As indicated in Chapter IV and in the preceding comments, the UN plan for the international control of atomic energy is wholly out of date, and the sooner we realize it, the better for us and for the world. It was at best a noble ideal, which did not have the slightest chance of realization from the very start. A re-examination of the entire problem, even before the advent of the H-bomb, had been long overdue. Today it is all the more imperative. Since such a re-examination requires, or at least implies, the withdrawal of the plan, originally sponsored by this country, it should be done by an international board, preferably at the suggestion of some nation other than the United States.
The new board, in considering the whole problem anew, should avoid our original error of regarding control of atomic weapons as a problem wholly separate from that of other weapons of mass destruction. It should recognize the facts of life and not aim at bringing the millennium overnight. It should not seek absolute security, since the facts show it to be unattainable. Rather should it accept as a wise maxim that even partial security is better than none.
If the board set for itself certain limited objectives, they would have a much better chance of universal acceptance than if its aims were too high, as they were in the original United States plan, now the plan of the majority of United Nations. Its first limited objective should be a general agreement to outlaw the use of all weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations. This would mean outlawing the use not only of A- and H-bombs against large urban centers of population, but also of all other conventional weapons for the mass killing of noncombatants.
A second limited objective should be the outlawing of radiological warfare in all forms, which should include the use of the rigged H-bomb as well as the use of A-bombs in a manner that takes advantage of their radioactive effects. This would mean the prohibition of the explosion of A- or H-bombs from a low altitude, or their explosion underwater in a harbor.
These limited objectives would still permit nations to manufacture atomic weapons and to use them as tactical weapons against military personnel, while they would eliminate their use as strategic weapons against large urban centers. The very possession of atomic weapons by both sides, however, may in itself prevent their use even tactically. In fact, there would still be the hope that they would serve as effective deterrents against war itself.
The advantage of such a plan of limited objectives is the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that even Russia would not dare to turn it down and thus stand before the world as preventing the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons against civilian populations. And once we reached agreement with Russia on one set of limited objectives, the door may possibly have been opened for further agreement on other limited objectives.
Peace, step by step, appears to be the only alternative to possible catastrophe. One limited objective after another must become our major policy.
A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET
The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face designed by W. A. Dwiggins. This type belongs to the family of printing types called “modern face” by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia borders on the general design of Scotch Modern, but is more freely drawn than that letter.
The book was composed, printed, and bound by Kingsport Press, Inc., Kingsport, Tennessee.