Analogies to words that differ only in accent, such as οὖ and οὔ, may be found in differences of pronunciation. "Hair very thick, sir," said a barber to a customer, whose hair was bushy, but beginning to turn grey. "Yes, I daresay. But I would rather have it thick than thin." "Ah, too thick to-day, sir." "But I don't want to dye it." "Excuse me, sir, I mean the hair of the hatmosphere, t-o-d-a-y, to-day."
"He said, saddle me the ass. And they saddled him."
(6) Ambiguity of inflexion (σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, Figura dictionis).
This is not easy to make intelligible in English. The idea is that a termination may be ambiguously interpreted, a neuter participle, e.g., taken for an active. Thus: "George is ailing". "Doing what, did you say? Ailing? What is he ailing? Ginger-aleing?"
Non-Verbal Fallacies, or Fallacies in thought, are a more important division. Aristotle distinguishes seven.
Of these, three are comparatively unimportant and trifling. One of them, known to the Schoolmen as Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum, was peculiar to Interrogative disputation. It is the trick of putting more than one question as one, so that a simple Yes commits the respondent to something implied. "Have you left off beating your father?" If you answer Yes, that implies that you have been in the habit of beating him. "Has the practice of excessive drinking ceased in your part of the country?" Such questions were unfair when the Respondent could answer only Yes or No. The modern disputant who demands a plain answer Yes or No, is sometimes guilty of this trick.
Two others, the fallacies known as A dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, and A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, are as common in modern dialectic as they were in ancient. The trick, conscious or unconscious, consists in getting assent to a statement with a qualification and proceeding to argue as if it had been conceded without qualification, and vice versâ. For example, it being admitted that culture is good, a disputant goes on to argue as if the admission applied to some sort of culture in special, scientific, æsthetic, philosophical or moral. The fallacy was also known as Fallacia Accidentis. Proving that the Syllogism is useless for a certain purpose, and then claiming to have proved that it is useless for any purpose is another example. Getting a limited admission and then extending it indefinitely is perhaps the more common of the two forms. It is common enough to deserve a shorter name.
The Fallacia Consequentis, or Non-Sequitur, which consists specially in ignoring the possibility of a plurality of causes, has already been partly explained in connexion with the Hypothetical Syllogism, and will be explained further in the Logic of Induction.
Post hoc ergo proper hoc is a purely Inductive Fallacy, and will be explained in connexion with the Experimental Methods.
There remain the two typical Deductive Fallacies, Petitio Principii (Surreptitious Assumption) and Ignoratio Elenchi (Irrelevant Argument) about which we must speak more at length.