Our non-sensational, or conceptual, states of mind, on the other hand, seem to obey a different law. They present themselves immediately as referring beyond themselves. Although they also possess an immediately given 'content,' they have a 'fringe' beyond it ([p. 168]), and claim to 'represent' something else than it. The 'blue' we have just spoken of, for instance, was, substantively considered, a word; but it was a word with a meaning. The quality blue was the object of the thought, the word was its content. The mental state, in short, was not self-sufficient as sensations are, but expressly pointed at something more in which it meant to terminate.
But the moment when, as in sensations, object and conscious state seem to be different ways of considering one and the same fact, it becomes hard to justify our denial that mental states consist of parts. The blue sky, considered physically, is a sum of mutually external parts; why is it not such a sum, when considered as a content of sensation?
The only result that is plain from all this is that the relations of the known and the knower are infinitely complicated, and that a genial, whole-hearted, popular-science way of formulating them will not suffice. The only possible path to understanding them lies through metaphysical subtlety; and Idealism and Erkenntnisstheorie must say their say before the natural-science assumption that thoughts 'know' things grows clear.
The changing character of consciousness presents another puzzle. We first assumed conscious 'states' as the units with which psychology deals, and we said later that they were in constant change. Yet any state must have a certain duration to be effective at all—a pain which lasted but a hundredth of a second would practically be no pain—and the question comes up, how long may a state last and still be treated as one state? In time-perception for example, if the 'present' as known (the 'specious present,' as we called it) may be a dozen seconds long ([p. 281]), how long need the present as knower be? That is, what is the minimum duration of the consciousness in which those twelve seconds can be apprehended as just past, the minimum which can be called a 'state,' for such a cognitive purpose? Consciousness, as a process in time, offers the paradoxes which have been found in all continuous change. There are no 'states' in such a thing, any more than there are facets in a circle, or places where an arrow 'is' when it flies. The vertical raised upon the time-line on which ([p. 285]) we represented the past to be 'projected' at any given instant of memory, is only an ideal construction. Yet anything broader than that vertical is not, for the actual present is only the joint between the past and future and has no breadth of its own. Where everything is change and process, how can we talk of 'state'? Yet how can we do without 'states,' in describing what the vehicles of our knowledge seem to be?
States of consciousness themselves are not verifiable facts. But 'worse remains behind.' Neither common-sense, nor psychology so far as it has yet been written, has ever doubted that the states of consciousness which that science studies are immediate data of experience. 'Things' have been doubted, but thoughts and feelings have never been doubted. The outer world, but never the inner world, has been denied. Everyone assumes that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our thinking activity as such, with our consciousness as something inward and contrasted with the outer objects which it knows. Yet I must confess that for my part I cannot feel sure of this conclusion. Whenever I try to become sensible of my thinking activity as such, what I catch is some bodily fact, an impression coming from my brow, or head, or throat, or nose. It seems as if consciousness as an inner activity were rather a postulate than a sensibly given fact, the postulate, namely, of a knower as correlative to all this known; and as if 'sciousness' might be a better word by which to describe it. But 'sciousness postulated as an hypothesis' is practically a very different thing from 'states of consciousness apprehended with infallible certainty by an inner sense.' For one thing, it throws the question of who the knower really is wide open again, and makes the answer which we gave to it at the end of [Chapter XII] a mere provisional statement from a popular and prejudiced point of view.
Conclusion.—When, then, we talk of 'psychology as a natural science,' we must not assume that that means a sort of psychology that stands at last on solid ground. It means just the reverse; it means a psychology particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint, a psychology all of whose elementary assumptions and data must be reconsidered in wider connections and translated into other terms. It is, in short, a phrase of diffidence, and not of arrogance; and it is indeed strange to hear people talk triumphantly of 'the New Psychology,' and write 'Histories of Psychology,' when into the real elements and forces which the word covers not the first glimpse of clear insight exists. A string of raw facts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level; a strong prejudice that we have states of mind, and that our brain conditions them: but not a single law in the sense in which physics shows us laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence can causally be deduced. We don't even know the terms between which the elementary laws would obtain if we had them ([p. 464]). This is no science, it is only the hope of a science. The matter of a science is with us. Something definite happens when to a certain brain-state a certain 'sciousness' corresponds. A genuine glimpse into what it is would be the scientific achievement, before which all past achievements would pale. But at present psychology is in the condition of physics before Galileo and the laws of motion, of chemistry before Lavoisier and the notion that mass is preserved in all reactions. The Galileo and the Lavoisier of psychology will be famous men indeed when they come, as come they some day surely will, or past successes are no index to the future. When they do come, however, the necessities of the case will make them 'metaphysical.' Meanwhile the best way in which we can facilitate their advent is to understand how great is the darkness in which we grope, and never to forget that the natural-science assumptions with which we started are provisional and revisable things.
