GEN. THOMAS' BIVOUAC AFTER THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.
"Upon an inspection of the map, you will observe these are all divergent lines, but rendered necessary, from the fact that our enemies choose them as places of refuge from pursuit, where they can receive assistance from neighboring States. Our lines are all too weak, probably with the exception of that of Prestonburg. To strengthen these, I am thrown on the raw levies of Ohio and Indiana, who arrive in detachments, perfectly fresh from the country, and loaded down with baggage, also upon the Kentuckians, who are slowly forming regiments all over the State, at points remote from danger, and whom it will be almost impossible to assemble together. The organization of this latter force is, by the laws of Kentucky, under the control of a military board of citizens, at the capital, Frankfort, and they think they will be enabled to have fifteen regiments toward the middle of this month, but I doubt it, and deem it unsafe to rely on them. There are four regiments forming in the neighborhood of Owensboro', near the mouth of Green River, who are doing good service, also in the neighborhood of Campbellsville, but it is unsafe to rely on troops so suddenly armed and equipped. They are not yet clothed or uniformed. I know well you will think our force too widely distributed, but we are forced to it by the attitude of our enemies, whose force and numbers the country never has and probably never will comprehend.
"I am told that my estimate of troops needed for this line, viz., two hundred thousand, has been construed to my prejudice, and therefore leave it for the future. This is the great centre on which our enemies can concentrate whatever force is not employed elsewhere."
Two days later Sherman wrote again:
"General McClellan telegraphs me to report to him daily the situation of affairs here. The country is so large that it is impossible to give clear and definite views. Our enemies have a terrible advantage in the fact that in our midst, in our camps, and along our avenues of travel, they have active partisans, farmers and business-men, who seemingly pursue their usual calling, but are in fact spies. They report all our movements and strength, while we can procure information only by circuitous and unreliable means. I inclose you the copy of an intercepted letter, which is but the type of others. Many men from every part of the State are now enrolled under Buckner—have gone to him—while ours have to be raised in neighborhoods, and cannot be called together except at long notice. These volunteers are being organized under the laws of the State, and the 10th of November is fixed for the time of consolidating them into companies and regiments. Many of them are armed by the United States as home guards, and many by General Anderson and myself, because of the necessity of being armed to guard their camps against internal enemies. Should we be overwhelmed, they would scatter, and their arms and clothing will go to the enemy, furnishing the very material they so much need. We should have here a very large force, sufficient to give confidence to the Union men of the ability to do what should be done—possess ourselves of all the State. But all see and feel we are brought to a standstill, and this produces doubt and alarm. With our present force it would be simple madness to cross Green River, and yet hesitation may be as fatal. In like manner the other columns are in peril, not so much in front as rear, the railroads over which our stores must pass being exposed. I have the Nashville Railroad guarded by three regiments, yet it is far from being safe; and, the moment actual hostilities commence, these roads will be interrupted, and we will be in a dilemma. To meet this in part I have put a cargo of provisions at the mouth of Salt River, guarded by two regiments. All these detachments weaken the main force, and endanger the whole. Do not conclude, as before, that I exaggerate the facts. They are as stated, and the future looks as dark as possible. It would be better if some man of sanguine mind were here, for I am forced to order according to my convictions."
Distrust of Sherman increased at the War Department. Whether or not he was really considered insane, the Government hesitated to intrust to him the command of the increased forces it was presently to place in Kentucky. Accordingly, on November 12th, Sherman was relieved from command and was sent to the Missouri, to drill and organize volunteers. His successor in command at Louisville was General Don Carlos Buell. The extraordinary extent to which the rumors of his mental unsoundness were carried, may be appreciated after perusal of the following passage, which occurred in an editorial in The Cincinnati Commercial—a paper supposed to be friendly to Sherman—early in December, 1861:
"The painful intelligence reaches us in such form that we are not at liberty to discredit it, that General W. T. Sherman, late Commander of the Department of the Cumberland is insane! It appears that he was at times, when commanding in Kentucky, stark mad. We learn that he at one time telegraphed to the War Department three times in one day for permission to evacuate Kentucky and retreat into Indiana. He also, on several occasions, frightened the leading Union men of Louisville almost out of their wits by the most astounding representations of the overwhelming force of Buckner, and the assertion that Louisville could not be defended. The retreat from Cumberland Gap was one of his mad freaks. When relieved from the command in Kentucky, he was sent to Missouri and placed at the head of a brigade at Sedalia, where the shocking fact that he was a madman was developed by orders that his subordinates knew to be preposterous and refused to obey. He has, of course, been relieved altogether from command. The harsh criticisms which have been lavished upon this gentleman, provoked by his strange conduct, will now give way to feelings of the deepest sympathy for him in his great calamity. It seems providential that the country has not to mourn the loss of an army through the loss of the mind of a General into whose hands were committed the vast responsibilities of the command in Kentucky."
This article in The Commercial was based on information furnished by a Washington correspondent of that paper. Sherman received a copy of the paper containing the editorial while he was with his family at Lancaster. He read it carefully, threw down the paper, and exclaimed nervously, "Well, now, I shouldn't be surprised if they fastened that on me. It's the hardest thing in the world for a man to prove himself sane when many people think him insane." His family and friends did not take the matter so calmly. They attributed the article to General McClellan, and would never be persuaded that he did not inspire it. As a matter of fact, McClellan's confidential adviser, Colonel Key, had actually been sent out to see Sherman and to report on his mental condition, and had reported that, in his opinion, Sherman was not sufficiently master of his judgment to warrant the intrusting to him of an important military command.
It will be of interest to quote at this point from a letter which was written some months afterward by General Halleck, referring to the current reports of Sherman's madness.
"The newspaper attacks are certainly shameless and scandalous, but I cannot agree with you, that they have us in their power 'to destroy us as they please.' I certainly get my share of abuse, but it will not disturb me."