‘I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon having one or two, more or less, British regiments; and that after having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of general Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them.
‘The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities—that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.’
Wellington to general Graham, 1811.
‘The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition (Barrosa) is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be. They march the troops night and day without provisions or rest, and abuse everybody who proposes a moment’s delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus, when the moment of action arrives they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal.’[11]
So much for Wellington’s opinion of the Spanish soldiers and statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish generals:—
1809. ‘Although the Duque de Albuquerque is proné by many, amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out. I think the marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is certainly a sensible man and has seen much of the world.’
Now reader, the following is the character given to Romana in my history; compare it with the above:—
‘Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information, but disqualified by nature for military command.’ And again, speaking of his death, I say, ‘He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss.’ If the expressions are more positive than Wellington’s, it is because this was the duke’s first notion of the marquis; he was more positive afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown to him, and after circumstances known to him, gave me a right to be more decided. The following additional proofs, joined to those already given in my former reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one of his letters, says, ‘I am sorry to find that Romana is a shuffler.’ And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about the same period to general Doyle to urge the advance of Palafox and Infantado, says, ‘I know that Romana has not supported the British as he ought to have done, and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported it with a tolerably efficient force.’
In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham, expressing lord Wellington’s opinions, after saying that Wellington declared he had never met with a really able man in Spain, while in Portugal he had found several, proceeds thus—