INDEX.
[A], [B], [C], [D], [E], [F], [G], [H], [I], [J], [K], [L], [M], [N], [O], [P], [Q], [R], [S], [T], [U], [V], [W].
Abstract ideas, [240], [25];
characters, [353];
propositions, [354]
Abstraction, [251];
see Distraction
Accommodation, of crystalline lens, [32];
of ear, [49]
Acquaintance, [14]
Acquisitiveness, [407]
Action, what holds attention determines, [448]
After-images, [43-5]
Agassiz, [132]
Alexia, [113]
Allen, Grant, [104]
Alternating personality, [205] ff.
Amidon, [132]
Analysis, [56], [248], [251], [362]
Anger, [374]
Aphasia, [108], [113];
loss of images in, [309]
Apperception, [326]
Aqueduct of Silvius, [80]
Arachnoid membrane, [84]
Arbor vitæ, [86]
Aristotle, [318]
Articular sensibility, [74]
Association, [Chapter XVI];
the order of our ideas, [253];
determined by cerebral laws, [255];
is not of ideas, but of things thought of, [255];
the elementary principle of, [256];
the ultimate cause of is habit, [256];
indeterminateness of its results, [258];
total recall, [259];
partial recall and the law of interest, [261];
frequency, recency, vividness, and emotional congruity tend to determine the object recalled, [264];
focalized recall or by similarity, [267], [364];
voluntary trains of thought, [271];
problems, [273]
Atomistic theories of consciousness, [462]
Attention, [Chapter XIII];
its relation to interest, [170];
its physiological ground, [217];
narrowness of field of consciousness, [217];
to how many things possible, [219];
to simultaneous sight and sound, [220];
its varieties, [220];
voluntary, [224];
involuntary, [220];
change necessary to, [226];
its relation to genius, [227];
physiological conditions of, [228];
the sense-organ must be adapted, [229];
the idea of the object must be aroused, [232];
pedagogic remarks, [236];
attention and free-will, [237];
what holds attention determines action, [448];
volitional effort is effort of attention, [450]
Auditory centre in brain, [113]
Auditory type of imagination, [306]
Austen, Miss, [261]
Automaton theory, [10], [101]
Azam, [210]
Bahnsen, [147]
Bain, [145], [367], [370]
Berklev, [302], [303], [347]
Binet, [318], [332]
Black, [45-6]
Blind Spot, [31]
Blix, [64], [68]
Blood-supply, cerebral, [130]
Bodily expression, cause of emotions, [375]
Brace, Julia, [252]
Brain, the functions of, [Chapter VIII], [91]
Brain, its connection with mind, [5-7];
its relations to outer forces, [9];
relations of consciousness to, [462]
Brain, structure of, [Chapter VII], 7[8] ff.;
vesicles, [78] ff.;
dissection of sheep's, [81];
how to preserve, [83];
functions of, [Chapter VIII], [91] ff.
