The History of Cuba, vol. 1

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

Gomez de Rojas, a member of the illustrious family whose members played so great a part in early Cuban history, was at that time the deputy of the Governor in that part of the Island, making his headquarters at Bayamo. A few days before this attack on Santiago he and his men had killed seven Frenchmen and captured ten more under the lead of a notorious freebooter. The heads of the seven he displayed on pikes at Bayamo, and on the very day when the two French vessels reached Santiago he hanged eight of the ten prisoners. It is recorded that the trial of these men was not yet concluded. But Rojas grimly observed that the trial could be finished after the hanging just as well as before, as there could be no doubt as to what the verdict and the sentence would be. For this ruthless proceeding the Bishop, Salcedo, reprimanded and indeed excommunicated Rojas, and there was danger that thus disastrous dissension would arise among the Spaniards. But Rojas, who seems to have been a diplomat as well as a soldier and administrator, contrived to make peace with the Bishop, and all was well.

Of such unity there was sore need. For a few days later a squadron of seven French ships, carrying 800 soldiers, appeared off Santiago. To meet them Santiago, with all possible aid from Bayamo and the country around could number less than 100 men, some say not more than 70, indifferently armed and with only a few pounds of gunpowder. For several days the French vessels lay off Santiago, frequently firing upon the town at a range at which their own cannon were effective but at which the Spaniards, with far inferior guns and little ammunition, were quite helpless. However, the French made no attempt at landing, a circumstance which for a time puzzled the Spaniards. Then came the explanation. While their fleet lay directly before Santiago the French had put 150 men ashore at Zuragua, and these were advancing upon Santiago over land. As soon as this was known a little force of 20 Spaniards and 10 Indians was sent out to meet them, with only two or three rounds of ammunition to each man. They met in unequal battle and the Spaniards lost five men. But they killed twenty Frenchmen before they were completely exhausted and were compelled to surrender. Another detachment of thirty Spaniards kept up a good fight at the landing place in Santiago until their ammunition was exhausted and then they retreated to the hills. The French fire from the ships destroyed more than half the town, and the troops who were then landed demolished most of the remaining buildings. Then a hasty retreat was made, presumably through fear of the rumored approach of the powerful Spanish fleet, which unfortunately did not materialize.

Gomez de Rojas had been at Bayamo when this attack began. As soon as he heard of it he hastened on horseback to Santiago, but arrived in time only to see the last French sail vanish in the distance. Had he been there it is not certain that he could have saved the town. Indeed it is probable that he could not have done so. But it is certain that he saved it after the event. So completely had Santiago been demolished by the French that many of the people were determined not to attempt to rebuild but to abandon the place and go elsewhere. A council of war was held on May 25, at a country house a league inland from the ruined city, at which all the officials and most of the citizens of Santiago were present. Rojas was, fortunately, the presiding officer. The military commander, Captain Camacho, told of what had happened and what the condition of the place was. It had no military strength. There was not a pound of powder or shot left. The few pieces of artillery which had not been captured or destroyed were concealed in the woods, but were of course useless without ammunition. Fewer than a score of houses were standing. The cathedral and the monastery had been destroyed, though the hospital and a church had received little damage. There was, he believed, nothing left to serve as the nucleus of a rebuilt town.

Much discussion followed his report. Some were resolute for rebuilding the place, which they regarded rightly as the birthplace of the Spanish settlement of Cuba. Others were equally bent on abandoning it altogether and migrating to Havana or elsewhere. Opinions were so evenly divided that it was finally agreed to suspend decision until one other leading citizen, who was absent from the meeting, could be heard from, with the understanding that his vote should be decisive.

