The loss experienced by Thielemann's Corps d'Armée in this Battle of the 18th and 19th of June, amounted to 2,476 men. No returns whatever of the losses sustained by Grouchy's Army are forthcoming, but they could not have been less than those of the Prussians.
Such was the Battle of Wavre; a Battle the result of which was of no advantage to Napoleon on the 18th, and of positive disadvantage to him on the 19th. On the former day it did not prevent the march of the great mass of the Prussian Army towards the Field of Waterloo; and, on the 19th, the continuance of the contest, while Napoleon was in full flight, exposed this, the only remaining intact, portion of the French Army, to the imminent risk of being completely cut off from all retreat. Nor can this defeat of Thielemann be looked upon as having shed additional lustre upon the French arms, when it is considered how long and successfully the Prussians battled against them with less than half their strength.
The errors which led to the circumstance of the force under Grouchy—constituting, as Napoleon himself has been pleased to term it, the Right Wing of the French Army—becoming exclusively occupied in attacking a single Corps of the Prussian Army; whilst the remaining three Corps of the latter were wending their way unmolested towards the decisive Field of Battle, have already been sufficiently discussed: and now that their result has been fully exhibited, it is scarcely necessary to draw attention to the proof which the latter affords of the entire ignorance of each other's proceedings which characterised the conduct of Napoleon and Grouchy, great Generals as they were, in this memorable Campaign. The former received intelligence, before he began the Battle with Wellington, that the Right Wing was to follow the Prussians to Wavre, and to act in such a manner as to prevent these from detaching towards the Anglo-Allied Army; and therefore felt satisfied that his general plan of operations was in successful progress. But in less than two hours from the commencement of the Battle, the fatal consequence of both Generals having unaccountably neglected to maintain a vigilant reconnaissance and an uninterrupted communication, was made manifest; and the first intimation Napoleon received of the advance of the Prussians towards La Belle Alliance was the distant view which he himself had, from his own Field, of Bülow's Corps descending the Heights of St Lambert, at about one o'clock.
The leading principle of the French Emperor's plan was to endeavour, by all means in his power, to beat the Armies opposed to him in detail. It was therefore incumbent on him, in order to insure the success of that plan, to adopt such precautionary measures as should procure for him the earliest and the clearest information concerning the movements of his Enemies. If he found it necessary temporarily to divide his force, and act upon two lines; those measures became still more indispensable, and at the same time admitted the greater facility of execution. Several reconnoitring parties, both upon the Flanks of the Army and in front of the interval between the two lines of operation, under the guidance of experienced, active and intelligent Officers, would have obtained for both Generals that insight into the movements and designs of their opponents which was so essential for the attainment of their common object: whilst parties detached from each Wing, for the sole purpose of maintaining a close and direct communication between them, would have afforded the ready means of regulating each other's proceedings according to the circumstances under which they might have found themselves respectively placed.
That there should have been so total a disregard of any measure of the kind appears almost incredible; yet such was the fact; and hence it came to pass that the despatch sent to Grouchy, at one o'clock, from the Heights in rear of La Belle Alliance did not reach him until seven in the evening; at which time, as before explained, it was too late to admit of the instructions it conveyed being fulfilled: and hence, also, Grouchy was left battling with his entire force—not less than a third of the whole French Army—against a single incomplete Prussian Corps, under Thielemann, from daybreak until about eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th, when he was first made acquainted with the fact that during the whole of that time the Army under Napoleon, having been most signally defeated and completely scattered on the preceding evening, was flying across the frontier in the wildest confusion.
On receiving this latter intelligence, Grouchy's first idea was to march against the rear of the main body of the Prussian Army: but, calculating that his force was not adequate for such an enterprise, that the victorious Allies might detach to intercept his retreat, and that he should be closely followed by that portion of the Prussians which he had just defeated; he decided on retiring upon Namur, where he would regulate his further operations according to the intelligence he might gain in that quarter concerning the real state of affairs.
Part of France