Bridgman, Laura, [252], [308]
Broca, [109], [113], [115]
Broca's convolution, [109]
Brodhun, [46]
Brooks, Prof. W. K., [412]
Brutes, reasoning of, [367]
Calamus scriptorius, [84]
Canals, semicircular, [50]
Carpenter, [223], [224]
Cattell, [125], [126], [127]
Caudate nucleus, [81], [86]
Centres, nerve, [92]
Cerebellum, its relation to equilibrium, [76];
its anatomy, [79], [84]
Cerebral laws, of association, [255]
Cerebral process, see Neural Process
Cerebrum, see Brain, Hemisphere
Changing character of consciousness, [152], [466]
Charcot, [113], [309]
Choice, see Interest
Coalescence of different sensations into the same 'thing,' [339]
Cochlea, [51], [52]
Cognition, see Reasoning
Cold, sensations of, [63] ff.;
nerves of, [64]
Color, [40-3]
Commissures, [84]
Commissure, middle, [88] ff.;
anterior, [88];
posterior, [88]
Comparison of magnitudes, [342]
Compounding of sensations, [23], [43], [57]
Compound objects, analysis of, [248]
Concatenated acts, dependent on habit, [140]
Conceiving, mode of, what is meant by, [354]
Conceptions, [Chapter XIV];
defined, [239];
their permanence, [239];
different states of mind can mean the same, [239];
abstract, universal, and problematic, [240];
the thought of 'the same' is not the same thought over again, [243]
Conceptual order different from perceptual, [243]
Consciousness, stream of, [Chapter XI], [151];
four characters in, [152];
personal, [152];
is in constant change, [152], [466];
same state of mind never occurs twice, [154];
consciousness is continuous, [157];
substantive and transitive states of, [160];
interested in one part of its object more than another, [170];
double consciousness, [206] ff.;
narrowness of field of, [217];
relations of to brain, [462]
Consciousness and Movement, [Chapter XXIII];
all consciousness is motor, [370]
Concomitants, law of varying, [251]
Consent, in willing, [452]
Continuity of object of consciousness, [157]
Contrast, [25], [44-5]
Convergence of eyeballs, [31], [33]
Convolutions, motor, [106]
Corpora fimbriata, [86]
Corpora quadrigemma, [79], [86], [89]
Corpus albicans, [84]
Corpus callosum, [81], [84]
Corpus striatum, [81], [86], [108]
Cortex, [11], note
Cortex, localization in, [104];
motor region of, [106]
Corti's organ, [52]
Cramming, [295]
Crura of brain, [79], [84], [108]
Curiosity, [407]
Currents, in nerves, [10]
Czermak, [70]
Darwin, [388], [389]
Deafness, mental, [113]
Delage, [76]
Deliberation, [448]
Delusions of insane, [207]
Dermal senses, [60] ff.
Determinism and psychology, [461]
Decision, five types, [429]
Differences, [24];
directly felt, [245];
not resolvable into composition, [245];
inferred, [248]
Diffusion of movements, the law of, [371]
Dimension, third, [342], [346]
Discharge, nervous, [120]
Discord, [58]
Discrimination, [Chapter XV], [59];
touch, [62];
defined, [244];
conditions which favor, [245];
sensation of difference, [246];
differences inferred, [248];
analysis of compound objects, [249];
to be easily singled out a quality should already be separately known, [250];
dissociation by varying concomitants, [251];
practice improves discrimination, [252];
of space, [338]
See Difference
'Disparate' retinal points, [35]
Dissection, of sheep's brain, [81]
Distance, as seen, [39];
between members of series, [24];
in space, see Third dimension
Distraction, [218] ff.
Division of space, [338]
Donaldson, [64]
Double consciousness, [206] ff.
Double images, [36]
Double personality, [205]
Duality of brain, [205]
Dumont, [135]
Dura mater, [82]
Duration, the primitive object in time-perception, [280];
our estimation of short, [281]
Ear, [47] ff.
Effort, feeling of, [434];
feels like an original force, [442];
volitional effort is effort of attention, [450];
ethical importance of the phenomena of effort, [458]
Ego, see Self
Embryological sketch, [Chapter VII], [78]
Emotion, [Chapter XXIV];
compared with instincts, [373];
varieties of, innumerable, [374];
causes of varieties, [375], [381];
results from bodily expression, [375];
this view not materialistic, [380];
the subtler emotions, [384];
fear, [385];
genesis of reactions, [388]
Emotional congruity, determines association, [264]
Empirical self, see Self
Emulation, [406]
End-organs, [10];
of touch, [60];
of temperature, [64];
of pressure, [60];
of pain, [67]
Environment, [3]
Essence of reason, always for subjective interest, [358]
Essential characters, in reason, [354]
Ethical importance of effort, [458]
Exaggerated impulsion, causes an explosive will, [439]
Exner, [123], [281]
Experience, [218], [244]
Explosive will, from defective inhibition, [437];
from exaggerated impulsion, [439]
Expression, bodily, cause of emotions, [375]
Extensity, primitive to all sensation, [335]
Exteriority of objects, [15]
External world, [15]
Extirpation of higher nerve-centres, [95] ff.