Then it was that Gomez de Rojas rose to the height of the occasion. He ascertained secretly that this missing citizen was in favor of abandoning Santiago and would so declare himself. Determined to forestall and to prevent such a decision and thus to save the town, Rojas immediately ordered the clergy to celebrate mass next morning. He ordered the town authorities to put all the remaining buildings in order for occupancy and to repair those which had been damaged. He ordered every man in town to appear at the church that morning, ready for any action which might be needed. He ordered the Town Council to meet as usual the next day. He ordered the market to be opened at once, and artisans to get to work and the Indians to burn the bodies of the Frenchmen who had been killed in battle, and in brief he ordered everybody in Santiago to get to work to rehabilitate the town. The sheer energy of this one strong man carried the day, and Santiago arose from its ruins larger and more important than ever before, though it was never again to be the capital of all Cuba. Havana had already for several years been practically, though without full authority, the capital of the Island. The formal and authoritative change was made a few years later, in 1589.

During the administration of Governor Luzan there was some renewed interest in copper mining in Cuba, although the wealth of the island in that metal was not yet appreciated. In 1580 what was supposed to be an immensely rich mine was discovered, but it proved to be a mere "pocket" of limited extent. That disappointment, together with the cost of transportation from the neighborhood of Santiago to Havana for shipment, discouraged further efforts for a time. But in May, 1587, after inspection of the Cobre mine, near Santiago, the Governor reported to the Spanish government: "There is so much metal, and the mines are so numerous, that they could supply the world with copper." Comparatively little was done, however, until 1599, when effective work was begun at El Cobre. The ore was conveyed to Havana for smelting and casting, and on the site of the present Maestranza Building there was established a foundry where copper was cast into both cannon and kettles.

CHAPTER XXII

It is an interesting circumstance that what threatened to be a great disaster to Cuba proved in fact to be one of the greatest blessings that the Island had enjoyed since the Spanish settlement. We have already seen how great an alarm was caused at Havana and throughout Cuba by the threatened attack of the British under Sir Francis Drake and how fine a degree of public spirit and unity among all classes was thereby inspired. The threatened attack did not occur, and it was many years before an actual British conquest or even invasion of the Island was effected. But the lessons learned in that period of agitation and after were not speedily forgotten, either in Cuba or in Spain. Therefore, a much larger degree of public spirit and of unity prevailed in the Island, among the Government officers and among the people, while the Spanish crown was awakened to a fuller realization than ever before of the value of Cuba and the imperative necessity of defending the Island if the integrity of the Spanish Empire in the Western Hemisphere was to be maintained. It was then that Philip II began to appreciate Cuba as the bulwark of the West Indies and of the City of Havana, its capital, as the key to the New World. Hitherto Cuba had been nothing but a stepping stone between Spain on the one hand and Mexico, Darien and Florida on the other; and Havana was merely a convenient base of operations and a port of call. But now the immense strategical importance of Havana was realized, while the value of the Island, in its products of copper, wood, sugar, hides and other commodities, was appreciated.

Governor Luzan administered the affairs of Cuba until the end of March, 1589. On that day he was succeeded by Juan de Tejada, a Field Marshal of the Spanish Army. He was selected by the King chiefly because of his military experience and knowledge, and he was the first of the line of governors of Cuba to be known as Captain-General. In him were merged both the civil and the military authority of the Island, so that there would no longer be any such friction as had prevailed between Luzan and Quiñones. Tejada was speedily commissioned by the King to make plans for the fortification of Cuba and also of the other important islands of the Spanish West Indies. He was accordingly accompanied on his coming to Cuba by one of the most distinguished Italian engineers of that age, Juan Bautista Antonelli. Together they surveyed the port of Havana, the port of San Juan in Porto Rico, and that of Carthagena in Colombia and planned powerful defenses for them all. There fortifications were in fact constructed under the direction of Antonelli and to this day bear impressive testimony to his skill.

His first attention was paid, most properly, to Havana. Already there had been constructed temporary fortifications at La Punta and El Morro, and also a camp more of observation than of defense at San Lazaro Cove, probably where the Queen's battery stood in later years. Both Captain-General Tejada and Antonelli were quick to see the importance of the Punta and Morro fortifications and to approve those headlands as the sites of the most powerful fortifications of Havana. Plans were accordingly made for extensive masonry forts at both those places, and these were approved and very prompt execution ordered by the King. Funds for the work were obtained from Mexico, from which source also appropriations were received for the maintenance of La Fuerza with its garrison of 300 men.