History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3

by William Francis Patrick Napier

The next point of consideration was the probable expense. “The actual yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of transport-vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence the most important consideration was the expense of renovating, and supporting the Portuguese military, and civil services. The British government, had already subsidised the Portuguese Regency, at the rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of twenty thousand men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place at the service of the English commander-in-chief.

“But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars, which, after a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese army from disbanding from want of food.

“It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the Regency, and yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished the country that it was impossible to raise the revenue or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and, therefore, justice as well as policy required that England should afford pecuniary assistance to the Regency.

“Without it, nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The officers of that army had, for many years, done no duty, partly that their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons, and lived with their families; and, to these advantages, added others arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary discipline introduced by marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom, or against whom, they were to fight.

“If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to enable the Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before-mentioned, should be added a further subsidy of about three hundred thousand pounds, to supply the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance, the difficulties of the moment might be overcome; but, without it, he lord Wellington, felt assured, that the whole financial and military system of the Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense, hitherto incurred, would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide.

“There remained two other points to consider—the re-embarkation of the British army, in the event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry and artillery, those could not be carried off, if the embarkation took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances, the expense of horse-transports would be more than the worth of the animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although I,” he said, “consider the Portuguese government and army as the principals in the contest for their own independence, and that their success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British officers and troops, I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the state of the war, not only in Portugal but Spain. If, therefore, it should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually the British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than continue, by their means, the contest in this country.”

Peniché and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event of failure, but neither were likely to come within the scope of the operations, and lord Wellington’s opinion as to the facility of carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon admiral Berkeley’s assurances that the embarkation would not take longer than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all the ground above Passo d’Arcos, which, from the circumstance of its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian’s for an embarkation. But the admiral’s views, as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the Tagus, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank.

Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which, from the recent loss sustained on the Walcheren expedition, they truly observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of England, the ministers assented to lord Wellington’s proposals, undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; but thus pledging themselves to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of complete efficiency.

Thus supported, lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending contest. His troops removed from the Guadiana, took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal, and he expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry from England. Smaller detachments had already reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand; nine thousand were in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the effects of past illness.

The 20th of January, the head-quarters, and the artillery parcs, were established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry, was quartered, by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico, and Santarem. General Hill, was left with five thousand British, and a like number of Portuguese at Abrantes, and the remainder of the infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was distributed along the valley of the Mondego.