Thielemann still retained possession of his original position in the Line of Battle; and General Jagow, with several detached Battalions belonging to Zieten's Corps, occupied Bry and its immediate vicinity. From this position the latter General quietly effected his retreat about an hour after midnight, taking the direction of Sombref, and thence proceeding to Gembloux, presuming, in all probability, that the general retreat would be towards the Meuse. It was not until three o'clock in the morning, when the Field of Battle had been completely evacuated by the remainder of the Prussian Army, that Thielemann commenced his retreat, which he conducted slowly, and in perfect order, to Gembloux; near which Bülow's Corps d'Armée (the Fourth) had arrived during the night.
The loss of the Prussian Army on the 15th and 16th of June, amounted in killed and wounded to about 12,000 men: that of the French to between 7,000 and 8,000. But few prisoners were taken on either side.
In consequence of this defeat, Blücher was compelled, in order to maintain and secure his close communication with Wellington, to abandon the line of the Meuse between Namur and Liege; but his orderly and unmolested retreat afforded him sufficient time to remove all his stores and material from these points to Maestricht and Louvain, which now constituted his new base of operations.
It was not, however, a defeat which involved the loss of every advantage previously gained. Blücher was not driven from the Field: but, on the contrary, he maintained it during the night, with the exception of the Villages of Ligny and St Amand in his front; thus facilitating the orderly retreat of his own Army, and, at the same time, affording a considerable degree of security to the direct line of retreat of the Duke of Wellington.
The defeat certainly compelled the latter to retire on the following morning, whatever might have been his success at Quatre Bras; but so long as Blücher had it in his power to fall back in such a manner as to effect his junction the next day with Wellington, the advantage which accrued to the common object of the two Commanders was of the highest importance. They would then unite after the concentration of each Army had been accomplished; hitherto, they had been compelled to meet their opponents before they had succeeded in collecting their respective forces. If, however, Wellington had been unable to maintain his ground against Ney, and Napoleon had in this manner succeeded in beating both Armies in detail; or, if the Prussian defeat had been followed up by a vigorous pursuit, the loss of the Battle of Ligny might have placed both Armies in a critical position.
The struggle at Ligny was undoubtedly of a most desperate and sanguinary character. It was, almost throughout, one continued village fight; a species of contest which, though extremely harassing and destructive to both parties engaged, was that most likely to prove of a long duration, and consequently to afford a better prospect of relief by the promised support from Wellington, or by the hoped-for junction of Bülow.
It remains a question whether Blücher, had he confined himself during the latter part of the action to the same defensive system he had so successfully carried on up to that time, instead of detaching his Reserves to the Right, and preparing for an attack upon the Enemy's Left, might not have fully maintained his original position until dark, and thus have saved his Army from defeat. By the arrival of Bülow's Corps during the night, he would then have been prepared to meet his opponent on the following morning with a greatly preponderating force; whilst, on the other hand, Wellington, having concentrated a considerable portion of his Army, would have been placed in an equally advantageous position as regards the already vanquished Enemy in his own front. When it is considered that along the whole extent of Blücher's line, the French had not gained any material advantage upon one single point, and that the Prussians continued to hold their ground with most exemplary firmness; the circumstance of his not having delayed the collecting of his Reserves, for a grand attack upon the Enemy's Left, until actually joined by either the British or Bülow's troops, can scarcely be explained except by a reference to the peculiar character of the Prussian Chief, whose natural fiery temperament led him, in all probability to seize with avidity the first prospect which opened itself of a favourable opportunity of aiming a deadly thrust at his hated foe, rather than to adhere to that comparatively passive kind of warfare which so ill suited his own individual inclination and disposition.