CORNWALLIS IN SOUTH CAROLINA.
As the British forces were divided between New York and the southern provinces, it is obvious that the issue of the struggle depended on the command of the sea. So long as the British held the ocean way, the southern army would be able to receive reinforcements and supplies, and could be aided by diversions, the French alliance would be of little profit to the Americans, and the long land journey, expensive and open to attacks, would cut off the southern provinces from succours from the north. The navy, as both Clinton and Washington saw, "had the casting vote in the contest".[152] In July, 1780, soon after Clinton returned to New York from South Carolina, a French squadron brought nearly 6,000 men, commanded by Count de Rochambeau, to Rhode Island. A few days after the arrival of Rochambeau, the British fleet under Arbuthnot received reinforcements which made it stronger than the French. Clinton took measures for attacking the French by land and sea, but was called back to New York by a movement on the part of Washington, and a renewal of the plan was defeated by a quarrel between him and Arbuthnot. The seven French ships remained at Newport, blocked up by the British fleet, and though Washington obtained some help from the land force, the greater part stayed to guard the ships. Rodney should have attacked these ships as soon as he arrived at New York in September. He probably thought them of little importance, as they were thoroughly blockaded, and did not care to risk his ships within reach of the French batteries on the shore. The destruction of the squadron was within his power and was well worth some risk. Great as he was on sea, he did not understand the wide aspects of operations of war. The presence of the French compelled the British to keep a large force in New York and so hindered their operations in the south.
Before Clinton left South Carolina, he issued a proclamation which put an end to all hopes of neutrality; those who would not fulfil the duties of loyal subjects would be held to be rebels. This step caused many who would willingly have remained neutral to join the revolutionists rather than fight against them. The country soon became disturbed; the British were forced to act with severity, and the Americans, both revolutionists and loyalists, behaved with great cruelty towards their fellow-countrymen of the opposite party.[153] Partisan leaders, among whom Sumter and Marion were conspicuous, raised bands on their own responsibility, and fought against the British, acting sometimes independently and sometimes in conjunction with the forces of congress. Cornwallis worked energetically at Charleston, enrolling militia and providing for the administration, while Lord Rawdon with the main body of the army kept the border at Camden. Anxious to press on, Cornwallis desired Clinton to send a force to Chesapeake bay, to divert the enemy while he invaded North Carolina; but before he could advance further he had to fight for the southern province. Gates was appointed to the supreme command in the south and was threatening Camden. Cornwallis hastened thither with his staff and found Rawdon with 700 sick and less than 2,000 fit for duty. The enemy was greatly superior in number, without reckoning 1,000 men under Sumter, who was cutting the British off from their supplies on the west side of the Wateree river. Cornwallis met them on August 16, and began the engagement with a vigorous attack on the American left, formed by the Virginia and North Carolina militia who, as the British advanced, firing and cheering, threw down their arms and fled. The British victory was complete; the Americans lost about 1,000 killed and wounded, over 1,000 prisoners, and their artillery and stores; the British casualties were 324. Two days later Colonel Tarleton smartly surprised Sumter, and dispersed his band, retaking a convoy which had fallen into his hands shortly before the battle of Camden. The defeat of Gates's army drove the Americans almost to despair.
Cornwallis was encouraged to pursue his grand plan of "conquest from south to north". Clinton, though he did not approve of his forward policy,[154] sent General Leslie with 3,200 men to Chesapeake bay to co-operate with him, and Cornwallis entered North Carolina and advanced as far as Charlotte. In spite of his brilliant victory he was beset by difficulties. The loyalists did not give him the help which he expected; as soon as he left South Carolina it broke into a ferment of disaffection, and his troops were not suited for the guerilla warfare largely adopted by the enemy, who were, Rawdon wrote, "mostly mounted militia not to be overtaken by our infantry, nor to be safely pursued in this strong country by our cavalry".[155] In this as in many other respects, the experiences of the war were repeated in South Africa in our own day. Before Cornwallis left South Carolina he detached a force of 800 militia and 100 regulars under Major Ferguson to scour the border and keep the country quiet in the rear of the army. They were met by a partisan army of 3,000 men under different leaders at King's Mountain on October 7; Ferguson was killed and all his men were either slain or captured. So severe a loss, combined with the anxiety of Cornwallis lest the important post called Ninety-six should be taken, put a stop to any further advance. Cornwallis fell back on Winnsborough, and bade Leslie convey his force to Charleston, which he was able to do as England had command of the sea, and reinforce him. The safety of the border was his first care. No sooner had Tarleton checked the inroads of Marion in the east than he was summoned westwards to protect Ninety-six from Sumter. He engaged Sumter's force at Blackstock on November 20, and claimed to have defeated him. Tarleton was a dashing cavalry officer, given to overrating his own achievements. His troops were few and weary, and at best he escaped defeat; but Sumter's band dispersed, for its leader was wounded and disabled for a while from further action.[156]
BATTLE OF THE COWPENS.
