History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present time

by William Whewell

To these questions I answer, by distinguishing between Art, and Science in that sense of general Inductive Systematic Truth, which it bears in this work. To separate and compare, with precision, these two processes, belongs to the Philosophy of Induction; and the attempt must be reserved for another place: but the leading differences are sufficiently obvious. Art is practical, Science is speculative: the former is seen in doing; the latter rests in the contemplation of what is known. The Art of the builder appears in his edifice, though he may never have meditated on the abstract propositions on which its stability and strength depends. The Science of the mathematical mechanician consists in his seeing that, under certain conditions, bodies must sustain each other’s pressure, though he may never have applied his knowledge in a single case.

Now the remark which I have to make is this:—in all cases the Arts are prior to the related Sciences. Art is the parent, not the progeny, of Science; the realization of principles in practice forms part of the prelude, as well as of the sequel, of theoretical discovery. And thus the inventions of the middle ages, which have been above enumerated, though at the present day they may be portions of our sciences, are no evidence that the sciences then existed; but only that [241] those powers of practical observation and practical skill were at work, which prepare the way for theoretical views and scientific discoveries.

It may be urged, that the great works of art do virtually take for granted principles of science; and that, therefore, it is unreasonable to deny science to great artists. It may be said, that the grand structures of Cologne, or Amiens, or Canterbury, could not have been erected without a profound knowledge of mechanical principles.

To this we reply, that such knowledge is manifestly not of the nature of that which we call science. If the beautiful and skilful structures of the middle ages prove that mechanics then existed as a science, mechanics must have existed as a science also among the builders of the Cyclopean walls of Greece and Italy, or of our own Stonehenge; for the masses which are there piled on each other, could not be raised without considerable mechanical skill. But we may go much further. The actions of every man who raises and balances weights, or walks along a pole, take for granted the laws of equilibrium; and even animals constantly avail themselves of such principles. Are these, then, acquainted with mechanics as a science? Again, if actions which are performed by taking advantage of mechanical properties prove a knowledge of the science of mechanics, they must also be allowed to prove a knowledge of the science of geometry, when they proceed on geometrical properties. But the most familiar actions of men and animals proceed upon geometrical truths. The Epicureans held, as Proclus informs us, that even asses knew that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third. And animals may truly be said to have a practical knowledge of this truth; but they have not, therefore, a science of geometry. And in like manner among men, if we consider the matter strictly, a practical assumption of a principle does not imply a speculative knowledge of it.

We may, in another way also, show how inadmissible are the works of the Master Artists of the middle ages into the series of events which mark the advance of Science. The following maxim is applicable to a history, such as we are here endeavoring to write. We are employed in tracing the progress of such general principles as constitute each of the sciences which we are reviewing; and no facts or subordinate truths belong to our scheme, except so far as they tend to or are included in these higher principles; nor are they important to us, any further than as they prove such principles. Now with regard to processes of art like those which we have referred to, namely, the inventions of the middle ages, let us ask, what principle each of them [242] illustrates? What chemical doctrine rests for its support on the phenomena of gunpowder, or glass, or steel? What new harmonical truth was illustrated in the Gregorian chant? What mechanical principle unknown to Archimedes was displayed in the printing-press? The practical value and use, the ingenuity and skill of these inventions is not questioned; but what is their place in the history of speculative knowledge? Even in those cases in which they enter into such a history, how minute a figure do they make! how great is the contrast between their practical and theoretical importance! They may in their operation have changed the face of the world; but in the history of the principles of the sciences to which they belong, they may be omitted without being missed.

As to that part of the objection which was stated by asking, why, if the arts of our age prove its scientific eminence, the arts of the middle ages should not be received as proof of theirs; we must reply to it, by giving up some of the pretensions which are often put forwards on behalf of the science of our times. The perfection of the mechanical and other arts among us proves the advanced condition of our sciences, only in so far as these arts have been perfected by the application of some great scientific truth, with a clear insight into its nature. The greatest improvement of the steam-engine was due to the steady apprehension of an atmological doctrine by Watt; but what distinct theoretical principle is illustrated by the beautiful manufactures of porcelain, or steel, or glass? A chemical view of these compounds, which would explain the conditions of success and failure in their manufacture, would be of great value in art; and it would also be a novelty in chemical theory; so little is the present condition of those processes a triumph of science, shedding intellectual glory on our age. And the same might be said of many, or of most, of the processes of the arts as now practised.

2. Arabian Science.—Having, I trust, established the view I have stated, respecting the relation of Art and Science, we shall be able very rapidly to dispose of a number of subjects which otherwise might seem to require a detailed notice. Though this distinction has been recognized by others, it has hardly been rigorously adhered to, in consequence of the indistinct notion of science which has commonly prevailed. Thus Gibbon, in speaking of the knowledge of the period now under our notice, says,[88] “Much useful experience had been acquired in [243] the practice of arts and manufactures; but the science of chemistry owes its origin and improvement to the industry of the Saracens. They,” he adds, “first invented and named the alembic for the purposes of distillation, analyzed the substances of the three kingdoms of nature, tried the distinction and affinities of alkalies and acids, and converted the poisonous minerals into soft and salutary medicines.” The formation and realization of the notions of analysis and of affinity, were important steps in chemical science, which, as I shall hereafter endeavor to show, it remained for the chemists of Europe to make at a much later period. If the Arabians had done this, they might with justice have been called the authors of the science of chemistry; but no doctrines can be adduced from their works which give them any title to this eminent distinction. Their claims are dissipated at once by the application of the maxim above stated. What analysis of theirs tended to establish any received principle of chemistry? What true doctrine concerning the differences and affinities of acids and alkalies did they teach? We need not wonder if Gibbon, whose views of the boundaries of scientific chemistry were probably very wide and indistinct, could include the arts of the Arabians within its domain; but they cannot pass the frontier of science if philosophically defined, and steadily guarded.

[88] Decline and Fall, vol. x. p. 43.

The judgment which we are thus led to form respecting the chemical knowledge of the middle ages, and of the Arabians in particular, may serve to measure the condition of science in other departments; for chemistry has justly been considered one of their strongest points. In botany, anatomy, zoology, optics, acoustics, we have still the same observations to make, that the steps in science which, in the order of progress, next followed what the Greeks had done, were left for the Europeans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The merits and advances of the Arabian philosophers in astronomy and pure mathematics, we have already described.

3. Experimental Philosophy of the Arabians.—The estimate to which we have thus been led, of the scientific merits of the learned men of the middle ages, is much less exalted than that which has been formed by many writers; and, among the rest, by some of our own time. But I am persuaded that any attempt to answer the questions just asked, will expose the untenable nature of the higher claims which have been advanced in favor of the Arabians. We can deliver no just decision, except we will consent to use the terms of science in a strict and precise sense: and if we do this, we shall find little, either in the [244] particular discoveries or general processes of the Arabians, which is important in the history of the Inductive Sciences.[89]