In 1808, an English[[35]]plenipotentiary had been for the second time[[36]] sent to treat at the Dardanelles, and peace was definitively signed in the month of December of the same year.
At the same time the Turkish plenipotentiaries, sent to Bukorest during the armistice, were endeavouring to adjust the differences with Russia; but the interview of the Emperor Alexander with Buonaparte took place at Erfurth, and the failure of their joint proposals to the court of London[[37]] was followed by instructions to Prince Prosoroffsky, commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in Moldavia and Wallachia, to signify to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries that, as the Emperor Alexander had acceded to the Continental System, the chief object of which was a continual state of warfare with England, he could no longer enter upon terms of peace with Turkey, unless the English ambassador, lately admitted at Constantinople, were sent out of the Ottoman dominions.
The Turkish ministers expressed astonishment at the versatility of the court of Russia, which, having made the first overtures for a negotiation, had not then in any manner alluded to England; they demanded time, however, for the arrival of instructions which were necessary to regulate their official reply to a communication so unexpected. They dispatched a messenger to Constantinople for that purpose, and he was accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Prince Prosoroffsky, Colonel Bock, who, on his arrival, signified to the Porte the Emperor’s ultimatum, through the channel of the French minister Latour Maubourg.
The Ottoman government, without much hesitation, recalled the Turkish plenipotentiaries from the congress of Bukorest, and hostilities were renewed.
A plan of partition had been formed at Erfurth between the emperors Alexander and Napoleon, by which the Turkish provinces were to fall to the share of Russia, and Spain to that of France. It was after this understanding between the two sovereigns that overtures were made to England. The English negotiation took time, and before it came to a decided issue, Buonaparte declared to his senate that the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were annexed to the dominions of his friend and ally the Emperor Alexander. When, however, Buonaparte found England determined to treat upon no basis which did not expressly admit of the evacuation of Spain, and that by entering into such terms he left a decided advantage to Russia with respect to Turkey, without reaping any benefit to himself from the political bargain made at Erfurth, he changed his views. The continental system, which he endeavoured to justify in attributing the general calamities of Europe to a tyrannical perseverance in war on the part of England, furnished him with a sufficient pretext for engaging Russia to continue her war against Turkey, who had just entered into terms of friendship with England. On the other hand, he prevailed upon the Turkish government to insist on the restitution of the principalities occupied by the Russian armies, and to continue hostilities so long as the Russian court should withhold its consent to that measure. His desire of keeping these two powers at variance with each other could not but increase when he had subsequently formed the plan of invading Russia, who, molested on one side by the Turks, and on the other by the Persians, was thus forced to employ considerable armies on distant frontiers.
The exhausted state of Turkey, the mediation of England, and the impatience of Russia, who was pressed by the hostile preparations of France, evidently intended against her, hastened the conclusion of peace in 1812 between the Mussulman powers and the Russians; but, critical as the circumstances were, the Court of St. Petersburgh signed a most advantageous treaty with both.
Galib Effendi, who, since the great changes of government at Constantinople, had resumed the functions of minister of foreign affairs, was chief plenipotentiary at the congress of Bukorest in 1811 and 1812; but the Greek prince Demetrius Mourousi, who, in his quality of state-interpreter, was present at the negotiations, conducted the greatest part of them, and was indeed intrusted with extensive power. He had, with his two brothers, been invariably attached to the Russian party since the beginning of his public career, and his hopes of being appointed to one of the principalities, the greatest objects of his ambition, after the restoration of peace, appeared grounded upon the best foundation. His office, his services at the congress, and the support of the court of Russia, were, in fact, considerations which appeared to render his nomination certain.
The cession of Wallachia and Moldavia could not, therefore, by any means, suit his views, and he combated it with energy and success; but, in rendering so important a service to the Porte, some proof of attachment to Russia was also necessary on his part; and although by insisting on the entire restitution of the principalities, no doubt but the Russian plenipotentiaries, who were instructed to hasten the conclusion of peace upon any terms not beyond that restitution, would have consented without hesitation, Mourousi, who was aware of it, finally settled the conditions by ceding to Russia the finest part of Moldavia, that which is situated between the rivers Dniester and Pruth, thus fixing the future line of demarcation of the Russian frontiers by the direction of the latter river.
The vigilant agents of Buonaparte at Constantinople did not suffer the conduct of Mourousi to remain unnoticed. When, after the signing of the treaty, they saw themselves frustrated in the hope of inducing the Porte to continue the war, they sought to bring the Mourousi family into disgrace, that they might, at least, prevail upon the Ottoman government to place at the head of the principalities persons of their own choosing. They represented the Prince Demetrius as a traitor who had been bribed by the Russians to serve their interests, at a time when it was in his power to obtain the most advantageous terms of peace.
Meanwhile hostilities commenced between France and Russia, and the Porte having evinced a resolution of remaining neutral, unwilling to give umbrage to either of the contending powers in the choice of the new Hospodars, resolved to fix upon two individuals whose political principles had never been connected with foreign parties. A great number of candidates offered their services, but none of them being qualified for the appointments, their claims were rejected. Halett-Effendi, intimate counsellor of the sultan, was instructed to make a choice, and he fixed it on the prince Charles Callimacki[[38]] for Moldavia, and Yanco Caradja for Wallachia. Halett-Effendi had been several years before Turkish secretary to Callimacki’s father, whilst at the head of the Moldavian government, and on terms of intimate friendship with Caradja, who had also a subaltern employment under the same prince. Being perfectly acquainted with the personal character of both, he recommended them to the sultan as the fittest persons in those circumstances, and they were appointed in August 1812.