But, neither in the inception nor in the maturing of the enterprise, had the Commander-in-chief been consulted; and the first knowledge he possessed of the project was derived from a letter from General Gates, inclosing another to the Marquis, informing him of his appointment to the command. [FN] The disrespect to the Commander-in-chief, to whom the youthful soldier was bound by the strongest ties of friendship and respect, was so manifest, that the Marquis at first hesitated in accepting the command. Nor was his reluctance lessened by the suspicious circumstance that General Conway, the base instrument of the Gates faction in the conspiracy against Washington, had been assigned as his second in command. Soaring above all selfish considerations, however, Washington advised the Marquis to accept the trust confided to him by Congress. Lafayette, therefore, repaired from the camp at Valley Forge to York town, to be more particularly advised as to the object and the details of the enterprise. The plan of organizing a light but efficient force, to make a sudden dash upon St. Johns, and destroy the flotilla which gave the enemy the command of Lake Champlain, and to inflict such farther injury as might be effected in a rapid campaign, was fully unfolded to him. Ample supplies of men and means were promised by Gates; and, after securing the services of the Baron de Kalb to the expedition—an officer older in rank than Conway, who would necessarily be his second in command—the Marquis accepted the appointment.
[FN] "I am much obliged by your polite request of my opinion and advice on the expedition to Canada and other occasions. In the present instance, as I neither know the extent of the objects in view, nor the means to be employed to effect them, it is not in my power to pass any judgment upon the subject. I can only sincerely wish that success may attend it both as it may advance the public good, and on account of the personal honor of the Marquis de Lafayette, for whom I have a very particular esteem and regard."—[Letter of Washington to Gates, Jan. 27, 1778.] "I shall say no more of the Canada expedition, than that it is at an end. I never was made acquainted with a single circumstance relating to it."—Letter of Washington to General Armstrong, of Pennsylvania.
Full of high hopes, a brilliant enterprise before him, and panting for an opportunity to signalize himself in a separate command, the Marquis pushed forward to Albany, amid all the rigors of winter, to enter at once upon the service, and apparently with as much confidence as though he had achieved the exploit. Sad, however, was his disappointment at the posture of affairs on his arrival at Albany. Conway, who had arrived there three days before him, at once assured him that the expedition was quite impossible. Such, likewise, was the opinion of Generals Schuyler, Lincoln, and Arnold, the latter two of whom were detained at Albany by the unhealed wounds received upon the fields of Saratoga. Indeed, he was not long in ascertaining, from the quarter-master, commissary, and clothier-generals, that there was a lamentable deficiency of almost every necessary of which he had been led to expect an abundant supply. The number of troops was altogether inadequate. Three thousand effective men were believed to be the smallest force that would suffice, and that number was promised. But scarcely twelve hundred could be mustered fit for duty, and the greater part of these were too naked even for a Summer campaign. [FN-1] Their pay was greatly in arrear; and officers and men were alike indisposed to the service. [FN-2] Originally it had been intended to confide the proposed expedition to General Stark, whose prowess at the battle of Bennington had rendered him exceedingly popular with the people; and it was supposed that he could at once bring into the field a sufficient number of his mountaineers to strike the blow with success. [FN-3] Stark was invited to Albany, and James Duane was sent thither from Congress to confer with him upon the subject. But the inducement offered by Congress being in the form of a bounty, contingent only upon success, was thought not sufficient; and when a representation of the circumstances was made by Mr. Duane to that body, the scheme was changed and enlarged, at the suggestion of General Gates, according to the plan which the Marquis was to execute.
[FN-1] Letter of Lafayette to General Washington, dated Albany, Feb. 13, 1778.
[FN-2] On the 19th of February James Duane wrote to Governor Clinton respecting the impracticability of the enterprise, since the Marquis could find neither the troops nor the preparations. In the course of his letter, Mr. Duane said of the Marquis:—"His zeal for this country, of which he has given marks even to enthusiasm, and his ardent desire of glory, lead him to wish the expedition practicable; but he is too considerate to pursue it rashly, or without probable grounds of a successful issue. I must mention to your Excellency a circumstance which shows the liberality of his disposition. He determined, on his entering into Canada, to supply his army through his own private bills on France to the amount of five or six thousand guineas, and to present that sum to Congress as a proof of his love to America and the rights of human nature."
[FN-3] "I was to find General Stark with a large body, and indeed General Gates told me 'General Stark will have burned the fleet before your arrival.' Well, the first letter I receive in Albany is from General Stark, who wishes to know 'what number of men, from where, for what time, and for what rendezvous, I desire him to raise.'"—Letter from Lafayette to Washington.
Having attentively examined the situation of affairs, and the means within his control, and consulted with the several able captains at Albany, the young soldier saw with inexpressible chagrin that the obstacles were insuperable. In the language of another, amounting to a bitter satire, whether thus intended or not—"the Generals only were got in readiness;" [FN-1] and the gallant Marquis was compelled to relinquish the enterprise, without even the poor privilege of making an attempt. He certainly had great reason, not only for vexation, but disgust—advised, as he had been, to announce to his court the degree of confidence reposed in him by Congress, in thus confiding to him a separate command of such importance—not, of course, suspecting, for a moment, that General Gates could have been so ignorant of the actual situation of the department from which he had been so recently transferred. [FN-2]