On the 9th Sir John Moore drew up his whole force in position, and offered battle. After waiting in line of battle till towards evening, the General ordered the army to retire in the night, the Reserve covering their march. They kept up bright fires to deceive the enemy, and then, in a night of terrific weather, and in drenching showers of rain and sleet, they fell back towards Betanzos. Near this town the enemy came up with them, and attacked them during their passage over a bridge, with some loss.

The sufferings of the Battalion in the next few days were terrible. The men were in a state of starvation; many without shoes, and almost all in rags. The officers were, many of them, barefooted; and some, from hunger and fatigue, so incapable of further exertion that they had to be carried on mules. In this state they arrived, on the 11th, at El Burgo (the main body of the troops having entered Corunna), their discipline unimpaired and their courage undismayed. ‘For twelve days,’ says Napier, ‘these hardy warriors had covered the retreat, during which time they had traversed eighty miles of road in two marches, passed several nights under arms in the snow of the mountains, were seven times engaged with the enemy, and now assembled at the outposts, having fewer men missing, including those who had fallen in battle, than any other division of the army: an admirable instance of the value of good discipline.’

As soon as they had passed the river at El Burgo the bridge was blown up, and two companies of Riflemen, under Major Norcott, were posted in the village; the remainder of the Battalion being, with the Reserve, cantoned upon the high road to Corunna, at a little distance.

The enemy’s cavalry again came in sight on the morning of the 12th, and, after reconnoitring, dismounted a part of their force, and attacked the companies at El Burgo vigorously. This skirmishing continued during the day; but their efforts to drive the Riflemen from the post were ineffectual.

On the 14th, however, this post was withdrawn, as the enemy had forded the river on our left. The Battalion therefore joined the Reserve in the position taken up by the army on the heights about two miles in front of Corunna; while the enemy was employed in concentrating his forces on a very strong range of hills opposite and nearly parallel to the British line, and distant from it about five hundred yards.

The Battalion was advanced, in the course of the morning, about half-a-mile in front of the Reserve, in order to occupy several detached and commanding pieces of ground, on the right of Lord William Bentinck’s brigade, and just opposite a battery of guns on the left of the French position.

The enemy’s troops continued to pour into his position during the whole night. Their bands played, and shouts, plainly heard by the Riflemen, announced their joy at the certainty of a general action on the morrow, and the anticipated destruction or capture of the British army.

On the 16th several movements of cavalry, artillery and infantry were observed in the French lines, and about two o’clock in the afternoon the Riflemen could distinctly see their first line getting under arms on the brow of the hill. The assault was not long in coming. At three o’clock a furious onset of three thousand skirmishers burst upon the whole line of English picquets; which, although at first driven back, rallied under cover of the numerous stone walls which intersected the valley, and kept the enemy in check for a considerable time; particularly at the village of Elvina, which was watched by the brigade under Major-General Coote Manningham.

The enemy finding his first efforts to drive in our picquets unavailing, reinforced his first line with several battalions, and compelled them to fall back to their respective brigades. The action immediately became general, and the attacks particularly severe from the Corunna road to the extreme British right (comprising about half the English forces). It was evidently Soult’s great object to turn the right, whilst on the left and left centre the attack was not pushed with much energy, and was intended only as a feint. Lord William Bentinck’s brigade was so roughly handled about five o’clock, and was losing so many men by the fire of the enemy’s guns on our right (by which Sir John Moore fell at this time), that Colonel Beckwith pushed on with the whole Battalion; and dashing into the very midst of the enemy’s artillery, would inevitably have captured or destroyed them in a few minutes, had not two battalions of Voltigeurs moved out so rapidly from the second line to their assistance, that the Riflemen were obliged to fall back for the moment. They were checked, not quelled; a sharp skirmish, kept up for two hours between the Riflemen and the Voltigeurs, ended in the complete repulse of the latter, with considerable loss, leaving seven officers and one hundred and fifty-six men prisoners in the hands of their opponents, whom the Battalion took on ship-board and brought to England.

By this time the enemy had been completely defeated at all points, and retired to his position.