[FN-1] Marshall.
[FN-2] The history of this abortive project has been drawn chiefly from a long MS. letter from James Duane to Governor Clinton, in the author's possession. On his way to Albany, the Marquis visited Mr. Duane, and was accompanied by him thither.
The Marquis wrote to his greatest and best friend, the Commander-in-chief, upon the subject of what he called his "distressing and ridiculous situation," in the bitterness of his spirit. "I am sent," said he, "with a great noise, at the head of an army, to do great things. The whole continent, France, and, what is the worst, the British army, will be in expectation. How far they will be deceived, how far we shall be ridiculed, you may judge by the candid account you have got of the state of our affairs." It is quite evident, from the tenor of the letter we are quoting, that the Marquis suspected that he had been purposely detached from the company of Washington with some sinister design:—"There are things, I dare say, in which I am deceived. A certain Colonel is not here for nothing." . . . "I am sure a cloud is drawn before my eyes. However, there are points I cannot be deceived in." . . . "They have sent me more than twenty French officers. I do not know what to do with them. I am at a loss to know how to act, and indeed I do not know for what I am here myself." And again, toward the close of the letter, he says:—"I fancy the actual scheme is, to have me out of this part of the continent, and General Conway as chief under the immediate direction of General Gates. How they will bring it about I do not know, but be certain something of that kind will appear. You are nearer than myself, and every honest man in Congress is your friend; therefore you may foresee and prevent the evil a hundred times better than I can." [FN]
[FN] Letter from Lafayette to Washington, dated Albany, Feb. 23, 1778.—Vide Sparks, Cor. of Washington, vol. v, Appendix.
The true position of affairs at Albany having been made known to Congress, it was resolved to instruct the Marquis to suspend the expedition, and at the same time to assure him "that Congress entertained a high sense of his prudence, activity, and zeal; and that they were fully persuaded nothing would have been wanting on his own part, or on the part of the officers who accompanied him, to give the expedition the utmost possible effect." [FN]
[FN] Secret Journal, March 2d, cited by Sparks.
But, to return to the Indian affairs of the Mohawk Valley. Early in the year, various unpleasant symptoms were perceptible, indicating the design of a renewed and more extensive Indian war than had been anticipated at any previous moment. Information was received from the remote West, of a general disposition among the nations in the region of the great lakes, and the upper Mississippi, to join the Mohawks, Cayugas, Onondagas, and Senecas, against the United States. The master-spirit of those threatened movements was Joseph Brant, whose winter-quarters were at the central and convenient point of Niagara. Nor were Sir John Johnson and his associates, Claus and Butler, inactive; while the British commander at Detroit, Colonel Hamilton, was at the same time exercising a powerful influence over the surrounding nations of the forest. On the opening of the year, therefore, great fears were entertained for the security of the frontiers from the Mohawk to the Ohio. Still, with the Six Nations, Congress resolved to make yet another effort of conciliation—to secure their neutrality, if nothing farther. Accordingly, on the 2d of February, resolutions were passed, directing a council to be held with these nations at Johnstown, in the County of Tryon. General Schuyler and Volkert P. Douw were appointed commissioners for that purpose, and Governor Clinton was requested to designate a special commissioner to be present on the occasion. In pursuance of this solicitation, James Duane was appointed for that duty. The resolutions of Congress instructed the commissioners "to speak to the Indians in language becoming the representatives of free, sovereign, and independent States, and in such a tone as would convince them that they felt themselves to be so." [FN] It was left to the discretion of the commissioners to determine whether it would be prudent to insist upon their taking up arms in behalf of the States, or whether to content themselves with efforts to secure their neutrality.