Napoleon had undoubtedly gained the victory from the moment he succeeded in penetrating the Prussian Centre; but it was not distinguished by that brilliant success, or by those immediate and decisive advantages, which might have been anticipated from the admirable manner in which the attack had been prepared, and the care with which it was concealed from the Prussians, at a moment when they had no Reserve remaining, and when the co-operation of the British on their Right, or the arrival of Bülow's Corps from Hannut, had become quite impracticable. This appears the more surprising when we reflect that he had a considerable Corps of Cavalry under Grouchy at hand to support this attack, and that the whole of Lobau's Corps was in the Field, fully prepared for active operations.

The consequences resulting from the absence of energetic measures on the part of the French Emperor, in following up the defeat of the Prussians, on the evening of the 16th and morning of the 17th, will be fully developed in subsequent Chapters.


[CHAPTER VII.]

THE bivouac on the Field of Quatre Bras, during the night of the 16th, continued undisturbed until about an hour before daylight, when a Cavalry Patrol having accidentally got between the adverse Picquets near Piermont, caused an alarm in that quarter that was quickly communicated to both Armies by a rattling fire of musketry, which, rapidly augmenting, extended itself along the line of the Advanced Posts. Among the first who hastened to ascertain the origin and nature of the engagement was Picton, who, together with other Staff Officers, as they arrived in succession, on discovering that no advance had been attempted or intended on either side, soon succeeded in restoring confidence. Similar exertions were successfully made on the part of the French Officers, and as day began to break upon the scene, both parties resumed their previous tranquillity. In this untoward affair, the Picquets furnished by Kielmansegge's Hanoverian Brigade, and by the 3rd Brunswick Light Battalion were sharply engaged, and a Picquet of the Field Battalion Bremen suffered considerably.

It was not long before Wellington, who had slept at Genappe, arrived at Quatre Bras, where he found Major General Sir Hussey Vivian, whose Brigade of Light Cavalry, consisting of the 10th British Hussars (under Colonel Quentin), of the 18th British Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Henry Murray), and of the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion (under Lieutenant Colonel von Wissell), was posted on the left of that point with two strong Picquets thrown out; one, of the 18th Hussars, under Captain Croker, on the Namur road, and the other, of the 10th Hussars, under Major the Hon. Frederick Howard, in front—with a Picquet from the latter, under Lieutenant Arnold, on the right of the Namur road.

Vivian, on being asked what account he could give of the Enemy, communicated to the Duke the result of his observations, which were necessarily very limited, as, with the exception of the firing that had taken place, as before mentioned, along the line of Picquets, the French had continued perfectly quiet, and had as yet given no indication of any offensive movement.

The Duke then took a general survey of the Field, and while sweeping the horizon with his telescope, he discovered a French Vedette on some rising ground, in the direction of Fleurus, and a little to the right of the high road leading to Namur, apparently belonging to some Picquet thrown out from Ney's extreme Right on the previous night, after the battle had ceased; or to some detached Corps placed in that quarter for the purpose of observation, and for the maintenance of the communication between Napoleon and Ney. The Duke had received no intelligence of Blücher; and, probably, judging from the advanced position of the Vedette in question that whatever might have been the result of the Battle of Ligny, the Prussians could not have made any forward movement likely to endanger Ney's Right, he came to the conclusion that it was quite possible that, on the other hand, Napoleon might have crossed the Namur road, and cut off his communication with Blücher, with the design of manœuvring upon his Left and Rear, and causing him to be simultaneously attacked by Ney. His Grace therefore desired Vivian to send a strong Patrol along the Namur road to gain intelligence respecting the Prussian Army.

A Troop of the 10th Hussars, under Captain Grey, was accordingly despatched on this duty, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Sir Alexander Gordon, one of the Duke's Aides de Camp. As the Patrol advanced along the road, the Vedette before mentioned began to circle, evidently to give notice of the approach of an Enemy, and then retired. This induced the Patrol to move forward with great caution, so as to guard against the possibility of being cut off. Nevertheless it continued, but with all due precaution, advancing along the road, until after passing a few scattered cottages, comprising a hamlet called Petit Marbais, it reached, about a mile and a half further on, some rising ground, about five miles from Quatre Bras, and beyond which was another height. A Vedette was observed posted upon the latter, but who had evidently not yet discovered the approach of Captain Grey's Troop. Down in the intervening hollow was an isolated house, at the door of which stood a dismounted Sentry, and some horses were standing in an adjoining yard.