"The great fault of Mr. Kirkman's statements is that they are often so general in character as to be both true and false at the same time.... He does not seem to comprehend the nature of the railroad, or to perceive the danger of allowing a railroad to exercise its powers uncontrolled. He denies the State's right to interfere with any discriminations which a railway corporation chooses to adopt. He would allow railways to fix whatever charges they please for long hauls and short hauls.... Mr. Kirkman does not adduce a single fact in support of these remarkable views. He simply says: 'Railroads cannot, if they would, maintain any inequitable local tariff.' This is not argument, it is simply assertion. Every one who has learned the alphabet of this question knows that railways have been exceedingly unjust wherever competition or the law did not restrict their powers. If this were the proper place for it we would give the author instances of this injustice by the hundred, and almost any book on the subject refers to such cases by the thousand.... When confronted with the facts substantiating such charges the author answers the argument by exclaiming: 'But how absurd! But how untrue! Our commercial morals are equal to the highest in the world....' Scarcely an assertion can be taken without qualification. The author fairly revels in half-truths.... The book may have its merits, but they are too modest to reveal themselves."
It is a failing of mankind to take for truth without further investigation any assertion that has often been reiterated. Most people are prone to believe that an assertion made by a thousand hearsay witnesses is true, overlooking the possibility of their drawing from a common false source. But it is surprising that an author like Prof. Arthur T. Hadley should fall into such an error. In his otherwise excellent work, "Railroad Transportation, Its History and Its Laws," Mr. Hadley bases a number of his deductions upon false premises advanced by railroad managers, and arrives at conclusions which appear strange when their source is considered. In the chapter on railroad legislation Professor Hadley says: "But a more powerful force than the authority of the courts was working against the Granger system of regulation. The laws of trade could not be violated with impunity. The effects were most sharply felt in Wisconsin. The law reducing railroad rates to the basis which competitive points enjoyed left nothing to pay fixed charges. In the second year of its operation, no Wisconsin road paid a dividend; only four paid interest on their bonds. Railroad construction had come to a standstill. Even the facilities of existing roads could not be kept up. Foreign capital refused to invest in Wisconsin; the development of the State was sharply checked; the very men who had most favored the law found themselves heavy losers.... By the time the Supreme Court published the Granger decisions, the fight had been settled, not by constitutional limitations, but by industrial ones."
These statements are either utterly untrue or greatly misleading. Mr. Hadley ought to know that the railroad companies in the Granger States never complied with the letter, much less with the spirit of the law. Whenever they made an apparent effort to live up to it they only did so to make it odious. Rates were never reduced by the legislature to the basis previously enjoyed by competitive points, but merely to the average charge which had obtained before the passage of the law. As a rule the railroad revenues increased. If any companies failed to earn enough to pay fixed charges it was simply because they were determined not to do so. A non-payment of dividends did not injure the managers, but simply other stockholders of the road. A permanent establishment of the principle of non-discrimination, on the other hand, would have benefited stockholders, while prejudicing the speculative interest which managers had in the roads. Railroad construction came, after the financial panic of 1873, to a practical standstill throughout the United States; and if the Granger States did not get their share of the very small total increase during the five years following the panic, it was due solely to a conspiracy on the part of the railroad managers to misrepresent and pervert the legislation of these States. The laws, as has already been stated, were finally repealed, not because the people had tired of them or regarded them unwise or unjust, but because it was hoped that the commissioner system would prove more efficient. It was offered as a compromise measure and was accepted as such by the railroad managers, who, in their eagerness to rid themselves of the restrictions imposed by the Granger laws, gave every assurance of complete submission to the requirements of the proposed legislation.
Mr. Hadley even goes so far as to defend railroad pools. "Unluckily," he says, "we place these combinations outside of the protection of the law, and by giving them this precarious and almost illegal character we tempt them to seek present gain, even at the sacrifice of their own future interests. We regard them, and we let them regard themselves, as a means of momentary profit and speculation, instead of recognizing them as responsible public agencies of lasting influence and importance." We can partially account for this author's defense of pooling when we are informed that he accepts it as an axiom that "combination does not produce arbitrary results any more than competition produces beneficent ones." Referring to railroad profits, Mr. Hadley says: "The statement that corporations make too much money is scarcely borne out by the facts. The average return of the railroads of this country is only four per cent., the bondholders receiving an average of four and a half per cent., the stockholders of two and a half per cent. True, much of the stock is water, not representing any capital actually expended; but, even making allowance for this, it is hardly probable that the roads are earning more than five per cent. on the total investment. This assumes an average cost of $45,000 per mile, implying that about half of the stock and one-sixth of the bonds are water." Mr. Hadley would probably have come much nearer the truth if he had assumed three-fourths of the stock and one-fourth of the bonds to be water. Even Mr. Poor, who certainly cannot be accused by railroad men of being inimical to their interests, places the average cost of the railroads of this country no higher than at $30,000 per mile; and this estimate, it should be remembered, includes the value of the large donations made to railroad companies by the public. With a full understanding of all the circumstances, Mr. Poor said of railroad investments several years ago that if the water were taken out of them no class of investments in this country would pay as well. In the face of this statement Mr. Hadley would do well to revise his figures.
