But to allow France to be over-run in the meantime by the invaders would enrage the Parisians; and Parisians had always to be reckoned in any plan of Napoleon’s. A more splendid scheme soon presented itself to him. He had a great idea of the importance of winning Brussels: and defensive warfare was unworthy of his genius. He resolved to attack before the Allies should be concentrated. By the middle of June his available forces on the Northern frontier would amount to 125,000 men.
“He would enter Belgium: he would beat in turn, or separately, the English and the Prussians; then, as soon as new reinforcements had arrived from the depôts, he would effect a junction with the 23,000 men under Rapp, and would bear down upon the Austro-Russians.”[1]
Here was a plan after his own heart. To establish himself once more at the head of the nation he must win a glorious victory for France. The minds of Frenchmen were peculiarly susceptible to the inspiriting effects of military glory. Therefore he would strike at Belgium: he would separate Blucher from Wellington and beat each army in turn. And here is revealed the nicety of his calculations. He must attack and beat either Wellington or Blucher before they could join their forces.
“If he directed his line of operations against Brussels through Ath, and debouched from Lille or Condé against Wellington’s right, he would merely drive the English army towards the Prussian army, and two days later he would find himself face to face with their united forces. If, on the contrary, he marched against Blucher’s left, through Givet and the valley of the Meuse, in the same way he would still hasten the union of the hostile forces by driving the Prussians to the English. Inspired by one of his finest strategical conceptions, the Emperor resolved to break boldly into the very centre of the enemy’s cantonments, at the very point where the English and Prussians would probably concentrate. The road from Charleroi to Brussels forming the line of contact between the two armies, Napoleon, passing through Beaumont and Phillippeville, resolved, by this road, to fall like a thunderbolt on his foe.”[2]
Wellington’s troops were scattered in cantonments stretching over an arc from Oudenarde to Quatre-Bras. The Second Corps, under Lord Hill, formed the extreme right, and occupied Ghent, Oudenarde, Ath and Leuze. The Corps was 27,000 strong, of whom scarcely 7,000 were British troops. The First Corps, under the Prince of Orange, occupied Mons, Rouelx, Soignies, Genappe, Seneffe, Frasnes, Braine-le-Comte, and Enghien. This Corps was 30,000 strong, of whom only 6,300 were British. Its left rested on Genappe, Quatre-Bras, and Frasnes, and was in touch with the right of the First Corps, of the Prussian army, under Zieten, whose headquarters were at Charleroi. Wellington’s Reserve, 25,500 men, was posted in the neighbourhood of Brussels, under the Duke’s personal command. The Cavalry, under Lord Uxbridge, was comprised in seven brigades, British and King’s German Legion; with one Hanoverian brigade, five squadrons of Brunswick Cavalry, and three brigades of Dutch-Belgian Cavalry. The Brunswickers were stationed near Brussels; the three Dutch-Belgian brigades were allotted to the First Corps, and the remainder of the cavalry were stationed at Ninove, Grammont, and in the villages scattered along the Dender.
Wellington was expecting an attack by way of Lille and Courtrai, and always regarded this direction as Napoleon’s best move. For his army was based on Ostend, Antwerp, and the sea; hence, had Napoleon attacked by way of Mons, he would have cut Wellington’s communications, and forced him to evacuate Brussels. On the other hand, he would have driven the English army towards the Prussians.
Wellington’s dispositions were eminently suited to rapid concentration on threatened points, while, at the same time, they were sufficiently scattered to make the subsistence of the troops possible. He had selected Oudenarde, Ath, Enghien, Soignies, Nivelles, and Quatre-Bras as points of interior concentration; and in this way, by whichever route Napoleon chose to attack, Wellington could bring his Reserve to the threatened point, and at the same time bring the remainder of his forces into concentration, enabling him to throw at least two-thirds of his whole force in front of the enemy within twenty-four hours.
Blucher’s army, 116,000 strong, was divided into four Corps. The First Corps, under Zieten, had its headquarters at Charleroi; and its outposts stretched from Bonne Espérance through Lobbes, Thuin and Gerpinnes to Sossoye. Its right was in touch with the left of the Prince of Orange’s Corps of Wellington’s army. The Second Corps, under Pirch I., had its headquarters at Namur. Its Divisions were stationed in Thorembey les Beguignes, Heron, Huy and Hannut. Its outposts stretched from Sossoye to Dinant. The Third Corps, under Thielemann, whose headquarters were at Ciney, had its Divisions stationed at Asserre, Ciney, Dinant and Huy. Its outposts extended from Dinant to Rochefort. The Fourth Corps, Bulow’s, had its headquarters at Liège: its Divisions were stationed at Warème, Hologne, Liers, Tongres and Lootz.
Bluchers scheme of concentration enabled him to collect his four Corps together at their respective points of assembly—Fleurus, Namur, Ciney and Liège, within twelve hours. If the French crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, Blucher intended to concentrate his army in front of Sombreffe, on the Namur-Nivelles road, where he would be within 8 miles of Quatre-Bras, Wellington’s point of concentration under those circumstances. If Napoleon moved along the Meuse towards Namur, the First, Second and Fourth Corps were to concentrate on Namur, while Thielemann’s Corps, the Third, acting from Ciney, would attack the enemy’s right flank. If, again, Napoleon advanced on Ciney, Zieten, Pirch I. and Thielemann were to concentrate their Corps on Ciney, and the Fourth Corps was to remain at Liège as a Reserve.
These were the dispositions of the Allies; but they were not strategically in a sound position. Wellington’s line of supply lay through Ostend and Antwerp to the sea; Bluchers lay by Liège and Maestricht to the Rhine. Therefore, in the event of a disaster to either, or both, their lines of retreat would carry them further apart. It was this weakness on which Napoleon based his whole plan. The Prussian army, being the nearer to Napoleon, would be the first met with, and therefore the first to concentrate. By a rapid crossing of the Sambre at Charleroi, Napoleon would force the First Corps back on Fleurus, where the Prussian army was to concentrate, and throw himself on the point of junction of the Allied armies when concentrated; namely, the Quatre-Bras-Sombreffe road. He knew that the Prussians, by reason of their dispositions, would be concentrated first, and he therefore hoped, by possessing himself of the point of junction, to beat their concentrated army before Wellington, who, he decided, would be much slower in assembling his troops, could come up to Quatre-Bras. It was of vital importance to Napoleon to beat the Prussian army, entirely and completely, in its position at Sombreffe, before Wellington could come to Blucher’s assistance. The retreat of the Prussians on Wavre without such a decisive defeat, would have upset the whole plan: for Wellington would then have retired and united with Blucher, either in front of Brussels or behind it. But, if thoroughly beaten, the Prussians would retreat on Liège: and only in this way could Napoleon effectually separate the two armies and crush them in turn. Such was Napoleon’s argument. In conception, the plan was brilliant; but its execution was unworthy of him.