Among those who stood by Sherman firmly was Grant, who had from the first unbounded faith in him; a feeling which Sherman fully reciprocated. It is told that, late in the war, some one sought to win Sherman's favor by speaking disparagingly of Grant. "It won't do, sir," said Sherman. "It won't do at all. Grant is a great general, he stood by me when they said I was crazy, and I stood by him when they said he was drunk, and now, by thunder, sir, we stand by each other."

Halleck treated Sherman kindly during the months of his career in Missouri, but the popular clamor against him continued. After camp inspection work at Sedalia and service at Benton Barracks, St. Louis, Sherman was sent to Paducah, Kentucky, to command the post there. This was on February 13th, 1862. At about this time Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were captured, and Bowling Green was evacuated by the Rebels. It is interesting to recall that one day, just before these great events, Sherman, Halleck and other officers were discussing at St. Louis the general plan of the campaign. The question arose, "Where is the Rebel line?" It was indicated as passing through Bowling Green, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Columbus. Halleck asked, "Where should it be broken by our forces?" "In the centre," replied Sherman promptly. Then Halleck pointed out that the line of the Tennessee River cut the centre of the Rebel line, and that there would properly be the point of attack. As Grant conducted the Donelson campaign under Halleck's orders, Sherman always felt that Halleck was to be credited with the strategy; but certainly the execution of it was due to Grant.


[CHAPTER IX.]
SHILOH.

The Gloomy Winter of 1861–2—Exultation over Donelson—The Advance up the Tennessee—Responsibility for the Encampment at Pittsburgh Landing—Controversies over the Battle—Varying Accounts—Sherman's Personal Heroism—Number of Troops Engaged on Both Sides—Services of the Army of the Ohio—Losses of the two Armies.

The winter of 1861–62 was a time of gloom and depression to the Union. Vast armies were in the field, and the wealth of the Government was being poured out most lavishly for their support. Yet they remained chiefly inert, while the active and energetic Southern leaders strengthened the position of the Rebel hosts and promoted the claims of the Rebel cause upon the sympathetic interest of the world. A few small bodies of Union troops encountered the enemy here and there, with results not cheering to the Nation. And there was throughout the North such a feeling of discouragement and gloom as only those who personally experienced it can fully realize.

The eyes of the Government and of the Nation were chiefly fixed upon McClellan, the "Young Napoleon," from whom great things were expected. But they were to be gladdened not by the glory of his achievements, but by a sunburst of victory from another quarter, from that very central western region which, according to Sherman's bitter complaints, had hitherto been so much neglected. The news of the triumphs of Grant and Foote at Forts Donelson and Henry, in February, 1862, literally thrilled the heart of the Nation. For the first time Northern valor was grandly vindicated, and for the first time since Bull Run, a cheerful confidence in the victory of the Union cause prevailed. "Unconditional Surrender" Grant became the hero of the hour, and his terse message to Buckner, "I propose to move immediately upon your works," was exultingly re-echoed from Maine to California. Even the stern War Secretary, Stanton, who had succeeded Cameron, was moved to enthusiastic expressions of joy.

This campaign on the Tennessee, for the conception and direction of which Sherman should doubtless be largely credited, was, however, merely the beginning of incomparably greater operations, in which Sherman himself played a most important part. After the fall of Donelson, Grant incurred the displeasure of Halleck and was removed from the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and General Charles F. Smith, who had distinguished himself greatly at Donelson, was appointed to take his place. Smith accordingly directed the forward movement of the victorious army, southward, up the Tennessee River, but presently fell sick, at Savannah, Tennessee, and a few weeks later died. Thus Grant was restored to his command, and thenceforth was responsible for the conduct of the campaign.

Who was responsible for the encampment of the army at Pittsburgh Landing, however, has been a matter of dispute. To place the army there, instead of on the other side of the river, has been criticised as a serious error. Grant's friends have sought to free him from blame by saying that the choice was made by Smith, while Grant was in disgrace and practically under arrest. As Smith was dead when this statement was made, he could not reply to it. Grant himself made no effort to exculpate himself at Smith's expense. He has left it on record that when he was restored to his command, on March 13th, he found his army partly at Savannah, on the northeast bank, and partly at Pittsburgh Landing, on the southwest bank, nine miles apart. He at once moved them all to the latter place, but personally remained at Savannah, awaiting the arrival of Buell, who was to join him there with his Army of the Ohio. Lew. Wallace was with his division at Crump's Landing, on the southwest bank, five miles below Pittsburgh Landing, where he had been placed by Smith and where Grant was well satisfied to let him remain. By this acceptance of the place selected by Smith, Grant practically approved it; and by remaining there for three weeks, until the battle was fought, he made himself entirely responsible for the whole situation, a responsibility which he never sought to evade.