The History of Cuba, vol. 3

by Willis Fletcher Johnson

MIGUEL DE ALDAMA

A man of letters and of great wealth and social leadership, Miguel de Aldama was a native of Havana and one of the foremost citizens of that capital when the Ten Years' War began. He at once placed his fortune and himself at the disposal of his country, and was appointed by President Cespedes to be Agent of the Cuban Republic in New York. To that place he was reappointed by President Cisneros Betancourt. He served in that capacity throughout the war, to the great advantage of the patriot cause.

Meanwhile, reports of the cruelties of Spanish soldiers began to penetrate the ears of American citizens. It was reported, and pretty well authenticated, that disgusting atrocities were the order of the day, when the Spanish troops found in their path anyone, male or female, who was not in a position to resist them. There were stories of the raping of little children before the eyes of their mothers, and of mothers in the presence of their children, of the crucifixion, and hanging by the thumbs of old men, and even of able bodied persons, who happened to fall defenseless into the hands of the Spaniards. Tales of barbarity to prisoners, even to the extent of roasting them alive, fired the rage of justice-loving American citizens, and again touched the kind heart of their President. To these reports were added others, less revolting, but touching the commercial sense of the nation. American property in Cuba was being destroyed, and American citizens were being molested and restrained from the peaceful pursuit of their business. American commerce was impeded and losses were suffered. It was recalled that Spain had been prompt to recognize the Confederacy as a belligerent power, and it seemed but the irony of justice, and a fair sort of retaliation, that now the United States should give recognition to those who were rebelling against Spain's misrule. But Fish was deaf to all pleas in behalf of the Cubans, and resolutely blocked all attempts to secure recognition for them. He argued and pleaded with the President with such eloquence that presently he seemed to have him convinced that the cause of freedom in Cuba was not yet worthy of the recognition of the United States. In consequence, in his annual message, in December, 1869, President Grant, less than four months after his unpublished proclamation of recognition, declared that "the contest has at no time assumed the conditions which amount to a war in the sense of international war, or which would show the existence of a political organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency." He added that "the principle is to be maintained, however, that this nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of belligerency either to a people struggling to free themselves from a government they believed to be oppressive, or to independent nations at war with each other."

It is needless to say that this position was a great disappointment to the Cubans, and seemed to them utterly at variance with what they might have expected from a nation so lately torn by Civil War, and which had shown such keen individual sympathies with the cause of the freedom of Cuba. However, from that time on, the United States, officially, at least, showed the greatest patience—a patience which seemed almost unbelievably enduring—toward the hardships which the Spanish authorities put upon innocent Americans, and was indefatigably zealous in its efforts to prevent violations of neutrality on the part of sympathetic United States citizens. That there was some bitterness in the hearts of the Cuban leaders, who felt they had a right to expect the support of their sister republic, and a country which had against such odds won her own independence, it is easy to believe, and there were many who felt that this was a righteous indignation.

But during the months in which the Secretary of State and the somewhat unwilling President of the United States were shaping this policy, the war in Cuba was continuously waged. On March 7, 1869, a few days after the Cubans addressed their petition to the United States government, the Spanish attacked a strong Cuban position at Macaca, and were successful in ousting the revolutionists. This disheartening occurrence was followed by defeats for the Cubans, first at Mayari, where Spanish forces under General Valcosta were victorious over a small army of which General Cespedes was in command—General Cespedes, however, effecting a withdrawal with safety to his own person and a part of his supporters—and again at Jiguani, where it was the Cubans who made the attack upon a Spanish force under General Valmaseda, only to meet defeat at the hands of the Spaniards, and to be forced to flee in disorder to their mountain fastnesses.