Eye, its anatomy, [28-30]
Familiarity, sense of, see Recognition
Fear, [385], [406], [407]
Fechner, [21], [229]
Feeling of effort, [434]
Féré, [311]
Ferrier, [132]
Fissure of Rolando, seat of motor incitations, [106]
Fissure of Sylvius, [108]
Foramen of Monro, [88]
Force, original, effort feels like, [442]
Forgetting, [300]
Fornix, [81], [86], [87], [89]
Fovea centralis, [31]
Franklin, [121]
Franz, Dr., [308]
Freedom of the will, [237]
Free-will and attention, [237];
relates solely to effort of attention, [455];
insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds, [456];
ethical importance of the phenomena of effort, [458]
Frequency, determines association, [264]
"Fringes" of mental objects, [163] ff.
Frogs' lower centres, [95]
Functions of the Brain, [Chapter VIII], [91];
nervous functions, general idea of, [91]
Fusion of mental states, [197], [245], [339]
Fusion, of sensations, [23], [43], [57]
Galton, [126], [265], [303], [306]
Genius, [227], [327]
Goethe, [146], [157]
Goldscheider, [11], [64], [68]
Goltz, [100]
Guiteau, [185]
Gurney, Edmund, [331], [334]
Habit, [Chapter X], [134] ff.;
has a physical basis, [134];
due to plasticity, [135];
due to pathways through nerve-centres, [136];
effects of, [138];
practical use of, [138];
depends on sensations not attended to, [141];
ethical and pedagogical importance of [142] ff.;
habit the ultimate cause of association, [256]
Hagenauer, [386]
Hall, Robert, [223]
Hallucinations, [330] ff.
Hamilton, [260], [268]
Harmony, [58]
Hartley, [255]
Hearing, [47] ff.;
centre of, in cortex, [113]
Heat-sensations, [63] ff.;
nerves of, [64]
Helmholtz, [26], [42], [43], [55], [56], [58], [121], [226], [227], [231], [233], [234], [321]
Hemispheres, general notion of, [97];
chief seat of memory, [98];
effects of deprivation of, on frogs, [92];
on pigeons, [96]
Herbart, [222], [326]
Herbartian School, [157]
Hering, [24], [26]
Herzen, [123], [124]
Hippocampi, [88]
Hodgson, [262], [264], [280], [283]
Holbrook, [297]
Horsley, [107], [118]
Hume, [161], [244]
Hunger, sensations of, [69]
Huxley, [143]
Hypnotic conditions, [301]
Ideas, the theory of, [154] ff.;
never come twice the same, [154];
they do not permanently exist, [157];
abstract ideas, [240], [251];
universal [240];
order of ideas by association, [253]
'Identical retinal points,' [35]
Identity, personal, [201];
mutations of, [205] ff.;
alternating personality, [205]
Ideo-motor action the type of all volition, [432]
Illusions, [317] ff., [330]
Images, mental, compared with sensations, [14];
double, in vision, [36];
'after-images,' [43-5];
visual, [302];
auditory, [306];
motor, [307];
tactile, [308]
Imagination, [Chapter XIX];
defined, [302];
differs in individuals, [302];
Galton's statistics of, [302];
visual, [302];
auditory, [306];
motor, [307];
tactile, [308];
pathological
differences, [308];
cerebral process of, [310];
not locally distinct from that of sensation, [310]
Imitation, [406]
Inattention, [218], [236]
Increase of stimulus, [20];
serial, [24]
Infundibulum, [82], [84], [88]
Inhibition, defective, causes an Explosive Will, [437]
Inhibition of instincts by habits, [399]
Insane delusions, [207]
Instinct, [Chapter XXV];
emotions compared with, [373];
definition of, [391];
every instinct is an impulse, [392];
not always blind or invariable, [395];
modified by experience, [396];
two principles of non-uniformity, [398];
man has more than beasts, [398], [406];
transitory, [402];
of children, [406];
fear, [407]
Intellect, part played by, in space-perception, [349]
Intensity of sensations, [16]
Interest, selects certain objects and determines thoughts [170];