CAPITULATION OF CORNWALLIS.
By that time the inferiority of the British fleet rendered Cornwallis's situation extremely perilous. When Hood with the fourteen ships of the line left by Rodney (p. 218) arrived off Cape Henry on August 25, Graves was not there to meet him; he sailed to Sandy Hook and joined him. The fleet, nineteen ships of the line, sailed under Graves to Chesapeake bay, and found that during Hood's absence Grasse had entered the bay with twenty-eight ships of the line. Grasse at once stood out to sea, for he was anxious to secure a junction with the squadron from Newport, under Count de Barras, which Rodney had failed to attack in the previous September. Graves, who should have caught these ships instead of aiming at the main fleet, engaged him on September 5, handled his fleet badly, and got his ships knocked about. While he remained uselessly at sea the squadron of Barras slipped into the bay. On the 14th the British fleet returned to New York to refit, and Cornwallis was left without succour. Lafayette with a large army of French and Americans was already blocking the neck of the peninsula. Clinton attempted a perfectly useless diversion in Connecticut under Arnold. Washington's army joined Lafayette on the 18th, and Cornwallis was soon besieged by a force of over 16,000 men. On October 19 he was forced to capitulate. Of the garrison which surrendered at Yorktown and Gloucester, 6,950 men, only 4,017 remained fit for duty. On the day of the surrender, naval reinforcements having arrived at New York and the fleet at last being refitted, Clinton sailed with 7,000 troops to the relief of Cornwallis. They found that they were too late and returned to New York.
With this disaster the war in America virtually ended. Cornwallis in his attempt to recover the southern provinces showed a vigour and capacity which might, perhaps, have brought matters to a different issue if he had held the chief command. But his means were inadequate to meet the wastage caused by battle and sickness; he found the loyalists a broken reed, and his troops not well suited to the kind of warfare in which they were engaged. "Had Lord Cornwallis staid in Carolina, as I had ordered him," wrote Clinton, "and I had even assembled my forces at New York, and remained there with my arms across without affront, negative victory would have insured American Dependence."[159] "Arms across" seems indeed to have been Clinton's favourite attitude.[160] Cornwallis's advance into Virginia was certainly a risky movement, but it was a choice of evils and did not in itself entail disaster. Clinton reckoned, not without reason, that the Americans were too exhausted to prolong the struggle; he was in favour of desultory operations on the Chesapeake, against Baltimore and Philadelphia, with the view of gaining loyalist support, and of waiting until he had received reinforcements large enough to enable him to undertake a "solid" campaign in Virginia, without leaving New York insufficiently defended. Cornwallis believed that the best chance of success lay in securing a firm hold on Virginia. Germain, who still persisted in directing operations in America from London, considered Cornwallis's plan more promising than that of Clinton. He treated Cornwallis as though he had an entirely independent command, with the result that serious misunderstandings arose between Cornwallis and Clinton, the commander-in-chief, which hindered their co-operation; and while he approved of the plan adopted by Cornwallis he did not discountenance Clinton's proposals, with the result that neither course of action was vigorously pursued. It was by Clinton's order that Cornwallis retired to the York peninsula, where his safety depended on the continued command of the sea; the choice of Yorktown as his post was his own. It was not a good choice; but he had little reason to expect that he would have to hold it against an overwhelming force of French and Americans, with a French fleet in command of the sea. Clinton should not have been misled by Washington's simple trick into allowing the combined force to advance beyond his reach on its way to crush Cornwallis's army.
The true cause of the catastrophe, however, lay in naval mismanagement. The mistaken policy of employing the British fleet in various and distant enterprises instead of off the ports of the enemy enabled Grasse to sail from Brest unopposed. Rodney let slip a grand opportunity of baulking his plans off Fort Royal, and sent, perhaps was forced to send, Hood after him to America with an insufficient fleet. Partly through accident and partly through an error of judgment, Graves missed his junction with Hood. Grasse was consequently allowed quietly to enter Chesapeake bay, and Graves afterwards failed to use his ships to the best advantage. The loss of the command at sea was fatal to Cornwallis.
THE MINISTRY LOSES GROUND.
Tidings of the disaster reached London on November 25, two days before the meeting of parliament. On receiving them North's habitual calmness broke down; he threw up his arms as though he were shot, and repeatedly exclaimed, "O God! it is all over!" The king's fortitude was unshaken, and he showed no sign of agitation, save that, in acknowledging Germain's letter informing him of the surrender, he omitted to note the exact moment of his writing, as his custom was. The speech from the throne at the opening of parliament, while acknowledging disaster, contained no hint of giving way. Parliament for a while upheld the ministers, and the address was carried in the lords by 75 to 31, and in the commons by 218 to 129. Fox and Burke threatened the ministers with impeachment and the scaffold; and Pitt condemned their policy in speeches not less effective for being more moderate in tone. North announced that the war would no longer be carried on with a design of conquest, but only for the possession of posts on the coast which would be useful in the war with France and Spain. Crowded meetings in London and Westminster condemned the government. It was evident that there was dissension in the cabinet; North was anxious for an acknowledgment of American independence, Germain declared that he would never agree to it. By Christmas the government lost many supporters in parliament.