Meanwhile reinforcements came from Spain; this time as before, not a large number, being only about twelve hundred men, but enough materially to aid the governmental army, and to strengthen its morale. The Captain-General also endeavored to win the hearts of the timid by issuing a proclamation which declared important concessions in tax regulations. A fifty per cent reduction was made in the direct taxation on plantations, on cattle and on country real estate, as well as in those taxes only recently levied on merchants and tradesmen. As a crowning concession the taxes due for the last quarter of the year 1868-1869 were nullified. But it was apparently impossible for Spain to make concessions without accompanying them with demands of some sort to offset her seeming generosity. Therefore the Captain-General took occasion to levy some new duties: On muscovado sugar, if shipped under the flag of Spain, a tax of 16¢ a hundred weight, while shipment under a foreign flag called for an additional 4¢ duty; on boxed sugar shipped under the Spanish flag, a tax of 75¢ a box, while if under a foreign flag, 12¢ additional; on every hogshead of sugar shipped under the flag of Spain a tax of $1, and if under a foreign flag, 75¢ additional; a tax on molasses of 50¢ a hogshead, and on rum of $1 for an equal quantity.

It will be recalled that the Cuban patriots had by their proclamation of December 27, 1868, granted freedom to all slaves on the island. They now began a campaign to enforce this decree by removing, from all plantations of which their armies were able to take possession, the slaves for service in the Cuban army, and to make their liberation doubly sure, burning the buildings, and laying waste to the crops. In the districts around Sagua and Remedios there were nine thousand insurgents engaged in this work. This action it would be hard to excuse, if there were not taken into consideration the fact that the Cubans had endured such grievous wrongs at the hands of the Spaniards that they would have been much less than human if they had not had some desire to retaliate; and, after all, the retaliation which spoke most forcefully to the Spaniard was that which attacked his worldly goods and his pocketbook.

But to offset these actions, the Spanish at the same time proved themselves victorious in several engagements. On March 18, at Alvarez, they defeated the Cuban forces; at about the same time, at Guaracabuya, they won another victory, with Cuban losses numbering one hundred and thirty-six killed outright; and two thousand Cubans, under Generals Morales and Villamil, were routed by the Spaniards at Potrerillo. In this last affair the patriots suffered severe losses; three hundred wounded, two hundred and five killed, and twenty-one taken prisoners, together with many horses killed or captured. They were also obliged to retreat in such haste that they had to abandon a considerable quantity of ammunition, which was seized by the enemy. It is only necessary to add that the Spanish lost but one officer, one private and one of their number taken prisoner, to demonstrate the disheartening nature of the encounter. But the Cubans were, as has been stated, drafting large quantities of slaves into their army, and this victory for the Spaniards was a signal proof that the slaves were not good material for soldiers. Besides this, the patriots who took part in this engagement suffered severely a lack of proper equipment.

The tide seemed to be turning against the Cubans, and in the days that followed they were to face still further losses. The quality of the recruits which were being added to the patriot army did not increase its valor, skill or morale. They lacked guns, and those which they had were of antiquated pattern; there was a woeful scarcity of larger arms and ammunition, and the troops were weary and poorly fed. Against that portion of the Cuban army stationed in the Villa Clara district the Spanish now began to concentrate a large army, pouring troops into that district until they were ten thousand strong. The Cubans were outnumbered, and lacked the weapons of warfare, they had been outmanoeuvred, and suffered tremendous losses, and yet another crushing defeat lay before them, for on March 20, two thousand Cubans who were, as they fondly believed, strongly entrenched at Placitas, were put to flight by a small body of Spanish troops, highly skilled and well armed it is true, but numbering only three hundred regulars and a small company of the much feared Volunteers.

Emboldened by these successes, the Captain-General again shifted his position, and issued an order, to be made the excuse for an outrage against American shipping, which was severely to tax the friendliness of international relations. The Spanish government was ever haunted by the bugbear of American intervention, and doubtless the decree in question was issued as a preventive against such action, for the Spanish well knew that should such intervention once take place their cause would be irrevocably lost, and with it their dominion over Cuba. The decree provided for the confiscation on the high seas of any and all vessels carrying either men, arms or ammunition or all three, or indeed anything which might be construed as intended for material aid to the revolutionists, and further provided that "all persons captured on such vessels without regard to their number will be immediately executed." Viewed in the calm light of history this decree would seem bound, if enforced, to be almost suicidal to the Spanish interests, being in opposition to law and justice, and in express violation of existing treaty obligations between Spain and the United States, and thus bound to bring a storm of protest from the United States government.