In December Greene, a general of far greater ability than Gates, took the chief command in the south. Cornwallis found the enemy on both his flanks. On the east Marion, then in common with Sumter holding a commission from congress, Henry Lee, and Greene himself endangered his communications with the coast, and penetrated as far as Georgetown, and on the west another division under Morgan threatened Ninety-six. Disaffection was spreading rapidly through the province. Believing that his one chance of conquering from south to north lay in pushing forward, he determined to march into North Carolina. Leslie joined him in January, 1781, and Clinton sent Arnold and Phillips with a large force to take Leslie's place in Virginia. On setting out for North Carolina, Cornwallis detached Tarleton to deal with Morgan. He brought him to bay at the Cowpens, near King's Mountain, on the 17th. Tarleton's force, numbering about 1,100, was slightly superior to that of the enemy, but he engaged while his men were weary after a hard night-march. Some of his troops behaved badly; he was utterly defeated, and lost nearly 800 men. This defeat was a severe blow to Cornwallis, for it deprived him of the best part of his light troops, which were specially necessary for his march through a wooded and thinly populated country where much foraging had to be done. He determined to advance, hoping to get between Greene and Virginia, and force him to fight before he received reinforcements. He burnt his superfluous baggage and crossed the Catawba river. The two divisions of the American army retreated hastily through North Carolina, succeeded in forming a junction, and crossed the Dan into Virginia before the British could come up with them. Having thus cleared the province of the revolutionary troops, Cornwallis encamped at Hillsborough, and on February 20 summoned the loyalists to join him. Some were coming in when, on the 23rd, Greene, who had received reinforcements, recrossed the Dan. Any further loyalist movement was stopped by an act of revolting barbarity; 200 loyalists were caught by Lee's horse on their way to the British quarters; they made no resistance and asked for quarter, but were butchered by their fellow-countrymen.
Cornwallis, finding it difficult to support his troops and being anxious to encourage the loyalists by showing his superiority in the field, accepted Greene's offer of battle at Guilford courthouse on March 15. His force scarcely numbered 2,000, while the enemy, regulars and militia, were 4,300 strong. The battle was begun by the British left, consisting of the 22nd and 23rd regiments, supported by grenadiers and guards, which charged and routed the first line of the enemy with the bayonet. The second line, formed by Virginians, stood steady and was not driven back without a severe struggle; so too the First Maryland regiment, in the third line, repulsed the first attack upon it with heavy loss. The Second Marylanders fell back before a battalion of guards, who pressed heedlessly after them and were suddenly engaged by the American dragoons. The guards fought fiercely, but were broken. For a moment things looked awkward. Then the enemy was checked by the British artillery and the guards were rallied by their brigadier O'Hara, who, though severely wounded, was still able to do good service. The British fought magnificently and won a brilliant victory. Yet it was dearly bought, for the loss of over 500 rank and file, a full third of his infantry, left Cornwallis powerless. His little army was in need of supplies and he marched to Wilmington, where stores brought by sea were laid up for him.
CORNWALLIS ADVANCES INTO VIRGINIA.
Being too weak to do anything further without reinforcements, he decided to leave the Carolinas, effect a junction with Arnold in Virginia, and attempt the conquest of that province, reckoning that success there would check disaffection in South Carolina and ultimately tend to the conquest of North Carolina.[157] He wished Clinton to prosecute the war in Virginia with all the strength at his command, even at the expense of giving up New York. Clinton, however, was throughout opposed to his forward policy; he would have had him attempt nothing beyond the power of the force which he left with him, "the defence of South, and most probably the reduction of North, Carolina," and he did not intend the troops sent to Virginia to engage in "solid" operations, which he judged to be inadvisable until he should himself take the field. The king and the cabinet approved Cornwallis's line of action.[158] He advanced into Virginia on his own responsibility. This step led to unfriendly relations between the two commanders, and after the war was the subject of a bitter controversy between them. Cornwallis effected a junction with Arnold's army on May 20, and in command of over 5,000 troops overran the province, Lafayette, with a far inferior force, retreating before him. Meantime Rawdon struggled gallantly, though unsuccessfully, against Greene in South Carolina. He defeated Greene at Hobskirk hill on April 25, but was forced to retire from Camden. The loyalists saw that the British could not protect them; the whole province was disaffected, and post after post was taken by Greene, Lee, Sumter, Marion, and other generals. At last, after Rawdon's return to England on account of ill-health, a hard-fought battle at Eutaw springs on September 8, which both sides claimed as a victory, so weakened the British force that it remained in and about Charleston until it was withdrawn at the end of the war.
To return to the spring of the year, Cornwallis's invasion of Virginia and the destruction of property there seemed likely to bring the war to a successful issue. Washington's army was in grievous want of supplies, the American marine was annihilated, their finances were in a ruinous state, and their resources generally almost exhausted. Powerful co-operation with Cornwallis on the part of Clinton was urgently needed. The issue of the struggle depended on the power of Great Britain to prevent a French fleet and army from undertaking a joint enterprise with the Americans. At this critical juncture England lost the superiority at sea. In May, Washington and Rochambeau agreed that, as soon as Grasse brought his fleet over, they would join forces, and either attack New York or, perhaps, march into Virginia, as circumstances might direct. Clinton discovered their design, would not spare any troops from New York, and in June called on Cornwallis to send him part of the force under his command, and ordered him to take up a defensive position. Cornwallis retired down the James river to Portsmouth. Clinton withdrew his demand for troops and directed him to fortify a station on the Yorktown peninsula as a port for ships. He would there be able to take up a defensive position secured by access to the sea. Cornwallis concentrated all his forces, about 7,000 men, and fortified Yorktown and Gloucester. On July 6 Rochambeau, in expectation of the arrival of Grasse's fleet, brought his troops from Rhode Island (p. 219) and joined Washington at White Plains. It was agreed between Grasse and Washington that the united army, 4,000 French and 2,000 Americans, should march into Virginia and act in co-operation with the French fleet. Clinton, however, deceived by fictitious letters, written by Washington and designed to be intercepted, believed that it would attack New York, and remained quietly there while it marched half through New Jersey. Not until September 2 did he discover that it was on its way to join in a combined attack on Cornwallis. On the 5th it reached the head of Chesapeake bay.