It was not until about this time—towards nine o'clock—that Teste's Division gained possession of the Village of Bierge; on which occasion General Penne, an Officer of considerable distinction in the French Army, was killed. The French were prevented for some time from debouching from the place, by the determined opposition of the Tirailleurs of the 31st Prussian Regiment, under Major Natzmer.
Thielemann had now done all which could possibly have been expected from any General under similar circumstances—with a force not equal to one half of that of the Enemy, he had endeavoured, whenever an opportunity offered, and in defiance of superior numbers, to force back the French Left Wing upon the Dyle; but now that he had failed in effecting this object, and that Bierge, the key of his position, had been taken from him, whilst the French Left was pressing forward with increased numbers to gain the Brussels road, he saw very plainly that to attempt to maintain his ground any longer would be to expose himself to the imminent risk of total overthrow, and that no other course was left to him but to order a general retreat.
It was about ten o'clock in the morning when the Prussian troops began to retire from the Field. The Town of Wavre had not been attacked on the 19th, and Colonel Zepelin abandoned it without being much pressed upon his line of retreat. Colonel Marwitz was ordered to form the Rear Guard, which was furnished from the 7th and 8th Uhlans, and the 3rd and 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry. It was accompanied by three Batteries of Horse, and one of Foot, Artillery. With these troops Colonel Marwitz took Post, at first, in front of the Brussels road; placing three Batteries on his Left, and the remaining one in Reserve. Thielemann gave the Rear Guard an express Order not to march off until Wavre had been completely evacuated.
In the mean time, Gérard's Corps d'Armée had crossed the Dyle both at Bierge and at Wavre. The two Battalions of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr, which had been posted in the hollow in rear of the Town, for the protection of the twelve pounder Battery, became closely pressed in consequence of this movement. One of the Battalions under Major Schmade had advanced against an Enemy's Column near the Brussels road; when it unexpectedly received the fire of three French Battalions, which were pushing forward under cover of an eminence, and followed by some Cavalry. The Battalion succeeded in reaching the small Wood near La Bavette; and as the Enemy attempted to turn the latter, it suddenly attacked and drove him back, after which it came up with the Rear Guard. The other Battalion, commanded by Major Schwerin, attacked a French Battalion which was advancing against it, threw it back in confusion, and then continued its retreat. The gallantry and steadiness displayed in this affair by the Kurmark Landwehr acquired for the latter great and well merited renown.
The French Cavalry debouched from the Wood of Rixansart and drew up, with its Left resting upon Chambre. Vandamme now advanced the Columns of his Corps towards the Heights of La Bavette, and pushed forward some Cavalry along the high road. The latter, however, was driven back by Colonel Marwitz.
It has been explained that General Borcke, instead of posting his remaining six Battalions in rear of the position at Wavre, as intended by Thielemann, proceeded on his march to Couture, by St Lambert. This place he reached about nightfall, when he despatched an Officer to Blücher to report his arrival. The latter, in reply, desired him to bivouac on the spot where he was, and to await further Orders on the following morning. The Brigade was still in its bivouac at seven o'clock the next morning, when Colonel Stengel passed through St Lambert with his Detachment. The latter informed General Borcke that he had defended the Bridge of Limale, and had been followed by the Enemy's troops.
Borcke, on hearing this, immediately broke up his bivouac, and decided upon securing the Wood which extends from St Rober as far as Rixansart. He deployed two Battalions of the 8th Regiment along the edge of the Wood, and held the remaining four Battalions of his Brigade, then with him, in reserve. Perceiving French Cavalry, at the time of their first attack, marching into the Wood of Rixansart for the purpose of advancing through it upon Chambre; he opened a fire upon them from his Battery, with the hope of checking their movement. The only effect it produced was that of their detaching three Regiments of Cavalry towards his Brigade. These, however, contented themselves with watching his movements. It is curious that the Ninth Brigade, as if bent upon continuing the blunder committed the previous day of detaching itself from its Corps, should not have attempted, with its six Battalions, to effect a more important diversion upon the Enemy's extreme Left, from which it was not more than three thousand paces distant. It was then eight o'clock, and the Battle was maintained until about eleven; and yet General Borcke allowed the three Cavalry Regiments to move off and join the remainder of the French Cavalry, towards ten o'clock, at Chambre, without even attempting to molest their movement.
Thielemann effected his retreat, in several Columns, by Ottenburg and St Achtenrode; at which latter place (about half way to Louvain) he took up a position. The French Cavalry followed as far as the Brussels road, and the Infantry occupied the Heights of La Bavette.
Between Wavre and Louvain the country assumes a new character, being covered with hedges, hollow ways, ditches, and gardens, and is altogether much intersected. From Ottenburg as far as St Achtenrode, there is almost one continued defile. In this, Cavalry cannot act with advantage; and it was therefore fortunate for the Prussian Cavalry that it was followed but slowly by the French.