In 1946 the United States transmitted six volumes of technical information on atomic energy to the United Nations. This was one important means of providing members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with sufficient basic data to discuss international control.
No similar body of material on hydrogen bombs has been transmitted to the United Nations. Can the Commission now discuss the control of hydrogen warfare without further official information on its technical aspects? If such information is to be provided, who should be the provider, the United States or the Soviet Union, or both?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
All the information so far has come from the United States. In fact, the Smyth Report, the six volumes of technical information submitted to the UN, the testimony by scientists at the Congressional hearings on the McMahon Act, and much declassified information have been of invaluable aid to Russia in developing her own atomic bomb. It is about time that this one-way flow of information came to a stop. Not a trickle has so far come out of Russia—not even an official acknowledgment that she has exploded her first A-bomb—and until she shows her willingness to co-operate fully, we must stop playing Santa Claus.
16. Should a new panel of experts analogous to the Acheson-Lilienthal Board be appointed to study the H-bomb in relation to international control?
It is now more than 4 years since the Acheson-Lilienthal Board made its recommendations on international control. Their findings have since been largely incorporated into the UN plan.
Do the events of the last 4 years make it desirable, for technical reasons, to rethink the control problem? Are the technical data of hydrogen bombs such, as to demand a recasting and change of emphasis in the existing UN plan? Have the prospects of large-scale peacetime applications of atomic energy sufficiently changed that a different orientation in control measures is desirable?
If re-examination of the control question is indicated, should this inquiry be undertaken in the first instance by a group of qualified Americans? Or should the United States suggest that an internationally constituted board initially take on this assignment?
Considering the strong Soviet opposition to the UN plan, is it useful to consider the problem of control? Is the Soviet attitude at all likely to change in the foreseeable future? Would a rethinking of the control problem contribute to a solution unless Soviet representatives participated? Would the appointment of a new “Acheson-Lilienthal Board” raise false hopes?