‘Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as I have I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country.’
‘The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading people amongst them have invariably deceived the lower orders; and instead of making them acquainted with their real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of offensive operations which those who offer them for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked-for good. The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will at last become fatigued with the succession of their disasters which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented.’
Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810.
‘In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I enclose you a report which sir William Beresford has received from general Madden the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word in this letter that is not true. Yet these are the soldiers who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!
‘There is no remedy for these evils excepting a vigorous system of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in which discipline can be established. It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French, or of carrying on the war in any other manner. Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the Guerillas and by the Spanish armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies, are calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field.
‘But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period. Their courage, and even their activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances and is never a matter of choice nor of foresight.’
Wellington to lord Wellesley, 1810.
‘There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army either amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has in my opinion been the cause of the dastardly conduct which we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and they have become odious to the country. The peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph’s government to be protected from the outrages of their own troops.’
Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, Dec. 1810.