The Battle of Wavre and Grouchy's Retreat / A study of an Obscure Part of the Waterloo Campaign

by William Hyde Kelly

Composition of the French Army.

Napoleon’s Grand army for the invasion of Belgium was made up of the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Corps d’Armée; four Corps of Reserve Cavalry; and the Imperial Guard; a total of 116,124 men. The First Corps, under d’Erlon, consisted of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Infantry Divisions, and the First Light Cavalry Division. In the early part of June, the Corps was stationed at Lille. The Second Corps, under Reille, consisted of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Infantry Divisions, and the Second Light Cavalry Division. This Corps was quartered at Valenciennes. The Third Corps, Vandamme’s, comprised the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Infantry Divisions, and the Third Light Cavalry Division, and was stationed at Mézières. The Fourth Corps, Gérard’s, was composed of the Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Infantry Divisions, and the Seventh Light Cavalry Division. The Corps was stationed in Metz, Longwy, and Thionville. The Sixth Corps, Lobau’s, was made up of the Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Infantry Divisions; it was stationed at Laon. Grouchy commanded the four Corps of Reserve cavalry; these First, Second, Third, and Fourth Cavalry Corps were commanded by Pajol, Excelmans, Kellermann, and Milhaud respectively; they were mostly stationed between the river Aisne and the frontier. The Imperial Guard consisted of twelve regiments of infantry, two regiments of heavy cavalry, three of light cavalry, and thirteen batteries of artillery. The Guard left Paris for Avesnes early in June. To the First and Second Corps d’Armée were attached six batteries; to the Third and Fourth, five batteries; and to the Sixth, four batteries of artillery.

This army was the best, in point of courage, warlike spirit, and devotion to himself, that Napoleon ever led. But the men were without discipline, and distrusted their leaders. Napoleon’s generals were not the best that had ever served under him. Ney was a tried veteran, the “bravest of the brave,” but he had just come over to Napoleon from Louis XVIII. Grouchy had never held an independent command. It is remarkable that both Ney and Grouchy should have failed Napoleon in this, his last, campaign; but neither were fitted to the great trusts committed to them. Napoleon himself was not the same man who had beaten back the Allies a year previously at Montmirail, Montereau, and Champaubert, but he was still a master of strategy and the strongest man of France.

The First Movements of the French.

Napoleon began his concentration early in June. He moved the First Corps from Lille to Avesnes; the Second from Valenciennes to Maubeuge; the Third from Mézières to Chimay; the Fourth from Thionville to Rocroi; the Sixth from Laon to Avesnes; and the Guard from Paris to Avesnes.

The concentration was in full swing, with the exception of Grouchy’s Reserve Cavalry, when Napoleon left Paris on the night of 11th June. Grouchy had not received his orders for concentration from Soult, the Chief of the Staff, who had neglected to send them until the 12th. Here was an omission at the outset which might well have had serious results. But Grouchy lost no time in setting his Corps on their roads, and by rapid marching he had all his cavalry beyond Avesnes on the night of the 13th.

On the evening of the 14th Napoleon moved his headquarters to Beaumont. The First Corps was on the extreme left, between Maubeuge and Solre-sur-Sambre; the Second Corps between Solre-sur-Sambre and Leers; the Third and Sixth Corps between Beaumont and the Sambre; the Fourth Corps between Phillippeville and Florenne; Grouchy’s Reserve Cavalry between Beaumont and Phillippeville; the Imperial Guard at Beaumont. This concentration was brilliantly planned, and skilfully executed: worthy of Napoleon’s best days.

The French army crossed the frontier early in the morning of the 15th of June, in three columns. The left column (d’Erlon’s and Reille’s Corps) crossed by Thuin and Marchienne; the centre column (Vandamme’s, Lobau’s Corps, Imperial Guard, and Grouchy’s Reserve Cavalry), at whose head was the Emperor himself, crossed by Ham-sur-Heure, Jamioux, and Marcinelle; the right column, Gérard’s Corps, by Florennes and Gerpinnes. The front was covered by twelve regiments of cavalry.

The arrangements for relieving the troops of a fatiguing march by avoiding the crossing of columns in front of each other, and for the communication between each column, were admirable. The baggage and ammunition waggons, except those of the latter which were required for immediate use, were kept 9 miles in rear of the army. The advanced guards of the different columns communicated constantly with each other, so that no column should get ahead of the others. A screen of scouts was sent out in all directions to obtain every scrap of information as to the enemy’s position, and report direct to the Emperor. Everything was to be done to ensure the rapid march of a well-concentrated army on the point where it was expected that the Prussians would be met with. But three of the Corps commanders failed to carry out their instructions. D’Erlon started from his camp at half-past four instead of at three o’clock, as ordered. Vandamme never knew of the march of the army until Lobau’s Corps pushed on his rear: the orders sent to him from headquarters had not reached him, owing to an accident to the officer sent by Soult. And Gérard, who should have marched at three, did not reach Florennes until 7 A.M. All this was carelessness. Soult should have sent such important orders in duplicate. It is interesting to observe how these delays affected the subsequent movements of the columns on the 15th.

But, first of all, the centre column shall be followed, as being that led by the Emperor himself. In the advance on Charleroi, Pajol’s cavalry led the way. Zieten’s outposts were everywhere driven in, and when Pajol entered Charleroi at midday (the 15th) the Prussians had withdrawn, and taken up a strong position at Gilly, 2 miles north-east of Charleroi. The centre column halted to await Vandamme’s arrival; for Grouchy, who did not like the appearance of the Prussian position, would not attack until he had Excelmans’ Cavalry and Vandamme’s Corps with him. Napoleon, impatient at the delay, took command in person at 5 P.M., and pushed home a vigorous attack; and the Prussians retired at dusk to Fleurus. Vandamme and the Cavalry bivouacked within 2 miles of the Prussians. The Guard bivouacked between Gilly and Charleroi; Lobau’s Corps south of the river, near Charleroi; and Gérard’s Corps on the right, crossing the Sambre at Châtelet, bivouacked on the road to Fleurus. Napoleon thus had the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Corps, the Imperial Guard, and Grouchy’s Cavalry concentrated between Fleurus and Charleroi, intending to attack the Prussians in strength next day, either at Fleurus or at Sombreffe. The Emperor passed the night at Charleroi.