CHAPTER IV.
When the bishop of Oporto beheld, from his station at Sarea, the final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north of Portugal, he fled to Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the regency, became a member of that body, and was soon after created patriarch; and, as I shall have occasion to shew, used his great influence in the most mischievous manner; discovering, on every occasion, the untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition.
Meanwhile, the fall of Oporto enabled marshal Soult to establish a solid base of operations, and to commence a regular system of warfare. The immediate fruit of his victory was the capture of immense magazines of powder, and a hundred and ninety-seven pieces of artillery, every gun of which had been used in the action. Thirty English vessels, wind-bound in the river, and loaded with wine and provisions for a month, also fell into his hands.
Having repressed the disorders attendant on the battle, he adopted the same conciliatory policy [Appendix, No. 13]. which had marked his conduct at Chaves and Braga; and endeavoured to remedy, as far as it was possible, the deplorable results of the soldiers’ fury. Recovering and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants remaining in the town to be treated with respect; and invited, by proclamation, all those who had fled to return. He demanded no contribution; and, restraining with a firm hand the violence of his men, contrived, from the captured public property, to support the army, and even to succour the poorest and most distressed of the population.
Soult’s ability in the civil and political administration of the Entre Minho e Douro produced an effect which he was not prepared for. The prince regent’s desertion of the country was not forgotten. The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal being a dependency on the Brazils as it was to the usurpation of the French, and the comparison between Soult’s government and the horrible anarchy which preceded it was all in favour of the former. His victories, and the evident vigour of his character, contrasted with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency for the French power; and the party, formerly noticed as being inimical to the house of Braganza, revived.
The leaders, thinking this a favourable opportunity to execute their intention, waited upon the duke of Dalmatia, and expressed their desire for a French prince and an independent government. They even intimated their good wishes towards the duke himself, and demanded his concurrence and protection; while, in the name of the people, they declared that the Braganza dynasty was at an end.
Although unauthorized by the emperor to accede to this proposition, Soult was yet unwilling to reject a plan from which he could draw such immediate and important military advantages. Napoleon was not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion; but the marshal, trusting that circumstances would justify him, encouraged the design, and, appointing men to civil employments, raised a Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with so much dexterity [Appendix, No. 13]. that, in fifteen days, the cities of Oporto and Braga, and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Povoa de Barcim, Feira, and Ovar, sent addresses, containing the expression of their sentiments, and bearing the signatures of thirty thousand persons, as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants, as of the people.
These addresses were burnt when the French retreated from Oporto; but the fact that such a project was in agitation has never been denied. The regency even caused inquest to be made on the matter; and it was then asserted that very few persons were found to be implicated. That many of the signatures were forged by the leaders may readily be believed; but the policy of lessening the importance of the affair is also evident; and the inquisitors, if willing, could not have probed it to the bottom.
This transaction formed the ground-work of a tale generally credited, even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent crown; and the circumstances were certainly such as might create suspicion. That the conclusion was false, is, however, proved, by the mode in which Napoleon treated both the rumour and the subject Rovigo’s Memoirs. of it. Slighting the former, he yet made known to his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding, “I remember nothing but Austerlitz,”[5] and at the same time largely increased the duke of Dalmatia’s command.
S.
Journal of Operations MSS.