The Reserve formed in position on a range of heights about five hundred yards from the river, the 95th being advanced as a support to their rear-guard, and in that position awaited the enemy’s attack. He was not long in fording the river to our right and left with a large body of cavalry and about a thousand Voltigeurs, which latter had not until then come up with the retreating army. They had been passed over the river on the horses of the cavalry.

The attack by this infantry began at about four o’clock in the now rapidly approaching evening, on the flanks of the Rifle picquets and on the Battalion of Riflemen formed for their support; and the enemy moved at the same time a large force of cavalry over the bridge on the high road to Villa Franca. After some severe skirmishing both with the picquets and the Battalion, these were obliged to fall back and occupy a more defensible position; and five companies extended behind the banks, and in the vineyards on each side of the road, on which the British cavalry and some guns were posted. Scarcely had this movement been effected when a warm attack was made by the Voltigeurs and cavalry against the Riflemen, the dragoons, and the guns. After an hour’s hard fighting it was found impossible to withstand the superior force of the enemy, and the advanced wing of the Battalion was withdrawn, and joined the other five companies, with the view of following the main body of the Reserve, which had just before been ordered to retire.

It was now nearly dark; and General Colbert, who commanded the enemy’s cavalry, conceiving probably that the Riflemen had retired, and that the English cavalry and guns were unprotected, made a most rapid and furious charge upon them with a mass of cavalry. The Riflemen again instantly threw themselves into the vineyards, and from the banks lining the road poured so hot and well-aimed a fire that the attacking cavalry were instantly checked. It was at this moment that Thomas Plunket, a private of the Battalion, noted for his excellent shooting, crept out with some expression that he ‘would bring that fellow down,’ and throwing himself on his back on the snow-covered ground he caught the sling of his rifle over his foot, fired with deliberate aim, and shot General Colbert dead. His orderly trumpeter rode up to assist him, but Tom Plunket had reloaded, and he also fell before his unerring rifle.[59] He had just time to jump up, and, amidst the cheers of his comrades, by running in upon one of the rear sections, to escape the sabres of a dozen troopers who spurred after him in pursuit.

By the fire of the Riflemen the enemy’s cavalry suffered severely. Besides their General, some two hundred horsemen were killed, wounded, or prisoners.

Night had now fallen, and no further attack was attempted: the Riflemen retained the position till about ten at night, in order to give the rest of the army time to fall back. They then retired, marching all night, a most difficult and fatiguing march, part of it through vineyards, and arrived at Curtro about daybreak.

This most gallant action may be said to have been fought altogether by the 1st Battalion; for no troops assisted them except a few of the 15th Hussars, who, being hard pressed by the enemy, rode through the two rear companies at the first onset, and formed on the rising ground beyond the bridge on the Villa Franca road; and ‘a few of the 52nd,’[60] who, as night fell, appeared on that ridge to their assistance; but Colbert’s final charge had then been checked by the Riflemen. Mr. Moore, in his Life of his brother, says that ‘to arrest the enemy, four hundred Riflemen, with a small detachment of horse, were posted,’ while the Reserve crossed the bridge; but in fact scarce half that number remained on that side of the river. Only two companies (Norcott’s and O’Hare’s) were there posted; and their strength would not have been a hundred men each after the casualties of several days’ march, in weather of unusual severity, and amidst almost unparalleled toils.

The march was resumed in a few hours; the weather was intensely cold, the road rugged and difficult, and the snow knee deep, and the fatigue and exhausted state of the men were extreme; yet amidst all these sufferings the Reserve preserved order, ‘covered the retreat, and protected, as much as lay in their power, the stragglers.’[61]

On the road from Villa Franca to Herrerias the French patrols during the night attacked the Rifle picquets, and wounded a few men; but the Riflemen drove them back, and the enemy did not ascertain that the retreating army had abandoned the position. After a march of eighteen miles the Reserve reached Herrerias on the morning of the 4th. A forced march of thirty-six miles brought them on the 5th to Nogales. Thence they started again, and towards evening of that day, when near Constantino, the enemy came up with them. Moore was with them, and his position was difficult. A river was to be crossed, and a hill overlooking and close to the bridge would, if the enemy should occupy it, give him such an advantage as would render the passage of the Reserve very difficult. Moore posted a battery on the top of the hill, ‘and guarded it, as usual, by the brave Rifle Corps.’[62] They held the enemy in check while the Reserve defiled over the narrow bridge; as soon as they were safely over, the guns were limbered up, and trotted down the hill; the Riflemen followed at the double, and passed the bridge without the loss of a man. The French rushed on in pursuit; but when they reached the bridge the Reserve were in position, and after maintaining the post till nightfall General Paget fell back towards Lugo.

During all this retreat Moore accompanied the Reserve, and rode beside his friend General Paget, their chief. His cheerful demeanour sustained the spirits of the way-worn, suffering soldiers; he praised their superior discipline on the march, and warmly applauded their gallant conduct in action.

The whole of Sir John Moore’s forces were now in position in front of Lugo. On the 6th the French came in sight, and collecting in considerable numbers, took up a position in front of the rear-guard. On the next day the outposts were attacked, and the enemy repulsed. And on the 8th another attack was made, and with a similar result.