spaniards, when they found such victories as Ciudad Real and Medellin only leading to a stagnant inactivity on the part of the French, concluded that extreme weakness was the cause, and that the Austrian war had or would oblige Napoleon to abandon his projects against the Peninsula. This idea was general, and upheld not only the people’s spirit but the central junta’s authority, which could not otherwise have been maintained after such a succession of follies and disasters.

The misfortunes of the two Spanish generals had been equal; but Cartoajal, having no popular influence, was dismissed, while Cuesta was appointed to command what remained of both armies; and the junta, stimulated for a moment by the imminent danger in which they were placed, drew together all the scattered troops and levies in Andalusia. To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles of Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hundred horse and two thousand three hundred infantry, drafted from the garrison of Seville; these were followed by thirteen hundred old troops from Cadiz; and finally, three thousand five hundred Grenadian levies, and eight thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horsemen, taken from the army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers, until, in the latter end of April, they amounted to twenty-five thousand infantry, and about six thousand cavalry. General Venegas, also, being recalled from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina, and proceeded to organize another army of La Mancha.

King Joseph, justly displeased at the false disposition made of Lapisse’s division, directed that Alcantara should be immediately re-occupied; but as this was not done without an action, which belongs to another combination, it shall be noticed hereafter. It is now proper to return to the operations on the Douro, so intimately connected with those on the Guadiana, and yet so differently conducted.