Sultan Selim, a prince naturally timid and credulous, no sooner heard a message of this sort delivered in the name of the Janissaries, then in good understanding with the chiefs of government, and apparently united with the troops of the Nisam-y-gedid[[34]], than he ordered all communications with the English fleet to be suspended, and immediate preparations of defence to be made, in the event of its commencing hostilities.
This manœuvre, unknown at the time, and with which very few persons are yet acquainted, was the true cause of the failure of the negotiations which, at the commencement, bore so sure a prospect of success.
The fleet returned without even having made a show of hostile intentions, and left to the triumphant French party the most decided influence in the Seraglio.
Before we enter into further observations on the events which followed, it may not be amiss to make a few remarks on the character of those who were then at the head of the Turkish administration, as it is to them that the whole change of system of the Porte is to be attributed.
Haffiz-Ismaïl Pashah, Grand Vezier, appointed early in 1805, was a low-bred, ignorant man, so poor and thirsty after money, that the moment he was elevated to his station, he formed the plan of operating a change in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, although the time prescribed by the treaties was not yet near, with a view of getting a subsidy, and securing to himself an income which the candidates, who took no small advantage of the Vezier’s inexperience and selfish views, had promised to allow him when the appointment should have taken place.
Ibraïm-Aga, Kiaya-Béÿ, or minister of the interior, a man of little experience and great ambition, under the idea of ingratiating himself with his master, and rendering, as he thought, a signal service to the state, undertook the affair of protections which he treated in a manner so insulting and provoking, that it was impossible for any foreign power, jealous of its own dignity, to suffer it to remain unnoticed.
The Mufti, Sheriff-Zaadé-Attaa-Effendi, and the chief of the Janissaries, Pehlivan-Mehmet Aga, were entirely devoted to the French party. They willingly seconded the adoption of any measures which tended to alienate the Porte from England and Russia, and appeared calculated to promote Buonaparte’s scheme of overthrowing the triple alliance.
Galib Reïs-Effendi, minister of foreign affairs, and Yussuf-Aga, Validay-Kiayassi or chancellor to the Emperor’s mother, were the only two men in power friendly to the common cause. They disapproved of the measures pursued, but their opinion was over-ruled, and they both thought it prudent to retire from business, in order to screen themselves from responsibility with respect to the consequences they foresaw.
The military operations on the Danube be between the Russians and the Turks, which followed the first acts of hostility, were not more successful with regard to the object that brought them on, than the threats of the English fleet.
The peace of Tilsit took place; and the Porte, which had reason to expect an effective interference on the part of Buonaparte in behalf of its differences with Russia, gained no other advantage than the conclusion of a long armistice, the first condition of which was the retreat of the Russian armies from the principalities, whence, however, they did not remove. Negotiations for peace were, notwithstanding, set on foot; and the great revolutions, which overthrew the Sultan Selim, and consigned him to death, finally established a new order of things at Constantinople, and operated a complete change in the political system of the Turkish cabinet. The Porte remained no longer blind to the equivocal conduct of Buonaparte since his reconciliation with Russia, and began to look upon its state of hostility with England not only as useless, but even injurious to the interests of the country.