We find, however, in Prof. Hadley's book also eminently sound views, like the following: "If the object of a railroad manager is simply to pay as large a dividend as possible for the current year, he can best do it by squeezing his local tariff, of which he is sure, and securing through traffic at the expense of other roads by specially low rates; that is, by a policy of heavy discrimination. But the permanent effect of such a policy is to destroy the local trade, which gives a road its best and surest custom, and to build up a trade which can go by another route whenever it pleases. The permanent effect of such a policy is ruinous to the railroad as well as the local shipper." And he continues: "By securing publicity of management you do much to prevent the permanent interests of the railroads from being sacrificed to temporary ones. By protecting the permanent interests of the public you enlist the stockholders and the best class of railroad managers on the side of sound policy."
Edward Atkinson, in an essay entitled "The Railway, the Farmer and the Public," endeavors to prove that the farmers have no cause for complaining against the railroad, because rates of transportation have been greatly reduced during the past twenty years. Speaking of the reductions made in freight rates in the State of New York, he says: "Had the rate of 1870 been charged on the tariff of 1883 the sum would have been at 1.7016 cents on 9,286,216,628 tons, carried one mile, $158,014,262; the actual charge was $83,464,919, making a difference of $74,549,343 saved on one year's traffic on the lines reported in New York." It either did not occur to Mr. Atkinson, or, if it did occur to him, he failed to mention it, that these freight reductions were forced upon the railroads chiefly by water competition, and that if the railroad companies had not saved these seventy-four million dollars for the people, the canal lines, always subject to competition, would have saved a large part of it. With equal propriety might it be said that the railroads, by meeting canal competition, saved for themselves in the year mentioned a goodly share of their gross earnings. Such reasoning is absurd, and it is high time that the bubble of an argument so often used by railroad advocates be pricked. As Mr. Atkinson has introduced the farmer, let us apply his rule to him. There was a time when the farmer sold his corn for a dollar a bushel. To-day he sells it for thirty cents. He therefore saves to the people of this country, on 2,000,000,000 bushels, the enormous sum of $1,400,000,000. There is scarcely an industry in existence to which this argument does not apply with equal force. Mr. Atkinson virtually admits that railroads charge all the traffic will bear when he says: "The charge which can be put upon the wheat of Dakota or Iowa for moving it to market is fixed by the price at which East Indian wheat can be sold in Market Lane." He is opposed to the Interstate Commerce Law, which he regards as "obnoxious measures of national interference and futile attempts to control this great work." He would rely chiefly upon the publicity of accounts made by railway officers, as secured by the private publication of Poor's Railway Manual, for all needed regulation, but concedes the establishment of a figurehead commission, concluding his remarks upon the subject as follows: "A commission which may bring public opinion to bear upon railway corporations may well be established, and there the work of the legislator may well cease." When we consider the powerful agencies employed by railroads to create public sentiment in their favor we can well understand the inefficiency of such a milk-and-water method of control.
