The defence of Portugal, was not the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor was lord Wellington moved thereto, by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and deliberately, formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then to the period, when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his military and political proceedings up to the moment, when, confident in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project, unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men, who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, laboured to thwart his measures and to ruin his designs.
After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly to negotiate with the Central Junta, upon matters touching the war, but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley’s departure was caused by the state of politics in England, where a change in the administration was about to take place,—a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected; because the ineptitude of the government, was, in private, acknowledged by many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition, was only the signal, for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues, which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James’s the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, Lord Castlereagh’s Statementhad secretly, denounced lord Castlereagh to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting the public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him. Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his Mr. Canning’s Statementabilities, to plan, and conduct the fitting out, of the most powerful armament that ever quitted England. But when it became evident that only loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition, Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, was by him characterised as “a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private.” This was followed by a duel; and by the dissolution of the administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool were then empowered to form another Cabinet; and after a fruitless negotiation with lord Grey, and lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered the department of foreign affairs to lord Wellesley.
Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which were afterwards so gloriously realized, but which could never have been undertaken with confidence by the general, unless secure of some powerful friend in the administration, embued with the same sentiments, bound by a common interest, and resolute, to support him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise, and commendable, in lord Wellesley, to sacrifice something of his own personal pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects, promising so much glory to the country and his own family, and the first proceedings in parliament justified his policy.
Previous to the change in the Cabinet, sir Arthur Wellesley had been created baron Douro, and viscount Wellington; but those honours, although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the opposition members, who with few exceptions, assailed the general, personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His See Parliamentary Debates.merits, they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment. Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Gallicia and Estremadura, and obliged one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid!
Lord Grey opposing his own crude military notions, to the practised skill of sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter’s dispositions at Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that action; and some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect to the commander, as not warranting admission to a peerage always open to venal orators; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgement, they would have cast away as a thing of no worth!
This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side: there was a ministerial person, at this time, who in his dread of the opposition, wrote to lord Wellington complaining of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a public sensation: any thing provided blood was spilt. A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the general’s abhorrence of this detestable policy; but when such passions were abroad, it is evident that lord Wellesley’s accession to the government, was essential to the success of lord Wellington’s projects.
Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of Europe; and every step made towards their accomplishment merits attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and to the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. Now it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune in war, or that the duke of Wellington has always been one of her peculiar favourites; but I will make it clearly appear, that if he met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon solid grounds, that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be adduced.
Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the ministers were yet unchanged, lord Castlereagh, brought, by continual reverses, to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded lord Wellington’s opinion upon the expediency, the chance of success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached the general on the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject required many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; and, at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal, was necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that lord Wellington replied to lord Liverpool, who, during the interval, had succeeded lord Castlereagh in the war department.
Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. Badajos, 14th Nov. 1809. MSS.
Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, he observed, that, unless the Spanish armies met with some great disaster, the former could not then make an attack upon Portugal; yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that moment in the latter might defend it. “But the peace in Germany,” he said, “might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, when the means of invading Portugal would be increased, not only in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in that case, until Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, provided England employed her armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military service was organised to the full extent of which it was capable. But the number of British forces employed should not be less than thirty thousand effective men. Although the Portuguese regular force, actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry, three thousand artillery, and three thousand cavalry; and the militia amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanças.”