Its position was further weakened by continued ill-success in war. The Marquis de Bouillé retook St. Eustatius on October 25. Grasse returned to Martinique, and in January, 1782, the two commanders landed a force on St. Kitts and besieged the garrison. Hood followed Grasse with twenty-two ships, out-manœuvred him brilliantly, beat him off on the 26th, and held his station against a fleet of thirty-three ships of the line until February 14, when, as he was unable to prevent the fall of the island, he sailed away. The capture of St. Kitts and Nevis reduced the British possessions in the West Indies to Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbadoes. A joint attack on Jamaica was planned by France and Spain. Rodney, however, again arrived at the Antilles with twelve ships, was joined by Hood, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, restored the British flag to its proper place at sea. Nearer home, Kempenfeldt, the admiral whose tragic end is famous in Cowper's verse, dealt the enemy a severe blow. He was sent, in December, 1781, with only twelve ships to intercept a French fleet consisting, as the admiralty knew, or ought to have known, of seventeen ships with a convoy bound for the West Indies. Kempenfeldt took at least twenty of the convoy with troops and stores, but, overmatched as he was, he was forced to let the fleet sail on. It was dispersed by a storm shortly afterwards, and many of the ships returned home. The loss of this convoy seriously crippled the French in the West Indies.[161] In the Mediterranean, the garrison of St. Philips, in Minorca, which had been besieged since August by a French and Spanish army, was forced to surrender on February 5, after being reduced by sickness and war from 2,692 to 600 men fit for duty, and eighty years after its conquest the island was lost to England.
During the recess the ministers, convinced of the folly of prolonging the war, arranged to go on without Germain. Carleton succeeded Clinton at New York, and Germain was succeeded as third secretary of state by the insignificant Welbore Ellis, and was created Viscount Sackville, much to the wrath of the whig peers, who tried in vain to obtain a vote that the presence of a cashiered officer was derogatory to the dignity of their house. The opposition gathered strength. A powerful attack by Fox on the administration of the navy failed by twenty-two votes, a motion by Conway for putting an end to the American war only by one, and a like motion was carried a few days later by a majority of nineteen. The government then introduced a bill to enable the king to make peace, and North sent envoys to Paris to sound Franklin as to terms. It was evident that the end was near, and the new government was eagerly discussed. Pitt, though acting with the opposition, took a somewhat independent line, and announced in the house that he would not accept a subordinate office. This from a young member not then twenty-three excited some amazement, but his assumption soon proved to be well founded. On March 11 George sent the chancellor, Thurlow, to negotiate with Rockingham, but would not accept his terms. Three days later the government escaped a vote of want of confidence only by nine votes, and on the 20th North announced the resignation of the ministry. George was in great distress, and talked of retiring to Hanover, for life would be unendurable to him if he fell into the hands of the Rockingham party.
THE SECOND ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY.
The two parties in the opposition, though acting together against the government, held widely different views. The Rockinghams aimed at a homogeneous ministry; they represented the aristocratic whig faction, were the enemies of prerogative, and were strong advocates of American independence. Shelburne, like his old chief, Chatham, was opposed to government by party, held that the king should have an interest in the government, and so far "be his own minister," and like Chatham had been hostile to American independence.[162] For political reasons, then, George was drawn to Shelburne, while personally he despised Rockingham and hated Fox. He invited Shelburne first, and then Gower, to form a ministry. Both declined. Shelburne could not afford to split with the Rockinghams; he knew that they could not stand without him, and he advised the king to send for Rockingham. George would not see Rockingham himself, and negotiated with him through Shelburne on the basis of freedom as regards men and measures, and as to the acknowledgment of American independence.[163] Rockingham formed his cabinet on the 24th. He took the treasury. Shelburne was secretary for home, Irish, and colonial affairs; Fox for foreign affairs, the third secretaryship being abolished; Keppel, who was created a viscount, first lord of the admiralty; Richmond, master-general of the ordnance; Lord John Cavendish, chancellor of the exchequer; Camden, president of the council; Grafton, privy seal; Conway, commander-in-chief; Dunning, who was created Baron Ashburton, chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster. To please the king Thurlow was retained as chancellor. Pitt was offered, and declined, a subordinate office. Burke was treated by his aristocratic friends as unworthy of cabinet office, and was made paymaster of the forces.