The views and arguments were of a character similar to those employed by imperial federation leagues since that period—the shorter sea voyage, the fostering of common interests among the provinces, and the desirability of an interchange within the empire of news and correspondence, uncontaminated by passage through a foreign channel.
At that period, the last of these points had a peculiar timeliness. The rebellion in Upper Canada had just been subdued, but the embers were ready to blaze up afresh with the first favouring breeze; while in Lower Canada the outbreak was still unchecked. The fast sailing packets on the New York-Liverpool route so far outsailed the post office packets which ran to Halifax, that the news carried by way of New York was sometimes weeks in advance of that which arrived by the Halifax packets.
As American popular sympathies, as distinct from official sympathy at Washington and Albany, lay mainly with the rebels, and as newspaper publishers were in general less scrupulous as to the veracity of their news than they are to-day, it often happened that the British public, and even the government in Downing Street, were grossly misled as to the movement of events in the Canadas. The truth reached England eventually, but it had the proverbial difficulty in catching up with the nimble fiction, which had earlier circulation.
In September the treasury made its decision.[259] In the early part of that month, the Great Western Steamship Company, which was organized in 1836 for the purpose of providing a steam service between Great Britain and America, and which had been for some months past demonstrating the entire feasibility of this class of service, applied to the government for a contract for the conveyance of the mails to New York.
But the plea of Howe and Crane for a direct service prevailed. On September 24 the treasury announced the substitution of steam vessels for the sailing packets on the Halifax route, and directed that tenders should be invited for such a service as the admiralty and post office considered most suitable.
The treasury deprecated the haste with which the plans were being pushed forward, suggesting that a winter's experience would be valuable in dealing with so important a matter. But there were strong reasons for avoiding unnecessary delay. Relations with the United States were causing some anxiety, and as regards transatlantic correspondence, that country stood in a position of advantage, which it seemed the business of Great Britain to equalize as far as possible.
Tenders were invited for a steam packet service between Liverpool and Halifax in November. But none of those submitted satisfied the conditions prescribed by the government. Samuel Cunard, of Halifax, who had had a large experience as a contractor for packet services, visited England, and as the result of negotiations, entered into a contract with the admiralty.
The contract called for two trips monthly each way between Liverpool and Halifax, and for trips of the same frequency between Halifax and Boston, and between Pictou on the gulf of St. Lawrence and Quebec: the vessels to be employed to be of three hundred horse power for the transatlantic service, and of one hundred and fifty horse power for the other two routes. The contract was signed on May 4, 1839, the rate of payment being £55,000 a year.
This rate underwent a rapid series of augmentations. Two months after the contract was made £5000 a year was added to the rate on consideration that the vessels should leave the American ports, as well as Liverpool, on fixed dates. On September 1, 1841, the decision was reached that vessels of a larger size than in the service should be employed, and to secure these the rate was raised to £80,000.
Two years later, in consequence of representations by the contractors that the amount of payment was insufficient to enable them to carry on the service, £10,000 was added to the subsidy; and further additions were made as the result of changes in the arrangements, which will be detailed in their proper place.