Life of Wm. Tecumseh Sherman. / Late Retired General. U. S. A.

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

Concerning the arrangement and management of the Federal army during the three weeks before the battle, there have been voluminous and bitter controversies. Sherman was in a measure responsible for whatever was done, or left undone, since he was at Pittsburgh Landing all the time, while Grant spent half of his time at Savannah; and Sherman was the adviser of McClernand, who was the actual senior. The Rebels were known to be massed in force at Corinth, only a score of miles away, under their ablest and bravest commanders. Sherman himself had been, before the rendezvous was made at Pittsburgh Landing, sent out to cut the communication between the two points, to prevent a sudden advance of the enemy. In this he had not been successful. The errand was then accomplished by W. H. L. Wallace, but the damage done was quickly repaired by the Rebels and the line of approach restored. With such danger of attack staring them in the face, the troops made no elaborate preparations for defence. General Buell and other critics have charged them with the most astounding and culpable negligence. The army, according to Buell, had no line or order of battle, although it was on the enemy's ground and the enemy was confronting it in force; it had no defensive works of any sort; no outposts, properly speaking, to give warning of or to check the advance of an enemy; and no recognized head in the absence of its Commander, who spent half his time nine miles away. And so, continues this drastic critic, the enemy advanced upon it and formed in line of battle only a mile and a half away without being checked or even observed; and the actual attack was a complete and overwhelming surprise to the Union army. In this view the Rebel commander, General Beauregard, coincides, characterizing the attack as "one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved."

Grant made no detailed reply to these charges, merely saying, as to the lack of fortifications, that at that time the pick and spade were little used in the Western armies, and that he considered drill and discipline of more value than mere earthworks. Sherman himself thought very highly of the Pittsburgh Landing site, as of great strategic importance and as easy of defence. At a later period of the war, he says, the place might in one night have been rendered impregnable. That it was not fortified, he freely admits; and he adds that it was probably well that it was not thus fortified. It was next to impossible to move raw troops from fortified lines in such offensive work as that contemplated by Grant and Sherman. The story of a surprise, he indignantly repudiates, from first to last.

As this volume is not written for purposes of controversy, no discussion of these points will be indulged in here. The two sides of the case will be presented to the reader, and he may draw his own conclusions, if he has not already done so. Whatever that verdict may be, it cannot seriously affect the transcendent fame of Sherman.

Grant was superseded, as we have seen, by C. F. Smith, on March 4th, 1862. At this time Sherman was busy at Paducah, sending out boats and organizing troops, which he hoped soon to be allowed to lead in the field. The movement up the river was now begun, and on March 10th, Sherman, to his great satisfaction, was ordered to join it. He at once embarked with his four brigades, and proceeded to Fort Henry, where he reported to Smith, and was ordered to wait near by for the remainder of the army. A day or two later, he was sent on, escorted by two gunboats, to cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad between Tuscumbia and Corinth. On his way up the river he was impressed with the importance of Pittsburgh Landing, and sent back word to Smith that it ought to be occupied. He landed at the mouth of the Yellow River, and tried to reach the railroad and destroy it. But the country was flooded, and an advance was impossible; so he returned. Smith sent him back to take possession of Pittsburgh Landing, along with General Hurlbut, and told him to make room there for the whole army.

Sherman occupied Pittsburgh Landing on March 16th, and immediately marched inland about ten miles to a cross-road hamlet called Monterey, or Pea Ridge, where he learned that the enemy were gathering in force at Corinth. His idea was to take the offensive. To throw up fortifications would, he thought, make the raw recruits more timid. Presently other divisions came up, until the bulk of the army was at the landing.

Pittsburgh Landing, then, was an insignificant settlement of two or three cabins on the Tennessee River, near the mouth of Snake Creek. The country there is rolling, almost hilly. The table-land comes boldly up to the river, forming abrupt bluffs along the water-edge. At that time the country was well wooded and thinly populated. A couple of miles back from the Landing was a little log meeting-house, called Shiloh Church, and from this the place has become popularly known as the battleground of Shiloh. It was at such a place as this that the Union army of 32,000 or 33,000 men lay, awaiting the enemy's attack, although Sherman was anxious to attack the enemy instead.

About the first of April, the Rebel cavalry began skirmishing and raiding along the front of the Union camp, and on April 4th actually captured a number of pickets. That was Friday. On Saturday nothing of importance occurred, though skirmishing was continued, and the sounds of battle were heard at Savannah, where Grant lay abed, injured by the fall of his horse. The weather was wet, the roads miry. Sunday morning there was more skirmishing, then the whole Rebel army came through the woods with a rush, and one of the greatest battles of the war had begun.

Accounts of this tremendous conflict vary greatly. In the succeeding chapters will be found Sherman's own official report, giving his version, and also that of The Cincinnati Gazette's correspondent, which presents most forcibly the other view—that of the surprise. But upon one point all the numerous narratives are agreed, and that is, Sherman's personal valor in the battle, and his consummate ability in rallying and leading his men in action. Grant was on the field on Sunday, going from division to division, to encourage the commanders; but he "never deemed it important to stay long with Sherman." Sherman held the most critical position, and his troops had never been under fire before. But his constant presence inspired them with such courage that the most of them stood and fought like veterans of a long campaign. Sherman was shot twice, once in the hand and once in the shoulder, and a third bullet passed through his hat; and several horses were shot under him. But nothing made him waver for a moment. To him, the post of danger was the post of honor.

The severest critic of Sherman's management at Shiloh, was General Buell. Yet he frankly says of Sherman that, when he met him on that very field, he appeared a frank, brave soldier, ready without affectation or bravado to do anything that duty required of him.

When the battle began on Sunday morning there were about 33,000 Federal troops at Pittsburgh Landing, and on the evening of that day General Lew. Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing with some 5,000 more. But as many men fled from the field, panic-stricken, without firing a shot, it is not likely that on that day there were at any time more that 25,000 men in line. This is Grant's estimate. The next day, Buell came up with the Army of the Ohio, 20,000 strong. And then, there were the two gunboats, the Tyler and Lexington, which rendered valuable service.