One of the most radical books ever published at the instigation of railroad managers appeared in 1888, under the title "The People and the Railways." Its author is Appleton Morgan, who attempts to "allay the animosity towards the railway interests" as shown in Mr. James F. Hudson's book, "The Railways and the Republic." The means which Mr. Morgan chooses are not well calculated to accomplish his purpose, for the masses of the people prefer in such a controversy arguments to ridicule and sarcasm, weapons of literary warfare to which this author resorts altogether too freely. Mr. Morgan's opinion as to the benefits of centralized wealth and trade combinations differs greatly from that held by the great majority of the American people. He says: "The fact, the truth is, that (however it may be in other countries) the accumulation of wealth and centralization of commerce in great combinations has never, in the United States, been a source of oppression or of poverty to the non-capitalist or wage-worker." There is scarcely an evil in railroad management which Mr. Morgan does not defend. Pools, construction companies, rebates, discriminations and over-capitalization all find favor in Mr. Morgan's eye. "Rebates and discriminations," he says, "are neither peculiar to railways nor dangerous to the 'Republic.' They are as necessary and as harmless to the farmer as is the chromo which the seamstress or the shop girl gets with her quarter-pound of tea from the small tea merchant, and no more dangerous to the latter than are the aforesaid chromos to the small recipients." Pools and combinations receive an unusually large share of Mr. Morgan's attention. A few selections from his effusions in their favor may be given here, viz.:
"These pools are the legitimate and necessary results of the rechartering over and over again of railway companies to transact business between the same points by paralleling each other. So long as the people in their legislatures will thus charter parallel lines serving identical points—thus dividing territory they once granted entire—it is not exactly clear how they can complain if the lines built (by money invested, if not on the good faith of the people, at least in reliance upon an undivided business) combine to save themselves from bankruptcy." And again: "Against the inequality of their own rates and the hardship of the long and short haul (in other words, against the discrimination of nature and of physical laws) no less than against the peril of bankruptcy and the consequent speculative tendency of their stocks (after which may come the wrecking, the watering, and the vast individual fortunes), the railways of this republic have endeavored, by establishment of pool commissions, to defend both the public and themselves.... The honest administration of railways for all interests, the payment of their fixed charges, the solvency of their securities, the faithful and valuable performance of their duties as carriers, can be conserved in but one way—by living tariffs, such as the pools once guaranteed."
In the following passage this author denies to the State the right to regulate rates: "Granting that they [the railroads] must carry freights for the public in such a way as not to injure either the public or the freight in the carrying, most emphatically (it seems to me) it does not follow that they must add to the value of the freights they carry by charging only such rates as the public or the owners of the freight insist on."
But Mr. Morgan's indignation rises to the highest pitch in his discussion of the Interstate Commerce Act. He fears that it will cause the downfall of our liberties and sees in the background the Venetian Bridge of Sighs and the French Bastille. He asks: "Why should for any public reasons—for any reason of public safety—the Interstate Commerce Law have come to stay?" He then berates the act as follows: "To begin with, the present act abounds in punishments for and prohibitions against an industry chartered by the people, but nowhere extends to that industry a morsel of approval or protection. It bristles with penalties, legal, equitable, penal, and as for contempt, against railway companies, but nowhere alludes to any possible case in which a railway company might, by accident, be in the right, and the patron, customer, passenger or shipper in the wrong.... The constitutions of civilized nations, for the last few centuries at least, have provided that not even guilt should be punished except by due process of law, and have uniformly refused to set even that due process in motion except upon a complaint of grievance. But the Interstate Commerce Law denies the one and does away with the necessity for the other. That statute provides that the commission it creates shall proceed 'in such manner and by such means as it shall deem proper,' or 'on its own motion,' and that 'no complaint shall at any time be dismissed because of the absence of direct damage to the complainant.' Even the Venetian council often provided for a certain and described hole in the wall through which the anonymous bringers of charges should thrust their accusations. Even the court of star chamber was known to dismiss inquisitions when it found that no wrong had been done. But the statute of interstate commerce appears to issue lettres de cachet against anything in the shape of a railway company—to scatter them broadcast, and to invite any one who happens to have leisure to fill them out, by inserting the name of a railway company. It says to the bystander: 'Drop us a postal card, or mention to any of our commissioners, or to a mutual friend, the name of any railway company of which you may have heard, and so give us jurisdiction to inquire if that company may have by chance omitted to dot an i or cross a t in its ledgers, or whether any one of its hundreds of thousands of agents—in the rush of a day's business, or in a shipper's hurry to catch a train—may have named a rate not on the schedule then being prepared at headquarters, or charged a sixpence less than some other agent 250 miles down the line may have accepted a week ago for what might turn out to be a fraction more mileage service in the same general direction. No particular form is necessary. Drop in to luncheon with our commission any day between twelve and one, and mention the name of a railway company. The railway company may have done you no damage, nor grieved you in any way; just mention the railroad, and we will take jurisdiction of its private (or quasi-public) affairs. Or, if you don't happen to have time to mention it, we will take jurisdiction anyhow, 'of our own motion,' of any railway company whose name we find in the Official Gazette. It really does not matter which; any one will do." This is a fair example of the literature on the Interstate Commerce Law paid for by railroad men.