The plans of the English general, were—at first, grounded, upon the supposition, that the French would follow the right or northern line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations, against the Peninsula, that is, attack Portugal from the side of Old Castile, rather than Andalusia from the side of La Mancha. In this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon, his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms. Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment Seville was opening her gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh instructions, reiterating the question, whether Portugal should be defended at all, but at the same time transmitting, one of those clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the ministers’ information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; statements, in which, showing the bearings of past and present events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes, which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness.
Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810. MSS.
“The enemy,” he said, “aimed at conquering the south; he would no doubt obtain Seville with all its resources, and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however be lost and the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans would continue; Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist within its walls; but it would be without authority, because the French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs, left Portugal untouched; but it was chiefly to that country he wished to draw the ministers’ attention.
“They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within the last nine months, for the enrollment, organization, and equipment of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by military experience.
“When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to that pass, that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather than an advantage to the French government. Thence arose this question, ‘Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal, afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to the allies?’
“It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars every thing that discipline could effect had been done, and they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually determined to do every thing for the cause. Still they were not to be certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced in military affairs.”
Under these circumstances, and adverting to the approaching subjection of Spain, he demanded to know whether “the enemy, bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could be found. But, under any circumstances, (he said) the British army could always be embarked in despite of the enemy.”
Such being the view taken of this important subject by lord Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal could not be defended, Mr. James Moore’s Narrativewhereas lord Wellington did defend that country. The former general premising that he was not prepared to answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier, being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a superior force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c. which could only be made at Lisbon, that the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could alone defend the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded Appendix, [No. II.] Section 12.in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal “because the latter was without a military force,” and if it were otherwise, from the experience of Roriça and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on their troops. But this opinion, hastily given, had reference only to the state of affairs existing at that moment, being expressly founded on the miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military, Spain also being supposed conquered.
Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the termination of the anarchy, which prevailed during sir John Cradock’s time; after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force re-organized, and her regular troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature consideration, and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia, Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias, were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts with reference to this question, were still in possession of the Spaniards, and prepared for defence, lord Wellington, I say, came to Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14. 1809. MSS.the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the enemy then in the Peninsula, provided an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation. And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, although success Ibid. Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted. Lisbon also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as temporary posts. But, in all things concerning this war, there was between those generals, a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan of action.