On January 20, 1768, he again wrote recommending the inclusion, in the Council and the army, of a number of the noblesse. By this means he said: “We would at least succeed in dividing the Canadians and in case of war we would have a certain number on our side who would stimulate the zeal of the national troops of the king. Besides, the nobles would have reason to hope that their children without having received their education in France and without serving in the French service would be able to support their families in the service of the king, their master, in the exercise of offices which would prevent them from descending to the level of the common people through the division and the subdivision of their lands in each generation.” (Constitutional Documents, French Edit.)
On April 12, 1788, he again champions the noblesse and even recommends that the ceremony of seigneurial feudalism be kept up as under the ancient régime. “All lands here,” he says, “are dependent on His Majesty’s Château of St. Louis and I am persuaded that nothing can be more agreeable to the people and more suitable to secure the allegiance of the new subjects as well as the payment of fines, dues and rights which take the place of quit rents in this colony as a formal requisition, enjoining all who hold their lands directly from the king to render him foi et homage in his Château of St. Louis. The oaths taken by the vassals on this occasion are very solemn and binding and involve serious obligations; they are obliged in consequence to produce what they call here their ‘aveux et dénombrement,’ i. e., an exact return of their tenants and their revenue. In addition they have to pay their dues to their sovereign and to take arms to defend him in the case of an attack on the province.” (Constitutional Documents, French Edit.)
A letter of Carleton to Lord Hillsborough of November 20, 1768, is headed “Secret Correspondence” (“Archives,” Series Q, Vol. V, page 890).[5] It shows that others besides Murray and Carleton had been viewing with suspicion the actions of the noblesse who were thought to be meditating a revolt. “My Lord,” writes Carleton, “since my arrival in this province I have not been able to make any discovery that induces me to give credit to the paper of intelligence inclosed in Your Lordship’s letter of the 20th of May, last, nor do I think it probable the chiefs of their own free notion in time of peace dare assemble in numbers, consult and resolve on a revolt; that an assembly of military men should be so ignorant as to fancy they could defend themselves by a few fire ships only against any future attack from Great Britain after their experience in fifty-nine. Notwithstanding this and their decent and respectful obedience to the king’s government hitherto, I have not the least doubt of their secret attachment to France and think this will continue as long as they are excluded from all employment under the British government and are certain of being reinstated at least in their former commissions under that of France by which chiefly they supported themselves and families. When I reflect that France naturally has the affections of all the people, that to make no mention of fees of office and of the vexations of the law, we have done nothing to gain one man in the province by making it his private interest to remain the king’s subject, and that the interests of many would be greatly promoted by a revolution, I own my not having discovered a treasonable correspondence never was proof sufficient to convince me that it did not exist in some degree, but I am inclined to think if such a message had been sent, very few were intrusted with the secret; perhaps the court of France informed a year past by Mons. de Chatelet that the king proposed raising such a regiment of his new subjects caused this piece of intelligence to be communicated to create a jealousy of the Canadians and prevent a measure that might fix their attachments to the British government and probably of those savages who have always acted with them; however that may be, on receiving this news from France last spring, most of the gentlemen in the province applied to me and begged to be admitted to the king’s service, assuring me that they would take every opportunity to testify their zeal and gratitude for so great a mark of favour and tenderness, extended not only to them but to their posterity.”
The passage following is prophetic of the active interference which ten years later France was to take in the American war against Great Britain. “When I consider further that the king’s dominion here is maintained but by a few troops necessarily dispersed without a place of security for their magazines, for their arms or for themselves, amidst a numerous military people, the gentlemen all officers of experience, poor, without hopes that they or their descendants will be admitted into the service of their present sovereign, I can have no doubt but France as soon as determined to begin a war will attempt to regain Canada, should it be intended only to make a diversion while it may reasonably be undertaken with a little hazzard should it fail, and where so much may be gained should it succeed. But should France begin a war in hopes the British colonies will push matters to extremities, and she adopts the project of supporting them in their independent notions, Canada, probably, will then become the principal scene where the fate of America may be determined. Affairs in this situation, Canada in the hands of France would no longer present itself as an enemy to the British colony but as an ally, a friend and protector of their independency.”
The sympathy, respect and even fear of the seigneurs which Carleton evinced in his reports home largely influenced the final passage of the Quebec act. Their firmness and persistency in their demand for their privileges and their influence over the habitant and the possibility of their allegiance being tampered with by France made them prevail over the small but active minority of the commercial class. At this time preparations were being made in London for the settlement of the Quebec difficulty. Secrecy was being observed in high quarters. Lord Hillsborough’s answer, January 4, 1769, to Carleton’s last is also secret, “acknowledging your secret dispatch of November 21st before His Majesty. The remarks you make upon the state and temper of His Majesty’s new subjects will be of great utility in the consideration of the measures now under deliberation and do evince both the propriety and necessity of extending to that grave and faithful people a reaonable participation in those establishments which are to form the basis of the future government of Quebec.” He fears, however, although he agreed with Carleton’s recommendation, that prejudice being so strong it will be difficult to admit them to military offices.
The following summary of investigations conducted for the governments at this time may now be added as evidence of the military strength of the party Carleton wished to conciliate.
Noblesse in the Province of Quebec:
Noblesse in France:
| Grand Croix | 1 |
| Governors, lieutenant governors, majors, aide majors, captains and lieutenants of ships of war, having the order of St. Louis | 26 |
| Aide-majors and captains not having the order | 6 |
| Lieutenants | 12 |
| Ensigns | 19 |
| Canadian officers in actual service whose parents have remained in Canada | 15 |
| —— | |
| Total | 79 |