Reports of the strength of the Rebel force vary. According to General Beauregard, it contained more than 40,000 men on the first day of the battle, although, he says, he was not able to get more than 20,000 into action on the morning of the second day. Official records state that the effective Rebel forces, at the beginning of the battle, included 35,953 infantry and artillery and 4,382 cavalry, a total of 40,335. From these figures it is apparent that the two armies were, on the first day, by no means equally matched, the Rebels having a preponderance of about 7,000 men, while on the second day the Union army was numerically by far the stronger.
The Union loss in the two days' fighting was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 captured or missing; total, 13,047. Of these, Buell's Army of the Ohio lost 241 killed, 1,807 wounded and 55 captured or missing; total, 2,103. The official report of Rebel losses was 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing; total, 10,699. This, Grant says, cannot be correct, for the Union troops after the battle buried, by actual count, more Rebel dead than thus reported in front of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions alone. The estimate of the Union burial parties was that fully 4,000 Rebel dead lay on the whole field.
[CHAPTER X.]
OFFICIAL REPORTS ON SHILOH.
Sherman's Own Story—How his Troops were Posted—The Attack—Troops in Disorder—Grant and Buell at the Bivouac—The Battle Resumed in the Morning—Death of General Johnston—Gallant Conduct of Individual Officers—Grant's Official Report—Special Mention of Sherman for his Gallantry as a Soldier and his Skill as a Commander.
Few battles have been more discussed, or more vigorously discussed, than that of Shiloh, or Pittsburgh Landing. In these often acrimonious controversies, Sherman himself took a leading part. It is doubtful if an agreement as to the facts in the case can ever be reached; certainly the flood of argument, narration and abuse that has been poured forth has not materially tended toward such a settlement. The chief point at issue is, whether or not the Federal officers, especially Sherman, were surprised by the enemy. That they were, and that they were not, have both been stated and restated with every possible accumulation of emphasis. Perhaps it will best serve the present purpose to rehearse here, side by side, two narratives of the battle, both written at the time and on the spot, the one giving, in his own language, Sherman's account of the battle, the other the account written by one of the ablest newspaper correspondents in the war.
The gist of Sherman's own report, addressed to Captain Rawlins, Grant's Assistant Adjutant-General, was as follows:
"I had the honor to report that on Friday, the 4th instant, the enemy's cavalry drove in our pickets, posted about a mile and a half in advance of my centre, on the main Corinth road, capturing one First Lieutenant and seven men; that I caused a pursuit by the cavalry of my division, driving them back about five miles, and killing many. On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming down to our front; yet I did not believe he designed anything but a strong demonstration. On Sunday morning, early, the 6th instant, the enemy drove our advance guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms all my division, and sent word to General McClernand, asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him notice that the enemy was in our front in force, and to General Hurlbut, asking him to support General Prentiss. At this time, 7 A. M., my division was arranged as follows:
"First Brigade, composed of the Sixth Iowa, Colonel J. A. McDowell; Fortieth Illinois, Colonel Hicks; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel Worthington; and the Morton Battery, Captain Behr, on the extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road, over Owl Creek.